Carswell v. State
| Decision Date | 23 May 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. S05A0367.,S05A0367. |
| Citation | 279 Ga. 342,613 S.E.2d 636 |
| Parties | CARSWELL v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Robert P. Westin, Gordon, for Appellant.
Fredric Daniel Bright, Dist. Atty., Shelley S. Tice, Asst. Dist. Atty., Thurbert E. Baker, Atty. Gen., Raina Jeager Nadler, Asst. Atty. Gen., for Appellee.
The appellant, Larondney Carswell, appeals from his conviction for the malice murder and armed robbery of Marvin Godfrey.1 On appeal, Carswell contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress several statements that he gave to the police on the day of his arrest. Because we find no merit to this contention, and because we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support his convictions, we affirm Carswell's convictions for malice murder and armed robbery.
1. The evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find that Carswell knew that the victim, who was an acquaintance of Carswell's, routinely carried large sums of money on him; that Carswell planned to rob the victim in the early morning hours of December 3, 2001; and that, during that robbery, Carswell's co-defendant shot and killed the victim. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, it was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find Carswell guilty of malice murder and armed robbery beyond a reasonable doubt.2
2. On the day of the crimes, Carswell gave a series of five statements to the police over a span of approximately twelve to fourteen hours. Carswell moved to suppress evidence of the statements, but the trial court denied the motion. At trial, the State introduced evidence of the first, third, fourth, and fifth statements. On appeal, Carswell contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. For the reasons that follow, we disagree.
a. Carswell contends that the second statement was the result of questioning by a police officer; that the record does not show whether the officer informed Carswell's of his Miranda rights; that the State failed to carry its burden to show that the second statement was voluntary and not coerced; and that, therefore, the second statement, which contained the first inculpatory statements by Carswell,3 must be considered to be coerced and involuntary. Carswell further contends that the involuntary second statement tainted all subsequent statements, and that all subsequent statements should have been suppressed.4 We conclude, however, that this contention is without merit.
Carswell correctly notes that the record does not demonstrate whether Officer Chatman, who conducted the second interview, informed Carswell of his Miranda rights before that interview.5 However, even assuming that he did not, the failure to do so is of no consequence, as Carswell was informed of and waived his Miranda rights before the first interview and as the second interview, as well as the subsequent ones, were part of a continuous series of interviews. For these reasons, Officer Chatman was not required to inform Carswell of his Miranda rights before the second interview.6 Moreover, Agent Williams of the Georgia Bureau of Investigations, who participated in the first interview, and who conducted the third, fourth, and fifth interviews, testified that, before she conducted the third interview with Carswell, she asked Carswell if he had been forced to make any statements, and he responded that he had not. Also, in response to Agent Williams's questions before the third interview, Carswell stated that he had been treated fairly over the course of the morning of December 3, that he had not been promised anything, and that he was not under the influence of any alcohol or drugs. In this regard, Carswell mentioned to Agent Williams that he had spoken with Officer Chatman about the crime, but Carswell never stated that Chatman had treated him unfairly or coerced him into making a statement. Additionally, before the first and third interviews, Carswell acknowledged that he had a background in law enforcement, was familiar with Miranda rights, and was a high school graduate. Considering the totality the circumstances, we conclude that the second statement was freely and voluntarily given by Carswell.7
b. Carswell also contends that due to the length of time (12 to 14 hours) over which the five interviews occurred, and due to the fact that he was constantly in the presence of law enforcement officials during that time, all five of his...
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