Carter County R-1 School Dist. v. Palmer

• Decision Date: 19 January 1982
• Docket Number: No. 12197,R-1,12197
• Citation: 627 S.W.2d 664
• Parties: 2 Ed. Law Rep. 1226 CARTER COUNTYSCHOOL DISTRICT, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Joe Wayne PALMER, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 664

627 S.W.2d 664

2 Ed. Law Rep. 1226

CARTER COUNTY R-1 SCHOOL DISTRICT, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Joe Wayne PALMER, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 12197.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, Division Three.

Jan. 19, 1982.

John Gianoulakis, Mark J. Bremer, Robert A. Useted, Kohn, Shands, Elbert, Gianoulakis & Giljum, St. Louis, for plaintiff-respondent.

H. Lynn Henry, Henry, Henry & Henry, P. C., West Plains, for defendant-appellant.

TITUS, Judge.

Joe Palmer had an indefinite contract as a permanent teacher with the Carter County R-1 School District. §§ 168.104(3), (4) and (6). ¹ The board of education (§ 168.104(1) ) of the school district terminated Palmer's contract for alleged violations of § 168.114-1(4). Upon appeal, the Circuit Court of Carter County affirmed the board's action and Palmer appealed to this court. This tribunal reversed and remanded the "case to the circuit court with directions to enter judgment in accordance with §§ 168.116, subd. 4, and 168.120, subd. 4, RSMo 1969, reinstating appellant to the status of a permanent teacher ...." Carter County School District, R-1 v. Palmer, 582 S.W.2d 347 (Mo.App.1979).

The school district's motion for rehearing or transfer was denied. Its application to the Supreme Court for transfer met a similar fate and it was not until September 4, 1979, that the circuit court entered judgment that Palmer "be and is hereby ordered reinstated to the status of a permanent teacher ...." A certified copy of the judgment was served upon the school district on or about September 20, 1979, and was not effective upon the district until that date. Ex parte Le Mond, 295 Mo. 586, 595, 245 S.W. 1057, 1059(2) (banc 1922); Rule 74.33. By the time service was effected, teachers' assignments had been made and the 1979-80 school year had commenced. Palmer, who was certified to teach kindergarten through the twelfth grade, had been teaching English in a junior high school for two years before his employment had been wrongfully terminated. When he was reinstated to the status of permanent teacher following service of the circuit court's judgment, Palmer was assigned to teach kindergarten for the 1979-80 term. Later, the school district assigned Palmer to teach remedial mathematics in grades four through eight in the 1980-81 school year. Thereafter on August 22, 1980, Palmer moved the circuit court to declare the school district in contempt of the order that he be "reinstated to the status of a permanent teacher." In this court, Palmer contends that pursuant to the above mentioned judgment, he was not only entitled to be reinstated "to the status of permanent teacher" but was additionally entitled to be reinstated to his former position as a teacher of English in the junior high school or the equivalent thereof. We are not advised what position is claimed to be equivalent to teaching junior high school English. After a hearing on the motion and due proceedings, the trial court entered its order finding that the school district was not in contempt. Palmer appealed.

As already noted, the judgment of the court nisi faithfully aped the language of § 168.120-4 that Palmer "shall be restored to permanent teacher status." The same directives have been used in similar cases. E.g., Bishop v. Bd. of Ed. of Francis Howell Sch. Dist., St. Charles, 575 S.W.2d 827, 829 (Mo.App.1978); Dameron v. Bd. of Ed. of Lebanon Sch. Dist. R-3, 549 S.W.2d 671, 677 (Mo.App.1977); Pollard v. Bd. of Ed. Reorg. Sch. Dist. No. III, Platte County, 533 S.W.2d 667, 671 (Mo.App.1976).

To support a charge of contempt for disobedience of a judgment, decree or order, the court's pronouncement may not be expanded by implication in the contempt proceeding and must be so definite and specific as to leave no reasonable basis for doubt of its meaning. State ex rel. Girard v. Percich, 557 S.W.2d 25, 37(16) (Mo.App.1977); Gerard v. Kodner, 468 S.W.2d 677, 681(7) (Mo.App.1971). In deciding the validity vel non of a charge of contempt for disobeying an order, judgment or decree, the general rules of construction apply. Words and clauses used in the order, judgment or decree must be construed in accordance with their natural import. Mo. Fed. of Blind v. Nat. Fed. of Blind of Mo., Inc., 546 S.W.2d 182, 186(5) (Mo.App.1976). Moreover, the trial court's judgment in a contempt action will not be disturbed upon appeal unless its discretion has been grossly abused. Clark v. Francis B. Freeman Const. Co., Inc., 535 S.W.2d 531, 533(1) (Mo.App.1976).

In the hearing on the contempt charge, Palmer lamented his one year's assignment to teach kindergarten and his later position to instruct on remedial mathematics because he had no prior experience, interest or desire to teach either. Of course, when he moved to have the school district declared in contempt, the kindergarten assignment had been completed and was hardly a viable issue. However, conspicuously absent from Palmer's presentation was any evidence that he had ever complained to anyone in authority regarding these teaching assignments. Palmer acknowledged school had commenced before his reinstatement and opined the junior high school English position had probably been filled before that time. As the trial court correctly observed at the conclusion of Palmer's presentments, no evidence had been tendered to show his assignments following reinstatement were punitive rather than administrative in nature. The school district's superintendent testified that when Palmer was reinstated no teaching position but kindergarten was open without changing prior assignments of other teachers and this had lasted but one school year before Palmer was assigned to teach remedial mathematics, apparently a...