Carson v. Vill. of Dresden

• Decision Date: 16 June 1911
• Parties: CARSON v. VILLAGE OF DRESDEN.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

202 N.Y. 414

95 N.E. 803

CARSON

v.VILLAGE OF DRESDEN.

Court of Appeals of New York.

June 16, 1911.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

Action by Flora Carson against the Village of Dresden. From a judgment of the Appellate Division (137 App. Div. 927,122 N. Y. Supp. 1123), sustaining a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed and remanded.

W. Smith O'Brien, for appellant.

M. A. Leary, for respondent.

GRAY, J.

[1] The plaintiff brought this action against the defendant to recover damages; claiming to have sustained personal injuries in falling upon a defective sidewalk. She had a verdict in her favor, and the judgment entered thereon has been affirmed by the Appellate Division (137 App. Div. 927,122 N. Y. Supp. 1123). Upon the defendant's appeal to this court, several questions have been presented; but the only one which demands consideration relates to the sufficiency of the statement of the plaintiff's claim filed with the village clerk. The statute (Village Law, § 322, L. 1897, c. 414) provides that ‘no action shall be maintained against the village for damages for a personal injury * * * unless a written verified statement of the nature of the claim and of the time and place at which such injury is alleged to have been received shall have been filed,’ etc. The plaintiff alleged in the complaint that such a statement, following the language of the statute, was filed. The defendant's answer admitted that ‘a statement of plaintiff's alleged claim against defendant was filed’; but denied ‘that such statement was sufficient under the statute.’ On the trial, the plaintiff did not offer in evidence the statement; but the defendant, at the conclusion of the plaintiff's case, put it in evidence and based a motion for a nonsuit upon its inadequacy under the requirements of the village law. The motion was denied, and the ruling was excepted to. The statement was addressed to the trustees and village clerk and read as follows: ‘I claim a cause of action against said village of Dresden for $5,000, by reason of defects in a sidewalk in said village on Seneca street, and the following is a statement of such cause of action: On the 12th day of January, 1907, I was walking along said street and stepped upon a plank which was loose, and my feet went into a hole;’ continuing by stating the nature of her fall and consequent injury. This statement of the plaintiff's claim was not a compliance with the provision of the village law; for it failed to give any description of the place where the accident happened. Seneca street is three-quarters of a mile in length, and this notice does not give the slightest indication upon which side of the street, or in what part of it, the plaintiff fell. As we held in the case of Purdy v. City of New York, 193 N. Y. 521, 523,86 N. E. 560, 561, the statute requires ‘such a statement as will enable the municipal authorities to locate the place and fix the time of an accident.’ In that case a notice was held to be fatally defective, which stated: ‘Whilst walking along the sidewalk on Milford street, borough of Brooklyn, in the nighttime, I was caused to fall into an opening, gully, or trench running across said sidewalk,’ etc. There was even an attempt at greater particularity than in this case, in referring to the trench; but it was held that, with a street a mile in length, such a statement, not fixing the side of it, or a point in it, had failed to comply with the law. The statute was not intended to make difficult the recovery of any just claim for damages; it was intended to protect the municipality, as far as reasonably possible, by requiring that a notice of the claim be given, which shall apprise it sufficiently for the purposes of an investigation...