Carroll v. Town of University Park, Civil No. Y-96-1626.

• Decision Date: 11 August 1997
• Docket Number: Civil No. Y-96-1626.
• Citation: 12 F.Supp.2d 475
• Parties: Natalie CARROLL v. TOWN OF UNIVERSITY PARK, et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

12 F.Supp.2d 475

Natalie CARROLL v. TOWN OF UNIVERSITY PARK, et al.

Civil No. Y-96-1626.

United States District Court, D. Maryland.

August 11, 1997.

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Mary Ann Ryan, Anna M. Coyle, and Ryan & Coyle, Laurel, MD, for Plaintiff.

Linda S. Woolf, Jennifer L. Huesman, and Goodell, DeVries, Leech & Gray, LLP, Baltimore, MD, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JOSEPH H. YOUNG, Senior District Judge.

This suit arises from the employment and termination of Natalie Carroll ("Carroll") as a police officer for the Town of University Park, Maryland. Carroll alleges that she was denied her right to procedural due process, her First Amendment rights, and her right to equal protection. She also alleges that she was discriminated against on the basis of her sex and retaliated against for pursuing charges of discrimination. After the close of discovery, Defendants moved for summary judgment.

I. Facts

Carroll was hired as a police officer for the Town of University Park, Maryland ("Town"). Mayor Robert W. Werge ("Werge") confirmed the offer of employment by letter dated November 12, 1992. (Defs.' Ex. 7). On December 3, 1992, Carroll signed an Employment Agreement with the Town which required her to serve on probationary status "[f]or one year from the date of permanent employment." (Pl.'s Ex. C). She first reported for work on January 11, 1993 and attended the Police Academy from January 18 to May 21, 1993.

After completing her instruction at the Police Academy and assuming her responsibilities as an active duty officer, several instances occurred in which she is alleged to have acted improperly.

On December 20, 1994, Lieutenant Stephen S. Bacon ("Bacon"), who was Carroll's supervisor and the highest ranking member of the police department at the time,¹ completed Carroll's annual performance appraisal and recommended her termination to the Town Council. By Resolution 94-1, dated January 7, 1994, the Town Council decided to extend her probationary status for ninety (90) days from January 11, 1994. (Pl.'s Ex. V).

Sometime in December or early January,² the Town passed Resolution 93-20, which transferred authority for making police personnel and employment decisions from the Town Council to the Chief of Police. (Defs.' Ex. 5).

Carroll suffered an injury on the job on January 20, 1994 and remained on disability leave until she was released from her doctor's care on March 31, 1994.

On January 31, 1994, Carroll's attorney wrote a letter to the Town's attorney alleging that the extension of Carroll's probationary status violated the Law Enforcement Officers Bill of Rights ("LEOBR"), MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 727-734, and mentioning that her gender was improperly considered. (Pl.'s Ex. X). Carroll's attorney met with the Town's attorney on March 2, 1994, in an effort to resolve the matter. On March 15, 1994, Carroll's attorney wrote a letter to the Town's attorney advising her of Carroll's intent to file discrimination charges. (Pl.'s Ex. Z). The Town's attorney claims that she never received the March 15th letter.³

Sometime prior to March 31, 1994, Bacon was appointed acting Chief of Police. On March 31, 1994, Bacon signed a letter prepared by the Town's attorney terminating Carroll's employment with the Town. (Pl.'s Ex. 1). Mayor Werge apparently concurred with Bacon's decision to terminate Carroll's employment. Carroll received the letter on April 2, 1994.

On April 11, 1994, Carroll's attorney wrote a letter to newly appointed Chief of Police Richard Ashton ("Chief Ashton") requesting a hearing regarding Carroll's termination. (Pl.'s Ex. 2). By letter dated April 19, 1994, Chief Ashton refused Carroll's request for a hearing but agreed to meet with her. (Pl.'s Ex. Y part C). Subsequently, on April 22, 1994, Carroll's attorney wrote Chief Ashton indicating that Carroll had filed discrimination charges and seeking to set up a meeting. (Pl.'s Ex. Y part D). Chief Ashton responded by letter dated April 28, 1994, indicating that a meeting would be inappropriate in light of the filing of discrimination charges. (Pl.'s Ex. Y part E).

In a March 12, 1996 letter, the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission determined that "evidence obtained during the investigation does not establish a violation" of Title VII. Carroll filed the pending suit on May 24, 1996 against the Town, Bacon, and Werge alleging violations of her constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count I), discrimination on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII (Count II), and retaliation for pursuing charges of discrimination in violation of Title VII (Count III). After the close of discovery, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment which has been fully briefed and is ripe for consideration. Also pending before the Court are Motions to Strike filed by Plaintiff and Defendants.

II. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the litigation under governing law will preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be considered. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Id.

The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of Plaintiff's case will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the non-moving party, in this case Carroll. Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Plaintiff's evidence, however, is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in her favor. Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-159, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970)).

A. § 1983 Claim (Count I)

Section 1983 of Title 42 provides in pertinent part that "[e]very person who, under color of [law] ... subjects ... any citizen ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable...." 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Carroll contends that the Defendants the Town, Bacon, and Werge acted under color of law to deprive her of her constitutionally protected property and liberty interests without due process, her First Amendment rights, or her right to equal protection.

1. Plaintiff's Right to Procedural Due Process

To prevail on her § 1983 claim that she was denied procedural due process, Carroll must establish that she was deprived of a property or liberty interest protected under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985). Liberty and property are broad concepts "purposely left to gather meaning from experience...." Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972) (quoting National Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 646, 69 S.Ct. 1173, 93 L.Ed. 1556 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).

Constitutionally protected property interests are not created by the Constitution; instead, they are defined by existing rules that originate in an independent source such as state law. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701. In the context of public employment, "[t]o have a property interest ... a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. [Sh]e must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. [Sh]e must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it." Id. Absent some special statutory entitlement, a public employee does not have a federally protected right to continued employment. Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 602 n. 7 (1972).

The concept of liberty protected by the Constitution "denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint, but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized ... as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923) (emphasis added).

Carroll asserts that she was deprived of a cognizable property interest in her continued employment with the Town as well as certain generalized liberty interests. Her alleged deprivation of these constitutionally protected interests are discussed in turn below.

a. Law Enforcement Officers Bill of Rights

The Law Enforcement Officers Bill of Rights ("LEOBR") provides procedural protections to police officers, but it is generally not applicable to probationary officers. MD. ANN. CODE art 27, § 727(c). The Employment Agreement Carroll signed on December 3, 1993 requires her to serve as a probationary officer for "one year from the date of permanent employment." (Pl.'s Ex. C, ¶ 2).

Carroll argues that her permanent employment and, thus, her one-year probationary period began when she signed the Employment Agreement on December 3, 1993, even though she did not report for work until January 11, 1994. Thereupon, Carroll contends that her one-year probationary period ended December 3, 1994, and she had a property interest in her continued employment created by LEOBR when the Town attempted to extend her probationary status for ninety (90) days in January 1994 and, subsequently, when she was terminated.

The Defendants counter that Carroll's probationary period did not begin until January 11, 1994, when she initially reported for work and,...