Carsner v. State

Decision Date02 April 2014
Docket NumberNo. 08–11–00326–CR.,08–11–00326–CR.
Citation415 S.W.3d 507
PartiesLaura CARSNER, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Robin Norris, El Paso, for Appellant.

Jaime E. Esparza, Dist. Atty., El Paso, for The State of Texas.

Before McCLURE, C. J., RIVERA, J., and LARSEN, J. (Senior Judge), sitting by assignment.

OPINION

GUADALUPE RIVERA, Justice.

Appellant, Laura Carsner, presents two issues on appeal from her conviction for capital murder.

BACKGROUND

A jury found Appellant guilty of capital murder for killing both her mother, Irma Quiroz, and her stepfather, Javier Quiroz, on August 29, 2009, and she was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.

At trial, evidence was presented that Irma had filed a formal complaint to Child Protective Services (CPS) alleging Appellant had physically abused, neglected, or could not care for Appellant's daughter, Andrea, due to Appellant's alcoholism and heavy drinking. Appellant initially informed CPS that Javier had molested her as a child and requested that Andrea not be placed with the Quirozes. Eventually, Appellant checked herself into a residential treatment facility and Andrea was permitted to live there with Appellant. Andrea was subsequently removed from the facility by CPS. According to Appellant, she was not permitted to visit Andrea thereafter. In May 2009, Appellant moved to Austin with the intent of reestablishing her chiropractic clinic there.

Court hearings to resolve the CPS matter were held in July 2009, and again on August 28, 2009, the day before the Quirozes were killed. Appellant returned from Austin to attend these hearings, which was the only way she learned of Andrea's progress. Appellant was unaware of where Andrea had been placed but believed both that Andrea had been placed in foster care and that any visits Andrea had with the Quirozes had been supervised.

At the first hearing in July 2009, Appellant was concerned that her parental rights would be terminated even though CPS had ruled out Appellant's alleged abuse of Andrea after determining that Andrea did not have any bruises, marks, or injuries. However, at the hearing on August 28, 2009, at which Appellant sought to ask the court to bar the Quirozes from weekend visitation with Andrea and was hopeful that the CPS case would be transferred to Austin, Appellant first learned that some of Andrea's visits with the Quirozes had been unsupervised. Appellant begged the judge to bar the Quirozes from unsupervised visitation with Andrea, revealed to the court that Javier had sexually molested Appellant for years as a child, and maintained that she had advised CPS of this fact.

Evidence from the August hearing showed that this was the first case for Ms. Hardin, the court-appointed special advocate (CASA) who, although knowing of Appellant's allegation of sexual abuse and without ever having interviewed the Quirozes, recommended that Andrea continue visits with them.1 When asked whether it was appropriate for Andrea to have unsupervised visits with the Quirozes, even though the sexual assault allegation had been made, Hardin answered, “This is my first time in court.... I am going to say, yes,” and noted that no outcry had been made directly to her. Hardin conceded that she had no knowledge of whether Andrea was having unsupervised contact with Javier, that she had not interviewed the Quirozes, but continued to express that she had no concerns about Javier. Hardin also testified that she was aware that Andrea had made an outcry of sexual abuse, but because Andrea had not made an outcry directly to her, Hardin had no concerns about placing Andrea with Javier despite Appellant's assertion that he had sexually abused her as a child. Hardin stated that, despite Appellant's assertions, she did not have any concerns, but concededthat she had not interviewed Appellant. Hardin admitted that she had heard at the hearing testimony that Andrea had made an allegation of sexual abuse against one of her cousins, and stated that although that was a concern of hers, she continued to recommend unsupervised visits with the Quirozes, even while acknowledging that Andrea's visits with her cousin had been at the Quirozes' home.

Appellant first learned of Andrea's sexual abuse outcry against her cousin during the August hearing. She also learned that Andrea had reported to another foster child that she had been raped by her “boyfriend.” This terrified Appellant because Javier had made Appellant call him her “boyfriend.”

Although CPS had not yet arranged for Andrea to be evaluated by a psychologist or examined by a psychiatrist, it had ruled out Andrea's sexual abuse outcries without investigating Javier. At the conclusion of the hearing, the CPS caseworker recommended that unsupervised visits with the Quiroz family continue and that Appellant be denied access to Andrea.

Appellant's friend of twenty-five years, Claudia, called Appellant on August 29, 2009, the day after the hearing, to find out what had happened. Claudia had been aware of Appellant's fear that Irma Quiroz would obtain custody of Andrea from Appellant, and described Appellant as being “beside herself” after the hearing. Claudia learned that “custody” had gone to Irma, that Appellant felt helpless, stated that she was going to “eliminate the situation,” and wanted to remove Andrea from the Quirozes' care.

That day, Appellant drove to the Quirozes' home, armed with a gun, for the asserted purpose of removing Andrea from the Quirozes and taking her to police to report Javier's sexual assaults upon Appellant and Andrea, to a physician for a medical examination, and to have someone help Andrea. Appellant approached the Quirozes in their backyard, and testified that she told them that she had come to take Andrea to the police station. According to Appellant, both Irma and Javier rushed towards her and [t]he gun went off,” striking Javier four times and Irma eight times, and killing them. Appellant testified that she did not go to the Quirozes' home with the intent of killing them, and did not mean to kill the Quirozes, but feared that the Quirozes would take the gun away from her because they knew she was going to the police, and feared also for Andrea's and her own safety.

During its closing argument, the State argued that Appellant had not directed any claims of sexual molestation against Javier until Irma reported Appellant to CPS, and that Appellant's claims should be viewed with skepticism. The State advised the jury to not think that if Appellant had been abused, she was entitled to commit murder. The State also contended that Appellant did not act in self-defense, that Appellant had never informed anyone before trial that she acted in self-defense, and asked the jury to consider whether the evidence was “manufactured for [Appellant's] defense....”

In its charge, the trial court instructed the jury regarding the offense of capital murder as well as the lesser-included offenses of manslaughter and criminally-negligent homicide, but overruled Appellant's objection to the omission of an instruction on self-defense.

After being convicted of capital murder and sentenced to confinement for life without the possibility of parole, Appellant filed a motion for new trial in which she claimed that material evidence favorable to her had been discovered since trial “such that there is a reasonable probability that it would bring about a different result in another trial” and that [the] evidence is admissible and not merely cumulative, corroborative, collateral or impeaching.” After conducting a hearing, the trial court denied Appellant's motion for new trial.

DISCUSSION
Motion for New Trial

In Issue One, Appellant complains that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion for new trial because, more than being merely cumulative or corroborative, Appellant's post-trial, newly-discovered evidence would have overcome the State's suggestion that Appellant's claims of sexual abuse by Quiroz had been recently fabricated and was absolutely critical to the success of her defensive strategy regarding her mental state at the time of the killings.

At the motion for new trial hearing, Appellant presented evidence that after she was sentenced, Henry O'Hara read a newspaper article regarding Appellant's conviction which indicated that she had been convicted after the district attorney had persuaded the jury that Appellant's assertion of childhood sexual abuse was recently fabricated. O'Hara had dated Appellant thirty years earlier, while Appellant was in high school. Their relationship ended after Appellant declined to engage in a more physically-intimate relationship. According to O'Hara, Appellant had informed him that the thought of physical intimacy with a man was frightening to her because she had been sexually molested by Appellant's stepfather or grandfather. O'Hara could not remember whether Appellant had identified her stepfather or grandfather as the sexual offender. O'Hara also recalled Appellant's description of an unusual form of abuse in which the abuser would hang Appellant upside down in the bathroom, smear raw hamburger on her body, and lick it off. Because he thought he should inform someone that Appellant's claim of childhood sexual abuse had not been fabricated, O'Hara spoke with two assistant district attorneys, provided a statement to police, and spoke with Appellant's defense counsel. Appellant thereafter sought a new trial, testified that she did not remember informing O'Hara of the sexual abuse, and asserted that O'Hara's testimony was newly-discovered evidence.

Standard of Review

We review a trial court's ruling on a motion for new trial for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Herndon, 215 S.W.3d 901, 906 (Tex.Crim.App.2007). We do not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court but, rather, decide whether the trial court's...

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3 cases
  • Carsner v. State
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • June 15, 2018
    ...the case under the fourth prong of the test. We therefore concluded that Appellant was entitled to a new trial. Carsner v. State, 415 S.W.3d 507, 514 (Tex. App.--El Paso 2013), vacated & remanded, 444 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). After granting the State's Petition for Discretionary Rev......
  • Carsner v. State, PD–0153–14.
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
    • September 24, 2014
    ...v. State, 106 S.W.3d 103, 108 (Tex.Crim.App.2003) ; Keeter v. State, 74 S.W.3d 31, 36–37 (Tex.Crim.App.2002).3 Carsner v. State, 415 S.W.3d 507, 512 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2013).4 Id. at 512–14.5 Id. at 514.6 Ground one states: “The Eighth Court erred by failing to address whether O'Hara's testi......
  • Carsner v. State, PD-0723-18
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
    • June 5, 2019
    ...Appellant's petition for discretionary review as improvidently granted.Delivered: June 5, 2019Do not publish 1. Carsner v. State, 415 S.W.3d 507 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2013), vacated, 444 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). 2. Carsner v. State, 444 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). 3. Carsner v. St......

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