Carroll v. Kamps

• Decision Date: 13 June 2011
• Docket Number: No. 4:08–CV–23 JD.,4:08–CV–23 JD.
• Citation: 795 F.Supp.2d 794
• Parties: Michael D. CARROLL, as the Guardian of the Person and Estate of Joshua M. Carroll, Plaintiff,v.Calvin G. KAMPS, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

795 F.Supp.2d 794

Michael D. CARROLL, as the Guardian of the Person and Estate of Joshua M. Carroll, Plaintiff,

v.Calvin G. KAMPS, et al., Defendants.

No. 4:08–CV–23 JD.

United States District Court,N.D. Indiana,Hammond Division at Lafayette.

June 13, 2011.

Daniel J. Buba, Thomas C. Doehrman, Doehrman Chamberlain, Indianapolis, IN, for Plaintiff.Bruce D. Jones, Keith A. Gaston, Cruser Mitchell & Gaston LLC, Indianapolis, IN, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

JON E. DeGUILIO, District Judge.

On March 7, 2008, Plaintiff, Michael D. Carroll (“Carroll”), filed a complaint in this Court, as the Guardian of the person and estate of Joshua M. Carroll. [DE 1]. On August 11, 2009, Carroll filed an amended complaint. [DE 24]. In his amended complaint, Carroll alleges that Joshua M. Carroll suffered a severe brain injury when he was negligently struck by a tractor-trailer, driven by Defendant, Calvin G. Kamps (“Kamps”). See DE 24. Carroll alleges that the truck was owned by Kamps and operated pursuant to the authority bestowed upon Defendant, T and L Trucking of Michigan (“T & L”). See DE 24. Additionally, Carroll alleges that the attached trailer was owned by Defendant, High Lean Pork, Inc. (“High Lean”). See DE 24. Finally, Carroll alleges that Kamps was an employee of T & L, High Lean, and Defendant, ACN Enterprises Inc. (“ACN”). See DE 24.

On June 3, 2010, this case was reassigned to the undersigned for all further proceedings. [DE 47]. On September 23, 2010, High Lean filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of vicarious liability because High Lean was not Kamps' employer at the time of the accident. [DE 50]. On October 21, 2010, Carroll filed a cross motion for summary judgment, asserting that he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the same issue against High Lean based on federal statutes and regulations.¹ [DE 51]. On the same day, Carroll filed a brief in support of his motion and in opposition to High Lean's motion. [DE 52]. On November 4, 2011, Carroll filed a reply. [DE 53].

I. Facts

The following are the uncontested facts, taken directly from the parties' briefs and the exhibits attached thereto. High Lean is in the business of raising and selling hogs and pork products. DE 53–3 at 2. Instead of using its own trucks and drivers to deliver and sell its hogs, High Lean uses the trucks and drivers of others. DE 53–3 at 2. However, High Lean contracts to have its hogs shipped in its own trailers. See e.g. DE 50–1 at 2. Although High Lean has a United States Department of Transportation (“DOT”) number for use of its vehicles used in local transportation, High Lean does not have a ICC/MC permitting number. DE 52–3 at 1, DE 53–3 at 2. In addition, High Lean's DOT number is not displayed on any of its vehicles or trailers. DE 52–3 at 2.

On March 5, 2007, High Lean contracted with T & L and Kamps to transport High Lean's hogs in High Lean's trailers. See “Swine Trucking Agreement,” DE 50–1 at 2–3. In the parties' one-year, automatically renewing contract, T & L is identified as a motor carrier authorized to provide transportation of goods pursuant to the ICC/MC number 408888.² DE 50–1 at 2–3 ¶¶ 2, 13. T & L was not permitted to subcontract its shipment responsibilities without High Lean's written consent and was restricted to hauling only High Lean's hogs in High Lean's trailers. DE 50–1 at 3 ¶ 9.

Under the terms of the parties' contract, T & L was required to pick up and deliver High Lean's hogs at places and times specified by High Lean. DE 50–1 at 2 ¶ 4. In addition, T & L was required to submit a weekly freight bill to High Lean, specifying the pickup and delivery points of each shipment, the number of hogs shipped, and the details on the number of hogs lost during shipment. DE 50–1 at 2 ¶ 4. Drivers employed to make shipments under the contract were required to provide daily maintenance logs of the High Lean's trailers at High Lean's wash barn. DE 50–1 at 3 ¶ 9. Further, the drivers were required to enroll in a specified quality assurance program. DE 50–1 at 3 ¶ 9. Although the precise schedule of rates is not included as an exhibit, the contract indicates that rates of payments for each shipment were predetermined by the parties; and High Lean's payment to T & L was to be effectuated within ten days of each shipping invoice submitted by T & L. DE 50–1 at 2 ¶¶ 3, 5.

The contract required T & L to obtain insurance for public liability, property damage liability, and cargo liability. DE 50–1 at 2 ¶ 6. The contract specified the amounts of coverage; and it mandated that High Lean be a listed-insured under the policies. DE 50–1 at 2 ¶ 6. The contract indicated that T & L would be held liable for “excessive” losses and damages incurred on account of T & L's negligence. DE 50–1 at 2 ¶ 7. In addition, the contract required T & L to indemnify High Lean for all liability caused by T & L and its agents and employees during shipments. DE 50–1 at 3 ¶ 8.

On October 4, 2007, Kamps made a delivery of High Lean's hogs, driving his own 2003 Peterbilt tractor and pulling a 2002 Wilson trailer, owned by High Lean. DE 52–1 at 2; DE 52–2 at 2. After Kamps dropped off the shipment of High Lean's hogs at Indiana Packers in Delphi, Indiana, Kamps departed on Highway 421. DE 52–1 at 4. While on Highway 421, Kamps noticed Carroll walking along the side of the road about fifty feet ahead of him. DE 52–1 at 4. Kamps states that he braked and moved the truck to the left but was unable to avoid hitting Carroll, whom he says walked or stumbled in front of the truck. DE 52–1 at 4. As a result of the accident, Carroll suffered broken ribs and vertebrae and sustained a traumatic brain injury. DE 52–4 at 2. Further, Carroll sustained numerous medical bills and has not been able to return to work because of his injuries. DE 52–4 at 2.

II. Cross Motions for Summary Judgment

A. Standard for Granting Summary Judgment

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(2). “In other words, the record must reveal that no reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party.” Dempsey v. Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 16 F.3d 832, 836 (7th Cir.1994) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

The party seeking summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying” the evidence which “demonstrate[s] the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). “Substantive law determines which facts are material; that is, which facts might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Brown v. City of Lafayette, No. 4:08–CV–69, 2010 WL 1570805, at *2 (N.D.Ind. Apr. 16, 2010) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)).

Once the moving party has met this burden, the nonmoving party “may not rely merely on allegations or denials in its own pleading; rather, its response must ... set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2); Beard v. Whitley Cnty. REMC, 840 F.2d 405, 410 (7th Cir.1988). To establish a genuine issue of fact, the nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial, not “simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); First Nat'l Bank of Cicero v. Lewco Secs. Corp., 860 F.2d 1407, 1411 (7th Cir.1988). “It is not the duty of the court to scour the record in search of evidence to defeat a motion for summary judgment; rather, the nonmoving party bears the responsibility of identifying the evidence upon which he relies.” Harney v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 526 F.3d 1099, 1104 (7th Cir.2008). If the nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of an essential element on which it bears the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is proper-even mandated. Massey v. Johnson, 457 F.3d 711, 716 (7th Cir.2006) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548) (holding that a failure to prove one essential element “necessarily renders all other facts immaterial”).

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court must view all facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Popovits v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 185 F.3d 726, 731 (7th Cir.1999); NUCOR Corp. v. Aceros Y Maquilas de Occidente, 28 F.3d 572, 583 (7th Cir.1994). A court must avoid the temptation to “make credibility determinations, weigh the evidence, or decide which inferences to draw from the facts; these are jobs for a factfinder.” Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 770 (7th Cir.2003). Summary judgment is not a substitute for a trial on the merits or a vehicle for resolving factual disputes. Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir.1994). Instead, the court's sole task in ruling on a motion for summary judgment is “to decide, based on the evidence of record, whether there is any material dispute of fact that requires a trial.” Payne, 337 F.3d at 770; Waldridge, 24 F.3d at 920. If a reasonable factfinder could find in favor of the nonmoving party, summary judgment may not be granted. Payne, 337 F.3d at 770.

B. Analysis of Carroll's Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 51].

In Carroll's motion for summary judgment, Carroll exclusively argues that Kamps was High Lean's employee, based upon a theory of statutory liability under the federal trucking regulations involving leases.

Tort liability may be imposed on an employer for...