Carrigan, Committee, v. Davis

• Decision Date: 16 September 1919
• Citation: 84 W.Va. 473
• Parties: Carrigan, Committee, v. Davis
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court

84 W.Va. 473

Carrigan, Committee,

v.Davis

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted September 9, 1919.

Decided September 16, 1919.

1. Deeds Capacity to Make Deed.

A person is mentally competent to make a conveyance of land if he knows the nature, character and effect of his deed. (p. 475).

2. Same Burden of Proof Fraud.

The presumption of law is in favor of the sanity and mental capacity of a grantor, and the person attacking his conveyance on the ground of his incapacity, or the exertion of undue influence over him in inducing him to make the deed, bears the burden of proof. One who charges fraud and undue influence must prove it. (p. 475).

3. Infants Loan to Infant Batification by Conveyance Consideration. '

An infant's contracts are not void, but voidable at his election, and money loaned to an infant, whether to supply himself with necessities or not, is good consideration for a conveyance of land made after he attains his majority. (p. 475).

Appeal from Circuit Court, Marshall County. Action by Charles E. Carrigan, committee, against William Davis. Decree for plaintiff and defendant appeals.

"Reversed, and bill dismissed.

J. Howard Holt, for appellant.

Everett F. Moore, and J. B. Allison, for appellee.

Everett P. Moore and J. B. Allison for Appellee relied on the following propositions and authorities in support thereof:

Whenever there exists between parties confidence on the one hand and influence on the other, from whatsoever cause they may spring, equity requires in all dealings between them the highest degree of a good faith on the part of him in whom the confidence is reposed. If a conveyance was executed in his favor the burden rests upon him of proving that it was not procured by means of such confidence and influence. It is his duty before accepting it to see that the Grantor has disinterested advice. McClure v. Lewis, 72 Mo. 314; Revett v. Harvey, 1 Sim. & St. 502; Allore v. Jewell, 94 U. S. 506, 24 L. E. 260. This rule is not limited to those well reorganized cases of confidence such as guardian and ward, attorney and client, &c, but the rule extends to all cases where the relation of confidence exists. Huguenin v. Basley, 14 Vesey 273; Dent v. Bennett, 4 My. & Cr. 269; McCormick v. Malin, 5 Black (Ind.) 509; Taylor v.. Taylor, 8 How. 83; Dingman v. Romine, 141 Mo. 475; Moore v. Moore, 56 Cal. 89; Hall v. Knappenberger, 97 Mo. 571; Tracy v. Locket, 1 Oh. St. 58; Whitethorn v. Hines, 1 Munf. 557; Wilson v. Oldham, 12 B. Mon. (Ky.) 55; Pomeroy Eq. Jur. (3rd ed.) Vol. 2, par. 947 and cases in note 3 Where persons from mental weakness are likely to be influenced by others, transactions entered into by such persons without independent advice will be set aside if there is any unfairness in them. Harris v. Walmsey, 41 Iowa 671; Allore v. Jewell, supra? Kilgore v. Cross, 1 Fed. 578; Williams v. Williams, 63 Md. 371. In Ridgeway v. Herbert, (Mo.) 73 Am. St. Rep. 464, where an infant was dissipated and a spendthrift, and the purchaser a much older man, the court said, "that the plaintiff knew before hand how the money would be dissipated and that the law would not justify that sort of dealing and deeds so obtained will be set aside." The same rule is recognized in Schuttler v. Brandfass, 41 W. Va. 207, though applied to a different state of facts.

Williams, Judge:

Defendant William Davis has appealed from two decrees of the circuit court of Marshall county, pronounced on the 20th of June, 1916, and the 28th of February, 1917, respectively, avoiding a conveyance to him of a tract of land by William G. Bole, made the 9th of October, 1913, the day Bole became twenty-one years of age. He was an only child and heir at law of his mother, from whom he inherited the land. His mother died about the year 1902, and his father about the year 1909. James D. Burley was appointed his guardian in 1902, and continued as such until he reached his majority, and the boy resided with his father until the latter's death. By means of a friendly suit the guardian sold the coal under the land, described by metes and bounds and as containing 69 acres and 125 poles. The fund derived therefrom, amounting to $662.92, went mto the guardian's hands. The expectation of coming into possession of this fund, when he should become of age, enabled the boy to obtain credit from a number of people, on his promise that he would then pay them. There was an oil and gas lease on the land, and the rentals in lieu of drilling amounted to $120.00 per year. In his final settlement, apparently not yet approved by the court, the guardian charges himself with $390.00 derived from this source, thus showing a sum in his hands to the credit of his ward, at the time he became of age, of $671.25. On the 17th of January, 1914, on the order of his ward, the guardian turned over to C. A. Showacre, his attorney, the balance of this fund, after crediting himself with certain disbursements on his ward's account. The sum turned over to his ward's attorney is $286.79. These facts are significant in considering the weight of evidence concerning Bole's alleged imbecility and incapacity, and whether the charge, that Davis exerted an undue influence over him and fradulently induced him to convey his land to him, is sustained.

In the spring of 1913 Bole married a woman much older than himself, by the name of Stella Patterson, and began housekeeping with her on his little farm. Soon thereafter he separated from her, charging her with adultery; and, being well acquainted with defendant Davis, he disclosed to him his domestic troubles. Thereupon Davis advised him he had good grounds for a divorce from his wife. Bole then consulted an attorney who advised him that, as he had continued to cohabitate with his wife after he knew of her guilty conduct, he thereby condoned the offense, and could not obtain a divorce. This happened before he was of age. On the 21st of July, 1914, about nine months after he became of age, Charles E. Carrigan was appointed a committee for him on motion therefor made by his wife Stella, to whom apparently he had shortly before become reconciled, and this suit was instituted by his committee on the 24th of the following August. The presumption of law is that, at the time Bole made the deed, he was sane, and his committee has the burden of proving otherwise. Buckey v. Buckey, 38 W. Va. 168; Delaplain v. Grubb, 44 W. Va. 612; and Eakin v. Hawkins, 52 W. Va. 124. Bole understood and appreciated the nature, character and effect of the transaction, and that shows he had sufficient mental capacity to satisfy the rule of law. "Eccentricity of manner and mental weakness of the grantor which does not amount to imbecility are not sufficient to overthrow a deed in the absence of proof of fraud in its procurement." Black v. Post, 67 W. Va. 253.

Plaintiff prays that the deed be canceled on two grounds: First, that his ward was non compos mentis and incapable of understanding such a transaction; and, second, that defendant exerted an undue influence over his ward, and induced him to make the deed by fraudulent and improper means. The depositions in the case make a voluminous record, over seven hundred pages. It is an unnecessary task which can serve no useful purpose to review in this opinion the conflicting testimony. Many witnesses have testified respecting Bole's mental capacity, and their opinions are diametrically opposed to one another. Two or three physicians and very many lay witnesses for the plaintiff swear, in their opinions, that he was not mentally capable of transacting business. But the doctors who so testified made no particular examination of him, and only a few plaintiff's other witnesses had had personal transactions or dealings with him, and their opinions were based on general impressions received from conversations with the boy and from neighborhood rumors. On the other hand, many witnesses for defendant testified that he was as capable of understanding and appreciating the nature of a transaction as anyone else. Dr. C. A. Wingerter, the only expert witness, a specialist in mental and nervous diseases with an experience of eight years or more, saw Bole on three occasions, and on two of them made a careful examination of him with a view of ascertaining whether he had any mental disease or was in any way abnormal. He examined him for two hours on each occasion, and his opinion is that he had the capacity to understand the nature, character and effect of business transactions, and that he was normal. The late distinguished juage below, whose written opinion in the case is copied in brief of counsel for appellee, held that mental incompetency was not shown. On the contrary, he says: "That brought to face a transaction he understands the act and what it means. He is not destitute of intelligence but he is without judgment. '' However, the court annulled the deed on the ground that Davis had induced Bole to make it by fraudulent means and undue influences exerted over him. But we hardly think this conclusion is justified by the weight of the evidence. Before he became of age, Bole induced many persons to extend him credit on his promise of paying them out of the funds in the hands of his guardian, when he became of age. He thereby deceived almost everyone who is shown to have had any dealings with him. He made many such promises and kept none of them. Such conduct may indicate moral obliquity, but it certainly does not tend to prove mental incapacity. Concerning his dealings with Davis, he and Davis are the most important witnesses, and as to the important transactions, the only witnesses. Bole first applied to Davis for money sometime in March, 1913, telling him he was in need of clothing. Davis then let him have about ten dollars, and continued to advance sums of money to him after that time, varying in amounts, until sometime in the month of October, 1913, on the faith of Bole's promise to pay him out of the fund in his guardian's...