Carrigg v. Cannon, 3384.
Citation | 347 S.C. 75,552 S.E.2d 767 |
Decision Date | 10 September 2001 |
Docket Number | No. 3384.,3384. |
Parties | Margaret T. CARRIGG and Marilyn T. Schmitt, as Personal Representatives of the Estate of Katherine T. Reese, Respondents, v. Al CANNON in his Official Capacity as Sheriff of Charleston County, South Carolina, Appellant. |
Court | Court of Appeals of South Carolina |
Stephen Bucher, of The Bucher Firm, of Charleston, for appellant.
Gedney M. Howe, III, of Charleston; and H. Stanley Feldman, of N. Charleston, for respondents.
This wrongful death action arises from the death of Katherine T. Reese after her vehicle was struck by a patrol car driven by a Charleston County sheriffs deputy. Margaret T. Carrigg and Marilyn T. Schmitt (Respondents), as personal representatives of Reese's estate, brought this action against Sheriff Al Cannon pursuant to the South Carolina Tort Claims Act, South Carolina Code Annotated §§ 15-78-10 to -200 (Supp.2000) (SCTCA). The circuit court granted Respondents' motion for partial summary judgment, holding Cannon was collaterally and judicially estopped from disputing liability based on the deputy's guilty plea to reckless driving and his statements about the accident. We reverse and remand.
On February 10, 1998, Reese was pulling onto Highway 171 from Southgate Drive when her vehicle was struck by a patrol car traveling north on Highway 171 and driven by Deputy Kenneth Heider. The intersection was controlled by a stop sign on Southgate Drive. Heider, who was on his way to a hearing, admitted he was speeding at the time of the accident and did not have his blue light activated. Reese died at the scene.
Heider was indicted for reckless homicide and pled guilty in August 1998 to the reduced charge of reckless driving. Shortly thereafter, Respondents commenced this wrongful death action against Cannon in his official capacity as Sheriff of Charleston County.
Respondents moved for partial summary judgment, arguing Cannon was collaterally and judicially estopped from disputing liability based on Heider's guilty plea to reckless driving and his statement during the plea proceeding that he accepted "full responsibility" for the accident. Cannon countered by arguing collateral and judicial estoppel were inapplicable in this case and there remained unresolved issues of fact to be determined. Cannon argued Reese's own negligence contributed to the accident because her impaired eyesight from macular degeneration prevented her from seeing Heider's vehicle and resulted in her failing to yield the right of way.
The circuit court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Respondents as to liability. The court found Cannon was in privity with Heider, who was acting in the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident. Therefore, the court reasoned, collateral and judicial estoppel prevented Cannon from disputing Heider's "reckless conduct was the proximate cause of [Reese's] injury and death[.]" The court concluded Cannon was liable to Respondents "for damages in such amount as the Court or Jury may hereafter determine." Cannon appeals.
Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(c), SCRCP; see also Tupper v. Dorchester County, 326 S.C. 318, 325, 487 S.E.2d 187, 191 (1997)
(. ) In determining whether any triable issues of fact exist, the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. Summer v. Carpenter, 328 S.C. 36, 42, 492 S.E.2d 55, 58 (1997).
Cannon contends the circuit court erred in finding the doctrines of collateral and judicial estoppel barred him from disputing liability based on the court's erroneous assumption that Cannon was in privity with Heider. We agree.
481 S.E.2d at 709 ( ).
Only a party to a prior action or one in privity with a party to a prior action can be precluded from relitigating an issue on the basis of offensive collateral estoppel.1 Ex parte Allstate Ins. Co., 339 S.C. 202, 206, 528 S.E.2d 679, 681 (Ct.App.2000); Wade v. Berkeley County, 330 S.C. 311, 317, 498 S.E.2d 684, 687 (Ct.App.1998) ().
"`[T]he term "privity," when applied to a judgment or decree, means one so identified in interest with another that he represents the same legal right.'" Allstate, 339 S.C. at 207, 528 S.E.2d at 681 (quoting Roberts v. Recovery Bureau, Inc., 316 S.C. 492, 496, 450 S.E.2d 616, 619 (Ct.App. 1994)). As the Wade court explained:
Privity deals with a person's relationship to the subject matter of the previous litigation, not to the relationships between entities. To be in privity, a party's legal interests must have been litigated in the prior proceeding. Having an interest in the same question or in proving or disproving the same set of facts does not establish privity. Nor is privity found when the litigated question might affect a person's liability as a judicial precedent in a subsequent action.
330 S.C. at 317, 498 S.E.2d at 687 (citations omitted). Due process concerns prohibit estopping litigants who never had a chance to present their evidence and arguments on a claim, despite one or more existing adjudications of the identical issue which stand squarely against their position. Richburg, 290 S.C. at 434-35, 351 S.E.2d at 166.
Even where all the elements for collateral estoppel are met, it will not be rigidly or mechanically applied, and the application of the doctrine may be precluded where unfairness or injustice results, or public policy requires it. State v. Bacote, 331 S.C. 328, 331, 503 S.E.2d 161, 163 (1998) ( ).
The circuit court found Cannon and Heider, as sheriff and deputy, were in privity because Heider was acting within the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident. The circuit court also noted "Heider, in privity with [Cannon], had a full opportunity in the criminal proceeding to have pled not guilty and have a jury determine whether his driving, which undisputedly resulted in the death of [Reese], was reckless." Respondents argue that since the underlying action is premised on the SCTCA, Cannon, as the agency or political subdivision for which Heider was acting at the time of the accident, is liable for the tortious conduct of his deputy, "making privity between the employee and the agency/political subdivision inescapable."
The circuit court and Respondents both incorrectly analyze the question of privity by focusing on Cannon and Heider's relationship. For purposes of collateral estoppel, privity turns on Cannon's relationship to the subject matter litigated in the prior proceeding, not Cannon and Heider's relationship to each other. Although Respondents assert privity is established since they would have to bring a claim against Cannon in his official capacity under the SCTCA instead of directly suing Heider, this statutory requirement sheds no light on the issue of privity. To be in privity, Cannon's legal interests must have been represented or litigated during Heider's criminal proceeding and, clearly, this was not the case. Cannon's legal interest in the civil action stands in sharp contrast to Heider's legal interest in the criminal case. Moreover, as a representative of law enforcement, Cannon's interest during the guilty plea proceeding would be more aligned with the prosecution than with Heider, as an indicted defendant, thereby creating a potential conflict of interest for Cannon that would foreclose a finding of privity in a subsequent lawsuit. See 50 C.J.S. Judgment § 830 (1997) ...
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