Carson v. Lewis

• Decision Date: 04 February 1999
• Docket Number: No. 95-CV-2802(JS).,95-CV-2802(JS).
• Citation: 35 F.Supp.2d 250
• Parties: Earl CARSON and Lydia Rivers, Plaintiffs, v. Detective William LEWIS, Chief Thomas Blomberg, and Suffolk County, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

35 F.Supp.2d 250

Earl CARSON and Lydia Rivers, Plaintiffs, v. Detective William LEWIS, Chief Thomas Blomberg, and Suffolk County, Defendants.

No. 95-CV-2802(JS).

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

February 4, 1999.

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Lawrence Kelly, Sayville, NY, for plaintiffs.

Scott Schneider, Assistant County Attorney, Suffolk County Department of Law, Hauppauge, NY, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

SEYBERT, District Judge.

Presently pending before the Court is Defendants' joint motion for summary judgment in this civil rights action, alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1981, and 1985, stemming from the arrest of Plaintiff Earl Carson and the search of Plaintiffs' residence. On or about March 6, 1998, this Court So Ordered a Stipulation of Discontinuance as against Defendants James Catterson, Suffolk County District Attorney, and William T. Ferris, III, Suffolk County Assistant District Attorney, and the present caption reflects this change.

On December 10, 1998, this Court heard oral argument on the original motion for partial summary judgment and directed the parties to brief why complete summary judgment should not be granted the Defendants. After consideration of all the briefs and exhibits submitted before and after the hearing, and the arguments advanced at the hearing, for the reasons that follow, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted in its entirety and Plaintiffs' complaint is dismissed with prejudice.

BACKGROUND

The facts as presented in Plaintiffs' complaint are that on or about July 13, 1992, Judith Monroe entered the Patchogue Post Office and passed an employee a note claiming she was abducted. The employee called 911 and passed on the information. The Suffolk County Police Department (hereinafter "SCPD") responded, investigated and arrested the Plaintiff Earl Carson for an outstanding bench warrant and ultimately for kidnaping and burglary. Monroe claimed that Carson abducted her from her home, burglarizing it in the process, and held her captive in Plaintiffs' residence while another male raped and sodomized her. Defendant Detective Lewis obtained and executed two search warrants for the premises rented by Earl Carson and Lydia Rivers, at 905 Sipp Avenue, East Patchogue, New York. A Grand Jury was convened and on July 17, 1992, it returned an indictment for burglary in the second degree against Earl Carson, however, new evidence was presented to a second Grand Jury in or about January 1993, which did not return a true bill and Carson was released from Suffolk County Jail.

Plaintiffs contend that the SCPD should have realized that Monroe, the complaining witness, was a drug user whose allegations were not credible. Further, Plaintiffs allege that the information provided in support of the application for a search warrant was knowingly false, made for the express purpose of garnering overtime, and that the resultant search exceeded the scope of its authority. In addition, Sergeant Pepper of the SCPD filed a report on or about July 14, 1992, which purportedly established that Carson should be released, however, Plaintiffs assert that the Defendants purposefully failed to act on the exculpatory information provided. Finally, the Plaintiffs maintain that the second Grand Jury was only assembled after Newsday ran a scathing article highlighting the lack of objective evidence supporting Carson's arrest.

Plaintiffs' first cause of action is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleging that because Plaintiffs are black they were treated differently than white citizens. Plaintiffs' second cause of action is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging police and prosecutorial misconduct. Plaintiffs' third cause of action is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), alleging that Defendants conspired to deprive Plaintiffs of the equal protection of law. Plaintiffs demand a jury trial and each seek approximately 90 million dollars in damages.

Defendants presently move for summary judgment asserting, inter alia, that no false arrest claim can exist because Carson was initially arrested for an outstanding bench warrant for failing to appear to answer a charge of driving while intoxicated. Defendants' also assert that an arrest based upon probable cause established through a private citizen's complaint is presumptively valid, and therefore, in light of the information known to the Defendants at the time of the arrest, the false arrest and malicious prosecutions claims must be dismissed as a matter of law. Defendants Detective William Lewis and Chief Thomas Blomberg also move for summary judgment with respect to Carson's false arrest and malicious prosecution claims on the grounds of qualified immunity. In that regard, Defendants assert that the existence of probable cause for the arrest precludes a § 1983 claim, irrespective of the Defendants' motivations, whether pure or otherwise. Finally, Defendants assert that a loss of consortium claim, as alleged by Plaintiff Lydia Rivers, is not actionable under § 1983.

DISCUSSION

I. STANDARDS FOR GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), courts may not grant a motion for summary judgment unless "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The burden of proof is on the moving party to show that there is no genuine issue of material fact, Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., L.P., 22 F.3d 1219, 1223 (2d Cir.1994) (citing Heyman v. Commerce & Indus. Ins. Co., 524 F.2d 1317, 1320 (2d Cir.1975)), and "all ambiguities must be resolved and all inferences drawn in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought." Id. (citing Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 249 (2d Cir.1985)). "Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (citing 10A Charles Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2725, at 93-95 (1983)).

A party opposing a motion for summary judgment "`may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but ... must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510 (quoting First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 1592, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968)). Under the law of the Second Circuit, "when no rational jury could find in favor of the nonmoving party because the evidence is so slight, there is no genuine issue of material fact and a grant of summary judgment is proper." Gallo, 22 F.3d at 1224 (citing Dister v. Continental Group, Inc., 859 F.2d 1108, 1114 (2d Cir.1988)).

It is within this framework that the Court addresses the present summary judgment motion.

II. FALSE ARREST

Plaintiffs' Section 1983 claims allege violations of the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments in connection with Carson's arrest and the search of their residence. Claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are guided by the tort law of the forum state. Russell v. Smith, 68 F.3d 33, 36 (2d Cir.1995); Singer v. Fulton County Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 118 (2d Cir.1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1189, 116 S.Ct. 1676, 134 L.Ed.2d 779 (1996).

As an initial consideration, an arrest pursuant to an outstanding warrant is presumptively valid. Golino v. City of New Haven, 950 F.2d 864, 870 (2d Cir.1991). At the Patchogue Post Office, Carson was taken into custody by one of the first assigned officers, Police Officer Soto, for violation of outstanding bench warrants arising from Carson's failure to appear to answer charges of driving while intoxicated and driving without a license, pursuant to New York State Vehicle and Traffic Law Sections 1192.2 and 509.1, respectively. Carson pled guilty on reduced charges, and as such, Carson's initial arrest was therefore lawful and Plaintiffs do not challenge the validity of this arrest. Any and all errors that arose with respect to the warrant procedures were not of a constitutional magnitude.

The next inquiry is whether the charges subsequently brought against Carson, burglary and kidnapping, violated his constitutional rights. To establish a claim under § 1983 for false arrest a plaintiff must show that: (1) the defendant intended to confine the plaintiff; (2) the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement; (3) the plaintiff did not consent to the confinement; and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged. Singer, 63 F.3d at 118. It cannot be gainsaid that a claim for false arrest will not stand where the arresting officer had probable cause. See Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 852 (2d Cir.1996); Zanghi v. Incorporated Village of Old Brookville, 752 F.2d 42, 45 (2d Cir.1985) ("It is abundantly clear that a finding of probable cause will defeat state tort claims for false arrest, false imprisonment and malicious prosecution."); Peterson v. County of Nassau, 995 F.Supp. 305, 313 (E.D.N.Y.1998) (citing Bernard v. United States, 25 F.3d 98, 102 (2d Cir.1994)); Decker v. Campus, 981 F.Supp. 851, 856 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("If there existed probable cause at the time of the arrest, the arrest is privileged, and the individual has no constitutional or statutory claim against the officer who made the arrest.").

Probable cause exists "when the officers have knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information of facts and circumstances that are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing a crime." Weyant, 101 F.3d at 852. Probable cause requires only a "probability or a substantial chance of criminal activity, not...