Carskadon v. Bd. of Education of School Dist. of Keyser
| Decision Date | 05 March 1907 |
| Citation | 56 S.E. 834,61 W.Va. 468 |
| Parties | CARSKADON v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF SCHOOL DIST. OF KEYSER et al. |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
Submitted September 8, 1906.
Syllabus by the Court.
This court is without jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from a decree of a circuit court perpetually enjoining a board of education from letting a public schoolhouse for an alleged illegal purpose, where the amount in controversy does not exceed $100, exclusive of costs.
An appeal does not lie from an order overruling a motion to dissolve and perpetuating an injunction, where purely pecuniary interests are involved, unless the amount in controversy, exclusive of costs, exceeds $100.
Appeal from Circuit Court, Mineral County.
Bill by James T. Carskadon against the board of education of the school district of Keyser and others. Decree for plaintiff and defendants appeal. Dismissed.
Wm MacDonald, for appellants.
Frank C. Reynolds and Taylor Morrison, for appellee.
SANDERS P.
On or about the 12th day of September, 1905, A. W. Coffroth, George P. Warner, and Wm. MacDonald, composing the board of education of the school district of Keyser, entered into an agreement with W. L. Radcliffe, by which, in consideration of $10 per night to be paid to the board, Radcliffe was to have the use of the Keyser high school auditorium for six lectures or concerts to be given during the winter of 1905 and 1906. The first of these entertainments was to be given by a company known as the "Bromell-Reed Concert Company," on October 25, 1906. On this date, however, after notice to the defendants, James T. Carskadon, suing on behalf of himself and all other taxpayers of the school district of Keyser presented to the circuit court of Mineral county his bill of complaint against the board of education and the members thereof, praying for an injunction restraining the board from permitting Radcliffe to hold the entertainment which had been advertised, or any of those to be held, on the ground that they formed no part of the scheme of teaching in the public schools of the state, and formed no part in the education of the pupils and children attending said school; nor would said entertainments instruct or help to educate said children and pupils, but, on the contrary, would prove a distraction and detriment to them. That the exhibitions were not to be given for the entertainment or education of pupils attending said school, nor were they religious or literary or Sunday school meetings, nor meetings such as are beneficial to the public generally, but were purely and solely theatrical performances, which the public generally were invited to attend, upon paying the prices of admission. The defendants demurred to the bill, and filed an answer, claiming that they were acting within their legal rights in making the contract in question. The court granted the injunction as prayed for, and later entered a decree overruling the demurrer and perpetuating the injunction. From this decree the defendants have appealed.
The appellee insists that this appeal should be dismissed because the amount in controversy is not sufficient to give this court jurisdiction. If appellate jurisdiction is predicated upon the statute authorizing appeals in matters merely pecuniary, then the amount in controversy is not sufficient to give jurisdiction. The execution of the contract between the board and Radcliffe is enjoined, the effect of which is to deprive the board of the amount agreed to be paid for the use of the building. This contract provides for the letting of the room for six certain nights, at a specifically named sum, $10 per night, for a particularly named purpose, and to a designated person. Therefore the question is: Has the board the right to carry out this contract; that is, has it the lawful right to let this room for the time and purpose specified in the contract, the performance of which involves to the board the sum of $60? It is not the perpetual use of the property that is enjoined, but the injunction is one for the purpose of preventing the carrying out of the original contract, which, if done, could under no circumstances yield to the board a sum sufficient to give this court jurisdiction. The right of the board to contract and to manage the property generally, or to use it for any other purpose at any other time, is not involved; but, the litigation being confined to the carrying out of the single contract made by the board with Radcliffe, which involves a sum less than $100, this court is clearly without jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. To give jurisdiction, where purely pecuniary matters are involved, a sum exceeding $100, exclusive of costs, must be involved. This is the plain language of the Constitution and statute, which has been repeatedly referred to and held by this court. Tompkins v. Burgess, 2 W. Va. 187; McCoy v. McCoy, 33 W.Va. 60, 10 S.E. 19; Berry v. Cunningham, 37 W.Va. 302, 16 S.E. 463; Shahan's Adm'r v. Shahan's Heirs, 48 W.Va. 477, 57 S.E. 552, 86 Am. St. Rep. 68; Minor v. Goodall, 3 Call (Va.) 393. But if purely pecuniary matters are not involved, and the appeal is sought to be maintained upon another and different ground, we will search in vain for a constitutional or statutory provision which extends the remedy. The jurisdiction of this court is circumscribed and limited by the Constitution and statute. State v. Shumate, 48 W.Va. 359, 37 S.E. 618; Miller v. Navigation Co., 32 W.Va. 46, 9 S.E. 57. We cannot, by construction, enlarge the Constitution or statute so as to extend the remedy by appeal, if its provisions do not call for such construction; but we must, giving them a liberal construction, construe and apply them as they exist, and, if the right of appeal in a particular case is not given, then the judgment of the circuit court is final and conclusive. Judgments and decrees of courts can only be reviewed when authorized by law. Where the Constitution does not expressly give the right of an appeal, the Legislature has the right to extend or deny this remedy to the litigant. A case once tried is...
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