Carroll v. Hinchley

• Decision Date: 12 September 1944
• Parties: CARROLL et al. v. HINCHLEY.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

316 Mass. 724

56 N.E.2d 608

CARROLL et al.

v.HINCHLEY.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Worcester.

Sept. 12, 1944.

Bill in equity by Esther M. Carroll and others against Anna Hinchley to enjoin defendant from obstructing plaintiffs' access to and use of a plot of land. From both an interlocutory and final decree, the defendant appeals.

Interlocutory decree affirmed, and final decree modified, and as so modified, affirmed.Appeal from Superior Court, Worcester County; Hammond, Judge.

Before FIELD, C. J., and QUA, RONAN, WILKINS, and SPALDING, JJ.

H. E. Manning, of Worcester, for appellant.

S. H. Benoit, of Worcester, for appellees.

SPALDING, Justice.

The plaintiff¹ by this bill in equity seek to enjoin the defendant from obstructing their access to and use of a plot of land (hereinafter called the park) located on the short of Lake Quinsigamond. The case was referred to a master who after hearing the parties filed a report which was confirmed by an interlocutory decree. The case comes here on appeals by the defendant from this and a final decree.

The master found these facts: On May 29, 1903, one Wilbur, who was in the land development business, bought a tract of unimporved land, comprising six acres on the easterly shore of Lake Quinsigamond and in the town of Shrewsbury, which he called Lake Shore Park. A survey was made and the tract was plotted into house lots and streets which were set forth on a plan which was recorded in the registry of deeds. The tract had a frontage of about 500 feet on the lake to the west and an average depth of about 200 feet; there was a frontage on the east side of about 600 feet on a street called North Quinsigamond Avenue. The surface of the land was hilly on three sides and sloped with a fairly steep pitch toward an inlet from the lake which was located near the center of the shore frontage; this inlet, shaped like a human thumb, was 30 feet wide and extended into the tract for a distance of 80 feet.

The development consisted of one hundred ten lots which were numbered on the plan. There was also shown on the plan an unnumbered plot designated ‘Park.’ This ‘Park’ plot, which is about 68 feet wide and 130 feet deep, enclosed the inlet on three sides; on it was a grove of chestnut and willow trees in which there had been placed picnic tables, swings and benches. Since only thirty-two of the lots had a water frontage, the park furnished access to and a view of the lake for some of the lots. The inlet, which was shallow, provided a safe place for small children to bathe; it was also used as a convenient mooring place for canoes and boats. In the winter it provided a place for sliding and skating.

The land was sold and purchased for summer camps and cottages by those desiring to enjoy the lake as a place of recreation. By 1917 Wilbur had sold off all the lots in the development. In each of the deeds he designated the lot by number and referred to the recorded plan mentioned above. The master found that ‘it was the intention of Wilbur and of all the lot purchasers, that the ‘Park’ tract be enjoyed by them as a means to pass to and from Lake Quinsigamond, and as a convenient gathering point or center, for usual recreation of a summer resort.'

The plaintiff Carroll owns two lots on which she has erected a year-round house; the plaintiff Belanger also owns two lots, located near the park, on which there is a cottage. The defendant owns fifteen and one half lots on which there are seven houses, one of which she occupies. Two of these lots are contiguous to the park. The plaintiffs and the defendant hold titles through mesne conveyances from the grantees of Wilbur. The master found ‘that between 1903 and 1921, the plaintiffs and the defendant, as lot owners, had a right to the use of the ‘Park’ in the manner above described, and that this right springs from Wilbur's intention to give it to them, and its being a reasonably necessary incident to their enjoyment of their land, and their expectation that they purchased this right, under their deeds.'

In 1921 Wilbur died and his widow, who was his residuary devisee, on July 18 of that year executed a quitclaim deed to the town of Shrewsbury conveying the park; the deed provided that the park was ‘to be kept open for the use of and access to the Lake by owners of lots shown on aforesaid plan, ² and the Inhabitants of the Town of Shrewsbury, in a reasonable manner, and subject to such park regulations as may be made from time to time.’ At a town meeting held on February 13, 1922, the town voted not to accept the deed. The deed, however, was recorded on April 13, 1922. ‘There was no evidence of the use of the ‘Park’ by the general public until after July 18, 1921, the date of the acknowledgment of the deed.' In 1942 the town erected a sign on the park which read: ‘This land is open for use by the Inhabitants of the Town of Shrewsbury, who are free to use it at their own risk.’ By a deed dated March 29, 1943, the town conveyed to the defendant a parcel of land comprising about five sixths of the park plot. Prior to this conveyance the plaintiffs protested the proposed sale on the ground that they had rights in the park as lot owners. In 1936 heavy rains filled in part of the inlet and the place appeared neglected and unsightly. The defendant took the matter up with the selectmen of the town and a commission of the Commonwealth designated to control the waters of Lake Quinsigamond, and was given permission to close up the inlet. This she did by building a stone wall across its mouth. This permission was obtained informally and no notice was given to the other lot owners. During the next three years the defendant completed the filling in of the inlet, planted grass, flowers and shrubs, and improved the appearance of the park. A foot path 15 feet wide was left open along the southerly side, but since receiving the deed from the town the defendant has closed this off by a wire fence so that now all are excluded from using the park for any purpose.

The master concluded his report as follows: ‘From the above facts, on all the evidence, I find the plaintiff and other lot owners, including the defendant, secured an easement to use the whole of the Park lot in common with one another, as a general center for activities of the neighborhood. Whether their rights have been enlarged or diminished by the conveyance by Wilbur to the Town in 1922, and the subsequent action by the Town, in my judgment, is a question of law for the court * * *.’

After confirming the master's report the case was heard on the matter of the final decree. The judge ruled that there was a dedication of the park to public use in 1903 by Wilbur and that this was in addition to the various easements granted to the lot owners as found by the master. He further ruled that the dedication was fortified by the deed to the town in 1921 and by the use of the park by the public for twenty years plus the fact that the town in 1942 had erected a sign stating that the park was open for use of the inhabitants of the town. A decree was entered perpetually enjoining the defendant ‘from interfering with or preventing the reasonable use of the said ‘Park’ by the owners of the several lots and the inhabitants of the Town of Shrewsbury as provided in deed from Addie Wilbur to same and as found by the master. A reasonable use thereof does not include the right to park automobiles in said Park.'

The interlocutory decree overruling the exceptions to the master's report and confirming the report was proper. Exceptions must be founded on errors shown by the report itself. Rosenberg v. Garfinkel, 294 Mass. 196, 198, 200 N.E. 907, 103 A.L.R. 1413;Israel v. Sommer, 292 Mass. 113, 119, 120, 197 N.E. 442. The first exception states that the master should have made further findings with respect to when the picnic tables, swings and benches were placed in the park. The defendant's remedy was by motion to recommit for further report and not by exception. Rosenberg v. Garfinkel, 294 Mass. 196, 198, 200 N.E. 907, 103 A.L.R. 1413....