Carroll v. City of Quincy, Civil Action No. 03-10317-NMG.

• Decision Date: 09 June 2006
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 03-10317-NMG.
• Parties: Timothy CARROLL, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF QUINCY et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

441 F.Supp.2d 215

Timothy CARROLL, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF QUINCY et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 03-10317-NMG.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

June 9, 2006.

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Jessica Diane Hedges, Michael L. Tumposky, Stephen B. Hrones, Hrones Garrity and Hedges LLP, Boston, MA, for Plaintiff.

Audrey E. Cosgrove, Office of the City Solicitor, Monica E. Conyngham, City of Quincy—Solicitor's Office, William F. Sullivan, Sullivan and Associates, Rebecca L. Andrews, Murphy, Hesse, Toomey & Lehane, LLP, Quincy, MA, Richard C. Bardi, Michael P. Judge, Law Office of Richard C. Bardi, Robert M. Delahunt, Jr., William P. Breen, Jr., Eckert Seamans Cherin & Mellott, LLC, Boston, MA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

GORTON, District Judge.

Plaintiff Timothy Carroll ("Carroll") brings suit against the City of Quincy ("the City"), and Quincy police officers John Keenan ("Keenan"), Richard Bergeron ("Bergeron"), William Horick ("Horick") and Michael Kelly ("Kelly") (collectively "the defendants") alleging negligence and violations of his federal and state civil rights. Defendants move for summary judgment.

I. Factual Background

On January 13, 1995, at 2:10 a.m., Carroll and an accomplice named Sweeney were arrested by Horick and Kelly for assault and battery and kidnapping. The officers placed Carroll in handcuffs and into the police cruiser for transport to the Quincy police station. During the course of the arrest, Carroll was unsteady on his feet and had difficulty walking without assistance. The officers could smell alcohol on Carroll's breath and believed he was intoxicated.

Sergeant Richard Bergeron was the desk sergeant at the Quincy police station that early morning. Because another arrestee was being booked when Horick and Kelly arrived at the station with Carroll, plaintiff was placed in a holding area while he waited to be booked. When Carroll was placed in the holding area, his hands were handcuffed behind his back. There was one other arrestee, Robert McCambly, in the holding area at that time.

Soon thereafter, Officers Keenan and Stephen O'Brien ("O'Brien") opened the holding area door and ordered Carroll to come out to be booked. No sooner had the officers called for Carroll when plaintiff suddenly and quickly fell backwards and hit his head during his attempt to exit the holding area of his own volition. Keenan and an EMT rendered medical assistance to Carroll while Bergeron called an ambulance, which arrived in less than five minutes and transported him first to Quincy Hospital and then to Boston City Hospital to receive medical treatment for his injuries. It was later determined at the hospital that Carroll had a blood alcohol content of 0.37. Carroll allegedly sustained serious injuries including a subdural hematoma, traumatic brain injury, depressive illness and seizure disorder.

On January 13, 1998, the last day before the statute of limitations ran, Carroll filed suit against the City of Quincy in Norfolk Superior Court for negligence and for civil rights violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The complaint was dismissed by the Superior Court on April 27, 1998, due to Carroll's failure to make service of process on the City. On October 9, 2002, Carroll, through new counsel, moved the state court to reinstate his complaint against the City. The motion was allowed on November 15, 2002. In January, 2003, Carroll filed an amended complaint which, for the first time, asserted claims against the officer defendants in addition to the City. The amended complaint states four Counts. Count I states a claim under the Massachusetts Torts Claims Act for negligence. Counts II and III are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the officer defendants and the City, respectively. Count IV states a civil rights claim against all defendants pursuant to the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, M.G.L. c. 12 §

The defendants have denied all liability and defendants Keenan, Horick and Kelly submit cross claims for indemnification, contribution and reimbursement of counsel fees and expenses against the City. On February 19, 2003, defendants Keenan, Horick and Kelly removed the case to this Court where it was assigned to Judge O'Toole.¹ The case was reassigned to this session on July 8, 2004.

Defendants Bergeron and O'Brien filed a motion for summary judgment on October 4, 2005, which was opposed by the plaintiff and is pending. On February 9, 2006, the remaining defendants, collectively, filed their own motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff moved to strike that motion on the ground that it was untimely. The Court denied that motion at a pretrial conference on February 23, 2006, and gave plaintiff three weeks to file his opposition. The defendants' motions for summary judgment raise similar arguments and, therefore, the Court will address them conjointly. Having now considered the memoranda in support of and opposition to the pending motions, the Court resolves them as follows.

II. Discussion

A. Legal Standard

The role of summary judgment is "to pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial." Mesnick v. General Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 822 (1st Cir.1991)(quoting Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 50 (1st Cir.1990)). The burden is upon the moving party to show, based upon the pleadings, discovery and affidavits, "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

A fact is material if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Id. A genuine issue of material fact exists where the evidence with respect to the material fact in dispute "is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id.

Once the moving party has satisfied its burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine, triable issue. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The Court must view the entire record in the light most hospitable to the non-moving party and indulge all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. O'Connor v. Steeves, 994 F.2d 905, 907 (1st Cir.1993). If, after viewing the record in the nonmoving party's favor, the Court determines that no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment is appropriate.

B. Analysis

In the pending motions for summary judgment, the defendants argue: 1) the plaintiff's claim against certain defendants was not filed within the applicable statute of limitations period, 2) the plaintiff cannot show "deliberate indifference" to his medical needs by defendants thus undermining his § 1983 claim, 3) the defendant officers are entitled to qualified immunity and 4) the claim under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act fails because there is no evidence that any defendants interfered with plaintiffs civil rights by means of threats, intimidation or coercion. The Court will address those arguments seriatim.

1. Statute of Limitations

Defendants argue that Carroll's claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Carroll filed suit against the City on January 13, 1998, the final day before the three-year statute of limitations ran. That complaint was dismissed on April 27, 1998, because plaintiff had failed to make service of process on the City. More than four years later, on October 9, 2002, Carroll moved the state court to reinstate his complaint against the City, which the Court allowed. Subsequently, Carroll filed an amended complaint that added defendants Keenan, Bergeron, Horick and Kelly as well as O'Brien.² Defendants contend that Carroll should not be permitted to add the individual defendants eight years after the incident and five years after the statute of limitations ran.

This Court need not address the statute of limitations issue because it was resolved against the defendants on two previous occasions. First, the Massachusetts state court allowed Carroll to reinstate his complaint and to amend it to add the officer defendants. Later, defendants Keenan, Horick and Kelly moved to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds but Judge O'Toole denied the motion.

This session considers Judge O'Toole's ruling to be the law of the case. In Harlow v. Children's Hospital, the First Circuit Court of Appeals stated that the law of the case doctrine posits that

when a court decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages of the same case.

432 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir.2005)(quoting Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618, 103 S.Ct. 1382, 75 L.Ed.2d 318 (1983)). Although the law of the case directs only the Court's discretion, see id., this Court will not disturb Judge O'Toole's previous ruling because it is neither clearly erroneous nor does it work a manifest injustice.

2. Deliberate Indifference

a. Officer Defendants

Next, defendants contend that this Court should enter summary judgment in their favor with respect to the § 1983 claims because Carroll has produced no evidence that they were deliberately indifferent to any serious medical need that Carroll had while he was in custody. "Deliberate indifference" is a term traditionally associated with violations of the Eighth Amendment. Pretrial detainees are protected under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Eighth Amendment but the standard to be applied is the same as that used in Eighth Amendment cases. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979)(stating that the Due Process Clause protections are at least as...