Carroll v. Sanderson Farms, Inc.

• Decision Date: 11 February 2014
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION H-10-3108
• Parties: REVENA J. CARROLL, Plaintiff, v. SANDERSON FARMS, INC. (PROCESSING DIVISION), Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

REVENA J. CARROLL, Plaintiff, v. SANDERSON FARMS, INC. (PROCESSING DIVISION), Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION H-10-3108

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS HOUSTON DIVISION

SIGNED: February 11, 2014

OPINION AND ORDER

Pending before the Court in the above referenced cause are (1) Plaintiff Revena J. Carroll's ("Carroll's") motion for judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58 (instrument #62, correction #64), including back pay and benefits in the amount of $25,000.00, prejudgment interest in the amount of $3,241.10 when the motion was filed, liquidated damages in the amount of $28,241.10 under 19 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)(A)(iii), and attorney's fees in the amount of $153,418.00, for a total judgment of $209,900.20, plus post-judgment interest; and (2) Plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees (#63) in the amount of $153,418 for work through the trial of this action, as well as for conditional appellate attorney's fees.

Because the attorney's fee request is raised summarily in the first motion and in more depth in the latter, the Court will address it with the more detailed, second motion.

I. Plaintiff's FMLA Claim and Judgment

After three days of trial, on July 18, 2013, the fourth day,the jury returned a verdict in favor of Carroll on her claim that Defendant Sanderson Farms, Inc. (Processing Division)("Sanderson Farms") discharged her for taking leave under the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"). The jury awarded Plaintiff compensatory damages in the amount of $25,000.00. #74.

A. Relevant Law

The FMLA, 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a) provides,

(a) Interference with rights

(1) Exercise of rights

It shall be unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right under this subchapter.

(2) Discrimination

It shall be unlawful for any employer to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any individual for opposing any practice made unlawful by this subchapter.

Regarding § 2615(a), 29 C.F.R. § 825.220 states, "An employer is prohibited from discriminating against employees or prospective employees who have taken or used FMLA leave."

Furthermore, 29 U.S.C. § 2617 (a) provides,

Civil action by employees

(1) Liability

Any employer who violates section 2615 of this title shall be liable to any employee affected--

(A) for damages equal to-

(I) the amount of-

(I) any wages, salary, employment benefits, or other compensation denied or lost to such employee by reason of the violation; or

(II) In a case in which wages, salary, employment benefits, or other compensation have not been denied or lost to the employee, any actual monetary losses sustained by the employee as a direct result of the violation, such as the cost of providing care, up to a sum equal to 12 weeks (or 26 weeks, in a case involving leave under section 2612(a)(3) of this title) of wages or salary for the employee;

(ii) the interest on the amount described in clause (I) calculated at the prevailing rate;

(iii) an additional amount as liquidated damages equal to the sum of the amount described in clause (I) and the interest described in clause (ii), except that if an employer who has violated section 2615 of this title provides to the satisfaction of the court that the act or omission which violated section 2615 of this title was in good faith and the employer had reasonable grounds for believing that the act or omission was not a violation of section 2615 of this amount, such court may, in the discretion of the court, reduce the amount of the liability to the amount and interest determined under clauses (I) and (ii), respectively; and

(B) for such equitable relief as may be appropriate, including employment, reinstatement, and promotion.

Title 29 U.S.C. § 260 provides,

In any action commenced prior to or after May 14, 1947 to recover any unpaid minimum wages, unpaid overtime compensation, or liquidated damages under the Fair laborStandards Act of 1938, as amended [29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.], if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that the act or omission giving rise to such action was in good faith and that he had reasonable grounds for believing that his act or omission was not a violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, the court may, in its sound discretion, award no liquidated damages or award any amount thereof not to exceed the amount specified in section 216 of this title.

Liquidated damages under the FMLA are not designed to be punitive, but compensatory, to compensate employees for retention of their pay. Firth v. Don McGill of West Houston, Ltd., No. Civ. A. H-04-0659, 2006 WL 846377, at *1 n.2 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2006)(liquidated damages provision is not penal in nature but intended to "compensate for the retention of a workman's pay which might result in damages too obscure and difficult for estimate other than by liquidated damages")( citing Snapp v. Unlimited Concepts, Inc., 208 F.3d 928, 934 (11^th Cir. 2000)), aff'd, 233 Fed. Appx. 346 (5^th Cir. 2007).

The FMLA does not define "good faith" for the purpose of avoiding the imposition of liquidated damages under 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(iii). Nero v. Industrial Molding Corp., 167 F.3d 921, 928 (5^th Cir. 1999). The Fifth Circuit has stated that Congress intended to model the enforcement scheme in the FMLA on that in Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") and made relief under the two statutes parallel, so it has turned to the FLSA to interpret the remedial provisions in the FMLA. Id. See also Singer v. City of Waco, Tex., 324 F.3d 813, 823 (5^th Cir. 2003)("We have held that anemployer 'faces a 'substantial burden' of demonstrating good faith and a reasonable belief that its actions did not violate the FLSA.'"), citing Bernard v. IBP, Inc. of Neb., 154 F.3d 259, 267 (5^th Cir. 1998), quoting Mireles v. Frio Foods, Inc., 899 F.2d 1407, 1415 (5^th Cir. 1990). Thus it determined that in deciding whether to award liquidated damages the trial court must first determine whether the employer has met its burden of proving that it acted in good faith. Id. As under the FLSA, if the court finds that the employer proved it acted in good faith and reasonably believed that its action was not a violation of the FMLA, the court may reduce the damages award. Id.

To establish good faith, the employer must show his subjective intent was to comply with the statute and that its application of the Act was objectively reasonable. Castro v. Chicago Housing Authority, 360 F.3d 721, 730 (7^th Cir. 2004), cited for that proposition in Firth, 2006 WL 846377 at *2. The employer must show that it took "'active steps to ascertain the dictates of the FMLA.'" Firth, 2006 WL 846377 at *2, citing Reich v. S. New England Telecomm. Corp., 121 F.3d 58, 71 (2d Cir. 1997). See also Dalhiem v. KDFW-TV, 712 F. Supp. 533, 536 (N.Tex. 1989)(it is the employer's burden, difficult to meet, to prove that "its failure to obey the statute was both in good faith and was predicated upon such reasonable grounds that it would be unfair to impose more than a compensatory verdict")(citations omitted).

On appeal, the Fifth Circuit will only reverse the district court's finding of good faith if that finding is clearly erroneous. Nero, 167 F.3d at 928. If it finds that the employer satisfied its burden, the appellate court would then decide if the district court abused its discretion in declining to reduce the damages award. Id. Even if the district court finds that the employer acted in good faith and reasonably, the district court still has the discretion to award liquidated damages in any sum up to the amount allowed by § 216(b). Id., citing Mireles v. Frio Foods, Inc., 899 F.2d 1407, 1416 n.8 (5^th Cir. 1990). The Fifth Circuit, along with other Courts of Appeals, has emphasized, "Doubling of an award is the norm . . . because a plaintiff is awarded liquidated damages in addition to compensation lost. The district court's discretion to reduce the liquidated damages 'must be exercised consistently with the strong presumption under the statute in favor of doubling.'" Id., quoting Shea v. Galaxie Lumber & Constr. Co., Ltd., 152 F.3d 729, 733 (7^th Cir. 1998), and Bernard v. IBP, Inc. of Neb., 154 F.3d 259, 267 (5^th Cir. 1998)("stating in FLSA case that even if BP acted in good faith, '[g]iven IBP's violation of the FLSA, we conclude that the district court did not err in exercising its discretion to award liquidated damages.'"). In accord, Firth, 2006 WL 846377, at *1 ("A strong presumption exists in favor of liquidated damages, which effectively results in a doubling of any award of lost wages."); Thom v. American Standard, Inc., 666 F.3d 968, 973 (6^thCir. 2012)("There is a strong presumption in favor of awarded liquidated damages that are double the amount of any compensatory damages. Thus, '[a]lthough in the final analysis we review a district court's decision on liquidated damages for abuse of discretion, that discretion must be exercised consistently with the strong presumption under the statute in favor of doubling.'")(emphasis in the original)(citation omitted); Hite v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 446 F.3d 858, (8^th Cir. 2006)("The district court should exercise its discretion 'consistently with the strong presumption under the statute in favor of doubling.'"), quoting Shea v. Galaxie, 152 F.3d at 733 (7^th Cir.).

The FMLA requires that reasonable attorney's fees be awarded to a prevailing plaintiff. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(3)("The court in such an action shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff, allow a reasonable attorney's fee, reasonable expert witness fees, and other costs of the action to be paid by the defendant.").

B. Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment (#62)

Plaintiff argues that the jury awarded her $25,000 in back pay and benefits denied or lost because it found Sanderson Farms liable for violating the FMLA by discharging her in retaliation for having taken FMLA leave and implicitly rejected Sanderson Farms' contention that its decision to discharge her...