Carroll v. Schneider

• Decision Date: 21 April 1947
• Docket Number: No. 4-8170.,4-8170.
• Citation: 201 S.W.2d 221
• Parties: CARROLL v. SCHNEIDER et al.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

201 S.W.2d 221

CARROLL v. SCHNEIDER et al.

No. 4-8170.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

April 21, 1947.

Appeal from Lonoke Chancery Court; Frank H. Dodge, Chancellor.

Mandamus proceeding by Troy Carroll against Henry Schneider and others, constituting the Board of Election Commissioners of Lonoke County, to compel defendants to place petitioner's name on the ballot as a candidate for office of County Judge. From an order dismissing the petition, petitioner appeals.

Cause dismissed.

J. Fred Jones, of Little Rock, for appellant.

J. B. Reed, of Lonoke, for appellees.

FRANK G. SMITH, Justice.

This is a petition for a writ of mandamus, and as grounds for its issuance the following facts were alleged. Petitioner, a resident citizen of Lonoke county, is an independent candidate for the office of County Judge of Lonoke county, and the defendants constitute the Board of Election Commissioners for that county. Pursuant to, and in compliance with, § 4705, Pope's Digest, he filed a petition with the said Board of Election Commissioners, praying that he be certified as an independent candidate for the office of County Judge of Lonoke County. The petition addressed to the election commissioners was filed with them October 21, 1946, and contained the names of seventy-seven alleged electors of that county. On October 25, 1946, petitioner was advised by the election commissioners that his name would not appear on the ballot as an independent candidate at the election to be held on November 5, 1946, because thirty-four of the seventy-seven signers of the petition were not electors for the reason that they had failed to sign their assessment blanks when their poll taxes were assessed, and eight of said signers had paid no poll tax at all, and that his name would not be placed on the ballot as a candidate for the reasons stated. This action of the election commissioners was alleged to have been arbitrary and unauthorized and it was prayed that a writ of mandamus issue, requiring the election commissioners to place petitioner's name on the ballot as a candidate pursuant to the petition filed by him.

A demurrer to the petition for mandamus was sustained and the petition dismissed, and from that order is this appeal.

Section 4705, Pope's Digest, pursuant to which the original petition was filed, provides that: "The nominations of candidates shall be certified in the following manner: By the chairman and secretary of any convention of delegates, or of the canvassing board of any primary election, held by authority of any origanized political party in the State, or subdivision thereof, in which such convention or primary election is held; and also, by electors of the State, district, county, township, ward of a city or incorporated town, for which the nomination is made. Provided, the number of signatures of electors so required shall not be less than fifty, nor more than one thousand, for the State or any district or county, and not less than ten, nor more than fifty, for any township, or ward of a city or incorporated town."

The statute does not prescribe how, or in what manner election commissioners shall determine the sufficiency of the petition of one who wishes to become a candidate by petition. But of necessity, they have the right to determine the prima facie sufficiency of the petition. For instance, they may and should count the number of signers and if it were found that there were less than fifty of these, the petition should be dismissed. But here the election commissioners exercised a power which the law did not confer upon them. After ascertaining that eight persons who signed the petition had not paid their poll taxes, leaving sixty-nine who had paid, they proceeded to determine the validity of the poll tax receipts of thirty-seven signers who had paid their poll taxes. After deducting the names of the eight signers who had not paid their poll taxes, there remained on the petition the names of sixty-nine persons, who had paid, and a prima facie showing of compliance with the law had been made, and the power and authority of election commissioners was at an end.

The duties of the election commissioners are ministerial and not judicial. They have the power to determine whether a prima facie showing of a sufficient petition has been made, but they have no other function.

Now the ballot cast at an election by one not eligible to vote may be discarded although he possesses a poll tax receipt. In other words, a poll tax receipt does not qualify one to vote, who is not otherwise qualified. Provision is contained in § 4730, Pope's Digest, for challenging the right to vote of one who is not eligible. The statute just cited provides that: "* * * when the ballot of any voter is thus challenged, it shall be the duty of the judges and clerks in said election precinct to make and retain a list of the names of all such persons so challenged and the ballots of all such persons shall be counted, preserved and separated from the remaining ballots to the end that the right of any such person to vote may be later determined either by the county central committee or the court in which an election contest may thereafter be filed." There a practice is prescribed and a power is conferred to determine the elector's qualifications. But here this is not true after a prima facie showing has been made of the sufficiency of the petition to have one's name placed on the ballot.

It will be remembered that this is not an election contest, nor is it a proceeding to enjoin the election commissioners from certifying the name of one as a candidate who had petitioned that action. Those would be judicial proceedings in which the facts could be inquired into and determined. Here the election commissioners, after determining that holders of sixty-nine poll tax receipts had signed the petition, then proceeded to adjudge also the question whether those persons had properly assessed their poll taxes. The law confers no such authority, and their determination cannot be given a judicial effect.

The opinion in the case of Irby v. Barrett, 204 Ark. 682, 163 S.W.2d 512, 513, is decisive of this question. There the Chairman and Secretary of the Democratic State Committee had refused to certify the name of Irby as a candidate for the State Senate from the district in which he resided, as required by the rules of the Democratic party. It was conceded that Irby had complied with the rules of the party to become a candidate, but the Chairman and Secretary of the party committee refused to certify Irby's name as a candidate for the reason, as found by them, that Irby was ineligible to serve if elected, inasmuch as he had been convicted of a felony, to-wit: the crime of embezzling public money. In awarding the writ of mandamus directing that Irby's name be certified as a candidate, we held that the Chairman and Secretary were without power to refuse to certify the candidacy of one who had complied with the rules of the party in that behalf. In so holding we said: "Certainly no law of this State confers that power and we are cited to no rule of the Party conferring it. Certain it is that the Chairman and Secretary of the State Committee are clothed with no judicial power. Their duties are purely ministerial, * * *".

In that connection, it was there further said: "If the Chairman and Secretary of the Committee have the right to say that because of the decision of this court petitioner is ineligible to be a candidate for office, they may also say, in any case, that for some other reason a candidate is ineligible. For instance, it has been held by this court in many election contests that one must pay his poll tax; that he must do so after proper assessment in the time and manner required by law, and that otherwise he is not eligible even to vote, and unless he were a voter he could not hold office. So with other qualifications, such as residence. May this question be considered...