Carson v. Dunham
| Decision Date | 05 March 1889 |
| Citation | 149 Mass. 52,20 N.E. 312 |
| Parties | CARSON v. DUNHAM. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
S. Bartlett and R.D. Weston-Smith, for plaintiff.
Wiggin & Fernald, for defendant.
This court has, without doubt, the power to restrain a citizen of this commonwealth, who is personally within its jurisdiction from prosecuting a suit in the courts of a sister state or a foreign country, where justice and equity require it.
In Dehon v. Foster, 4 Allen, 545, the court, at the suit of the assignees of an insolvent debtor, enjoined a citizen of this commonwealth from prosecuting a suit in Pennsylvania against the debtor, in which his property was attached, because the effect of allowing the suit to go to judgment would be to give the attaching creditor a preference over the other creditors, and to defeat the operation of the insolvent law. Id., 7 Allen, 57. The doctrine of this case was reconsidered and reaffirmed in Cunningham v Butler, 142 Mass. 47, 6 N.E. 782. Both of these cases proceed upon the ground, as stated by Mr. Justice DEVENS that "the act of the defendant in causing the property of the insolvent debtors to be attached in a foreign jurisdiction tends directly to defeat the insolvent law in its most essential features, to prevent a portion of the property of the debtors from coming to the assignees to be equally distributed among their creditors, and to obtain a preference for themselves; that the defendants, being citizens of this state, were bound by its laws, and could not be permitted to do any acts to evade or counteract their operation, the effect of which would be to deprive other citizens of rights which those laws were intended to secure." But the general rule is that, where a case may be brought in either of two tribunals, that court which first obtains jurisdiction of the case retains it; and this extends upon principles of comity to cases of conflicting suits brought in the courts of sister states.
This court, in the exercise of its judicial discretion, will not restrain the prosecution of such a suit unless a clear equity is made out, requiring the interposition of the court to prevent a manifest wrong and injustice, or a clear waiver of our laws which should govern the rights of the parties.
In the case at bar the defendant, Dunham, brought a suit in a court of competent jurisdiction in the state of South Carolina to foreclose a mortgage upon a plantation called "Dean Hall," situated in that state. The history of the mortgage is as follows: William A. Carson, who owned Dean Hall, died in 1856, leaving a widow, the plaintiff in this suit, and two children. He appointed Robinson and Blacklock his executors, with authority to sell the property, and to hold the proceeds in trust for his widow and children. In 1857 the executors sold Dean Hall to one Ball, and took his bonds for $35,000, secured by a mortgage of the plantation, most of which they held in trust for the widow and children. On May 7, 1863, Ball sold the property to Hyatt, McBurney & Co., and Robinson, acting in the absence of his co-executor, received payments of the said bonds of Ball in Confederate treasury notes. On May 8, 1863, Hyatt, one of the partners, sold to his copartners his interest in the firm of Hyatt, McBurney, & Co., and took, as part of the consideration, a mortgage for $40,000 on Dean Hall. In July, 1886, the executrix of Hyatt assigned the said mortgage to Dunham, who, in August, 1886, brought the suit to foreclose it in the South Carolina court, as above stated. No personal service upon Mrs. Carson was made, but she appeared by counsel and defended the suit, "setting up as a defense all the facts alleged in the present bill."
If these were all the facts, it would seem to be clear that there was no ground for claiming that this court could properly interfere by injunction to restrain Dunham from prosecuting his suit. He had the right to bring his suit in the state court. A suit to foreclose the mortgage could only be brought in South Carolina. The land mortgaged is there, and most of the contracts which affect the rights of the parties were made there. The tribunals of that state, whose laws govern the title to the real estate and the interpretation of the contracts, are the appropriate tribunals to determine the rights of the parties. But it further appears that in 1866, Mrs. Carson, to whom her children had assigned all their interest, brought a bill in equity in the circuit court of the United States for the district of South Carolina against McBurney and others, but in which Hyatt was not made a party, in which the prayer was that the bonds given by Ball might be declared valid and subsisting securities, and the mortgage to secure the same a subsisting lien on Dean Hall. The case went to the supreme court of the United States, and in that court a decree was rendered in favor of Mrs. Carson, as prayed for. McBurney v. Carson, 99 U.S. 567.
In 1879 the executrix of Hyatt brought a suit to...
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