Carroll v. Rondout Yacht Basin, Inc.

• Docket Number: 532781
• Decision Date: 27 April 2023
• Parties: Robert Bruce CARROLL, Appellant, v. RONDOUT YACHT BASIN, INC., Respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

215 A.D.3d 1190

187 N.Y.S.3d 854

Robert Bruce CARROLL, Appellant,

v.RONDOUT YACHT BASIN, INC., Respondent.

532781

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

Calendar Date: February 23, 2023

Decided and Entered: April 27, 2023

Robert Bruce Carroll, Connelly, appellant pro se.

Corrigan, McCoy & Bush, PLLC, Rensselaer (Scott W. Bush of counsel), for respondent.

Before: Lynch, J.P., Aarons, Pritzker, Fisher and McShan, JJ.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Pritzker, J. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Julian D. Schreibman, J.), entered January 27, 2020 in Ulster County, upon a verdict in favor of defendant.

The facts are set forth in two prior appeals involving these parties ( 183 A.D.3d 1000, 121 N.Y.S.3d 691 [3d Dept. 2020] ; 162 A.D.3d 1150, 79 N.Y.S.3d 321 [3d Dept. 2018], appeal & lv dismissed 32 N.Y.3d 1035, 88 N.Y.S.3d 392, 113 N.E.3d 448 [2018] ). As relevant here, plaintiff docked his boat at a marina in the Town of Esopus, Ulster County, which was operated by defendant. Plaintiff commenced this action alleging various causes of action, including breach of contract. Following joinder of issue, defendant moved for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the complaint. Supreme Court (Mott, J.) granted the motion in its entirety, but this Court modified said order by reversing so much thereof as dismissed the breach of contract cause of action ( 162 A.D.3d at 1152, 79 N.Y.S.3d 321 ). After reinstatement, plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment, which motion Supreme Court denied and this Court affirmed ( 183 A.D.3d at 1000, 121 N.Y.S.3d 691 ). A jury trial on plaintiff's breach of contract claim ensued. At the close of trial, both parties moved for a directed verdict, which motions were denied by Supreme Court (Schreibman, J.). The jury found in favor of defendant. Plaintiff then moved for a directed verdict, which was denied, and the court issued a judgment thereon. Plaintiff appeals.

We affirm. "A verdict in favor of a defendant may be successfully challenged as against the weight of the evidence if it can be shown that a preponderance of the proof presented at trial so strongly favored the plaintiff's case that a contrary verdict could not have been reached upon any fair interpretation of that evidence" ( Mosher v. Murell, 295 A.D.2d 729, 730, 744 N.Y.S.2d 61 [3d Dept. 2002] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lv denied 98 N.Y.2d 613, 751 N.Y.S.2d 168, 780 N.E.2d 979 [2002] ; see Adirondack Classic Design, Inc. v. Farrell, 182 A.D.3d 809, 811, 122 N.Y.S.3d 790 [3d Dept. 2020] ). As relevant here, "[t]o recover for a breach of contract, a party must establish the existence of a contract, the party's own performance under the contract, the other party's breach of its contractual obligations, and damages resulting from the breach" ( Adirondack Classic Design, Inc. v. Farrell, 182 A.D.3d at 811, 122 N.Y.S.3d 790 ). To establish the existence of a contract, the plaintiff must demonstrate that there was "an offer, acceptance of the offer, consideration, mutual assent, and an intent to be bound" ( Galarneau v. D'Andrea, 184 A.D.3d 1064, 1065–1066, 126 N.Y.S.3d 766 [3d Dept. 2020] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). The court may enforce "an oral agreement ... as long as the terms are clear and definite and the conduct of the parties evinces mutual assent sufficiently definite to assure that the parties are truly in agreement with respect to all material terms" ( id. at 1066, 126 N.Y.S.3d 766 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).

At trial plaintiff testified that, in April 2008, he paid the manager at the marina $500 as a down payment. It is plaintiff's contention that this $500 payment was the consideration for an oral contract allowing plaintiff to dock his boat in the marina for the summer. In support of this, plaintiff admitted an invoice between him and defendant to demonstrate the absence of any outstanding dues and the existence of an oral contract as of April 2008.¹ Plaintiff testified that, not long after making this payment, defendant gave him a letter stating that he had to leave the marina. Plaintiff explained that he obtained an injunction from a local court and that, after that was lifted, defendant launched his boat and brought it to Kingston Marina. Plaintiff lost track of the boat's location after he refused to pay the money that defendant was demanding. Plaintiff eventually found the boat and prepared a trailer to tow the boat, yet could not because there was construction equipment blocking the boat's pathway. Ultimately, by the time plaintiff paid for, among other things, the removal of the boat from the water, he had paid over $300.

Plaintiff then explained that, in the past, he would make the "usual payment" to the marina in the spring for his "summer slip arrangement" and a second one in the fall for winter. Plaintiff testified that over 10 years there were 20 contracts, all of which were written except two that may have been oral. Plaintiff then testified that if he was not given a contract to sign, he would just pay the manager at the marina and would receive his slip. Despite testifying that only two contracts were oral, plaintiff did not admit into evidence any written contract or agreement language over this 10–year time period. On cross-examination, defendant admitted a contract between plaintiff and defendant from May 2007, signed by plaintiff, which reflected an agreement between the parties for plaintiff to dock his boat from May 2007 until October 2007 for $1,700. Plaintiff maintained that the alleged oral contract mirrored the terms of the May 2007 written contract. Plaintiff then conceded that the $500 payment made by him to the marina manager would not have satisfied the contractual requirement or the alleged oral contract.²

Based on the foregoing, we find that "the evidence at trial did not so preponderate in favor of plaintiff that...