Carson v. Colvin, CIVIL DOCKET NO.: 1:12-CV-262

• Decision Date: 23 January 2014
• Docket Number: CIVIL DOCKET NO.: 1:12-CV-262
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of North Carolina
• Parties: JAMES O. CARSON, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

JAMES O. CARSON, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN,Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

CIVIL DOCKET NO.: 1:12-CV-262

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA ASHEVILLE DIVISION

Signed: January 23, 2014

Memorandum and Order

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Plaintiff, JAMES O. CARSON's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 9) and Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment (Doc. 10) and Defendant, CAROLYN W. COLVIN's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 11) and Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment (Doc. 12). For the following reasons, this Court will DENY Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, GRANT Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and AFFIRM the Commissioner's determination.

I. BACKGROUND

On July 7, 2009, Plaintiff James O. Carson ("Plaintiff") filed an application for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq., and for Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") under Title XVI of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1383 et seq., alleging an inability to work due to a disabling condition beginning on June 20, 2008. (Doc. 12, at 2). Plaintiff's claim was initially denied on October 27, 2009 and again upon reconsideration on February 25, 2010. (Doc. 10, at 2). Subsequently, in response to Plaintiff's written request, a hearing was conducted on November 22, 2010, by Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") WendellM. Sims. (Docs. 10, 12).

In a decision issued on March 4, 2011, the ALJ denied Plaintiff's claim for disability benefits; finding that Plaintiff was not disabled under sections 216(i), 223(d) and 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Social Security Act. (Tr. 63). On May 5, 2011, Plaintiff filed a request for review of the ALJ decision by the Appeals Council of the Social Security Administration. (Doc. 12). However, the request was denied on June 22, 2012 by customary notice and the ALJ decision became the Commissioner's final decision. (Doc. 10). Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit on August 23, 2012, with the timely filing of a Complaint in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina to review the aforementioned final decision of the Commissioner. (Doc. 1).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and § 1383 (c)(3), limits this Court's review of a final decision of the Commissioner to: (1) whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's decision, Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390, 401 (1971); and (2) whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards. Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Hunter v. Sullivan, 993 F.2d 31, 34 (4th Cir. 1992) (per curiam).

Furthermore, the Social Security Act provides, "The findings of the Commissioner as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). As established in Smith v. Heckler, the Fourth Circuit defined "substantial evidence" as "[m]ore than a scintilla and doing more than creating a suspicion of the existence of a fact to be established. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Smith v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1176, 1179 (4th Cir. 1986). The Fourth Circuit has long recognized that it is the Court's responsibility neither to re-weigh the evidence, nor to substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner, so long as the Commissioner's final decision issupported by substantial evidence. Hays, 907 F.2d at 1456.

Ultimately, it is the duty of the Commissioner, not the courts, to make findings of fact and to resolve conflicts in the evidence. Id.; King v. Califano, 599 F.2d 597, 599 (4th Cir. 1979) ("This court does not find facts or try the case de novo when reviewing disability determinations."); Seacrist v. Weinberger, 538 F.2d 1054, 1056 - 57 (4th Cir. 1976) ("We note that it is the responsibility of the Commissioner and not the Courts to reconcile inconsistencies in the medical evidence, and that it is the claimant who bears the risk of non-persuasion.") Indeed, so long as the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, it must be affirmed, even if the reviewing court disagrees with the final outcome. Lester v. Schweiker, 683 F.2d 838, 841 (4th Cir. 1982).

When considering cross-motions for summary judgment, the court "examines each motion separately, employing the Rule 56(c) standard." Desmond v. PNGI Charles Town Gaming, L.L.C., 630 F.3d 351 (4th Cir. 2011) (internal citations omitted); Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 516, 523 (4th Cir. 2003) (the Court reviews each motion separately on its own merits in order to "determine whether either party deserves judgment as a matter of law") (internal citations omitted). When considering each individual motion, the court must take care to "resolve all factual disputes and any competing, rational inferences in the light most favorable" to the party opposing the motion. Rossignol, 316 F.3d at 523.

III. THE ALJ'S DECISION

The Social Security Regulations define "disability," for the purpose of obtaining disability benefits, as the "inability to do any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment¹ which can be expected to result in deathor which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a); see also Pass v. Chater, 65 F.3d 1200, 1203 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423 (d)(1)(A)).To satisfy this definition, a claimant must have a severe impairment which makes it impossible to do previous work or any other substantial gainful activity that exists in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B).

1. The Five-Step Sequential Analysis

The Commissioner adheres to a five-step sequential analysis when determining if a claimant is disabled, pursuant to 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. See Albright v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 174 F.3d 473, 475 n. 2 (4th Cir. 1999). The steps are as follows:

(1) Whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity.² If so, the claimant is not disabled and the analysis ends.

(2) Whether the claimant has a severe impairment.³ If not, then the claimant is not disabled and the analysis ends.

(3) Whether the impairment meets or equals the medical criteria of 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, which sets forth a list of impairments that warrant a finding of disability without considering vocational criteria. If so, the claimant is disabled andthe analysis is finished.

(4) Whether the impairment prevents the claimant from performing past relevant work. If not, the claimant is not disabled and the analysis ends.

(5) Whether the claimant is able to perform any other work considering both his Residual Functioning Capacity ("RFC")⁴ and his vocational abilities. If so, the claimant is not disabled.

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.

2. The Residual Functional Capacity Determination

Applying this process, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not engaged in "substantial gainful activity" since June 20, 2008 and Plaintiff suffered from several "severe impairments." (Tr. 13 - 15, Findings 1 - 3). Additionally, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff's impairment or combination of impairments did not meet or medically equal the criteria of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1⁵ and that Plaintiff had the Residual Functional Capacity ("RFC") to perform a reduced range of light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b). (Tr. 15 - 18, Findings 4 and 5). Based on the evidence as a whole, the ALJ determined that:

the claimant has the residual functioning capacity to perform a reduced range of light work as defined in C.F.R. 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b). The claimant is able to lift up to twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently. The claimant is able to perform a job that will allow him to alternate between sitting and standing every thirty minutes. The claimant can use his lower extremities occasionally for pushing and pulling. The claimantcan occasionally climb stairs, balance, and stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. The claimant can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, and should not work around hazards such as moving machinery or unprotected heights. The claimant can perform jobs that require occasional visual acuity. The claimant is able to perform simple, routine, repetitive tasks and meet the demands of "unskilled" work at a non-production pace and in an environment with occasional stress and occasional interpersonal interaction.

(Tr. 16). In reaching a conclusion regarding Plaintiff's RFC, the ALJ considered the evidence as a whole and found that "the claimant's medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms ; however, the claimant's statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms was not credible to the extent they were inconsistent with the...residual functional assessment." (Tr. 18).

3. Performance of Past Relevant Work

The ALJ held that Plaintiff was unable to perform the functional demands of any of his past relevant work as a furniture upholster. (Tr. 22). The Vocational Expert ("VE") testified, and the ALJ relied upon the VE's testimony, that the Plaintiff's previous position was "medium in exertion and skill" and that Plaintiff could no longer perform it. Id.

4. Adjustment to Existing Available Work in National Economy

The claimant endures the initial burden of proving the presence of a disability. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512, 416.202 - 03; Smith v. Califano, 592 F.2d 1235 (4th Cir. 1979). If Plaintiff can establish at step four that he cannot complete any work he has previously done in the past because of severe impairments, the burden then shifts to the Commissioner at step five. Hunter, 993 F.2d at 35; Wilson v. Califano, 617 F.2d 1050, 1053 (4th Cir. 1980). The Commissioner...