Carson v. Ray

• Decision Date: 31 August 1860
• Citation: 78 Am.Dec. 267,52 N.C. 609,7 Jones 609
• Parties: Doe on the demise of J. M. CARSON, v. JEREMIAH RAY.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

7 Jones (NC) 609

52 N.C. 609

78 Am.Dec. 267

Doe on the demise of J. M. CARSON,

v.JEREMIAH RAY.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

August Term, 1860.

“My house and lot in the town of Jefferson, in Ashe county North Carolina,” the grantor having a house and lot, and only one, in that town, was Held to be a sufficient description of the premises to pass them by deed.

ACTION of EJECTMENT, tried before HEATH, J., at the last Fall Term, of Ashe Superior Court.

The lessor of the plaintiff claimed title under a judgment and execution against one Long, and a sheriff's sale and deed, made thereon, all of which, with the defendant's possession, were admitted.

The defendant claimed title, and gave in evidence a deed to him, from the said Long, for the premises, for a full and valuable consideration, in which the premises are described as follows, to wit: “My house and lot in the town of Jefferson, in Ashe county, North Carolina.” The deed bore date and was executed prior to the teste of the execution, under which the lessor of the plaintiff claimed. At the time the said deed was executed, Long, the bargainor, had a fee simple right to this house and lot in the said town of Jefferson, and there was no evidence that he owned any other house and lot therein, nor was it so alleged.

It was contended that the defendant's deed was void, for uncertainty in the description of the premises, and that no title passed thereby, which was the only question debated between the counsel of the parties. A verdict was, by consent, rendered for the plaintiff, subject to the opinion of the Court on the question of law raised in the case, with leave for him to set it aside and enter a nonsuit, in case he should be of opinion against the plaintiff. Subsequently, on consideration of the question reserved, his Honor ordered the plaintiff to be nonsuited.

Boyden, for the plaintiff .

Crumpler, for the defendant .

BATTLE, J.

We agree with his Honor who tried the cause, that the description of the house and lot contained in the deed, under which the defendant claimed, was sufficiently certain to identify and convey the property. The terms, “my house and lot in the town of Jefferson,” if contained in a will, would, undoubtedly be sufficient to pass the testator's house and lot, in the absence of any proof to show that he had more than one. Thus, it was held in a strongly analagous case, that a bequest of “my twenty-five shares of bank stock,” when the testator had just that number of shares, was a specific legacy, while a designation of them as simply “twenty-five shares of stock,” without the prefix of the word “my” was a general legacy. Kinsey v. Rhine, 2 Ired. Rep., 192. If, then, such a description would be sufficiently certain in a will, we cannot perceive any reason why it should...