Carter for Carter v. Sec. of Health & Human Services

• Decision Date: 25 November 1985
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 84-4649.
• Parties: Wanda CARTER for Lakesha and Felicia CARTER, Plaintiff, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

625 F. Supp. 281

Wanda CARTER for Lakesha and Felicia CARTER, Plaintiff, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 84-4649.

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, S.D.

November 25, 1985.

Diane M. Kwitoski, Detroit, Mich., for plaintiff.

Ross I. MacKenzie, Asst. U.S. Atty., Detroit, Mich., for defendant.

ORDER

JULIAN ABELE COOK, Jr., District Judge.

The Court has reviewed the file, the Magistrate's Report and Recommendation and the Plaintiff's agreement with that Report. The Magistrate made several recommendations. This Court accepts the following. Under a statutory rather than a constitutional analysis of 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A), this Court concludes that the applicable law, which was in effect at the time of the application, governs. In applying that law to the instant case, this Court concludes that there is substantial evidence on the record to support the Administrative Law Judge's decision that Lakesha and Felicia Carter had inheritance rights under Michigan law requiring "a mutually acknowledged relationship of parent and child." Thus, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and the action is remanded to the Secretary of Health and Human Services for a computation and payment of benefits.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

JUDGMENT

The Court has reviewed the file, the Magistrate's Report and Recommendation and Plaintiff's agreement with the Report. The Defendant has not timely filed any objections. The Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate is hereby accepted and adopted as the findings and conclusions of the Court.

IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff is granted and the case returned to the Secretary for a computation and payment of the benefits to which Plaintiff is entitled.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk serve a copy of this Judgment by United States mail on the counsel for Plaintiff and on the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Michigan.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

October 31, 1985

STEVEN D. PEPE, United States Magistrate.

This is a review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of a denial of child's insurance benefits.

The worker, Leonard Nabors, died on May 7, 1977. Plaintiff applicants applied for benefits on June 15, 1982, claiming that Leonard Nabors was their father. Lakesha Carter was born out of wedlock on October 8, 1976, and Felicia Carter was born out of wedlock on January 7, 1975. A decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) granting plaintiffs benefits was overturned by the Appeals Council, which claimed that the ALJ made an error of law. Before considering the specific facts of this case, some background on the law would be appropriate.

THE APPLICABLE LAW FOR CHILD'S SURVIVOR BENEFITS

An individual can receive child's survivor benefits under 42 U.S.C. § 402(d) if five conditions are met:

I. An application is filed.

II. The applicant is unmarried.

III. The applicant is under age 18, a full-time student under age 22, or under a disability before age 22.

IV. The applicant is a child of the insured worker under 42 U.S.C. § 416(d).

V. The applicant is dependent on the insured worker at the time of death.

In this case, there is no dispute regarding the first three conditions. The dispute centers on issues IV and V.

a. Eligibility Issue IV — Being a "child" under the Act:

There are four ways in which an applicant can be a "child" within the meaning of the Act. These can be labeled and defined as follows:

A. "The Inheritance Child" (42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A)).

If one would be a child under the state laws of the insured worker's domicile at the time of his death which determine the devolution of intestate personal property, one would be a child under the Act (or deemed a child if treated equivalently of a child under the appropriate state laws). (Most biological and adopted children would fall under this section.)

B. "The Flawed Marriage Child" (42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(B)).

If one would be a son or daughter of an insured who undertook a purported marriage ceremony made defective by a procedural flaw or a prior undissolved marriage one would be deemed a child under the Act.

C. "The Written Acknowledgment or Court Decree Child" (42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(3)(C)(i)).

If one is a son or daughter, but not a child (or deemed to be a child) under A or B above, one can be deemed to be a child of a deceased worker if a written acknowledgment, court decree of parenthood or support made prior to death established the applicant as a son or daughter.

D. "The Other Evidence of Parentage Child" (42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(3)(C)(ii)).

Other evidence satisfactory to the Secretary shows the insured worker to be the mother or father of the applicant and the insured was either living with or contributing to the support of the applicant at the time the insured died.

b. Eligibility Issue V — Being "Dependent" Under the Act:

A "child" is deemed "dependent" under the Act if he is a legitimate or adopted child 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(3). A child is deemed "legitimate" for the 402(d)(3) dependency test if he is a flawed marriage child under 416(h)(2)(B) or a written acknowledgment/court decree child or an other evidence of parentage child under § 416(h)(3)(C).

Type B, C and D children are all deemed dependent. Type D other evidence of parentage children are also deemed to fulfill eligibility condition V on "dependency" since proofs of living with the insured or supporting the insured were necessary to establish eligibility condition IV on being a child.¹ Again, the Type D other evidence of parentage child is an illegitimate child of the insured who cannot inherit from the insured and for whom there is no written acknowledgment of paternity, filiation or support decree.

Under the Act, if an applicant meets the definition of "child", it is likely that the child applicant will be "deemed" dependent on the insured notwithstanding who supports the child or where the child lives. One small group of insured children who are not "deemed" dependent on the insured are illegitimate Type A inheritance children with whom the insured does not live and to whom the insured does not contribute funds, goods or services for support. This small group of illegitimate Type A inheritance children must prove their actual dependency on the insured to be eligible for survivors benefits.

Plaintiffs' counsel asserts that each of the plaintiffs is either a Type A inheritance child, or Type C court decree child. For reasons stated below, it appears that each is either a Type A inheritance child or a Type D other evidence of parentage child. While the Michigan Probate Court did enter a decree establishing that the plaintiffs were the children of the deceased worker, this decree was entered after the worker's death, and 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(3) (C)(i)(III) requires that any such court decree be made before the death of the insured.

MICHIGAN INHERITANCE LAW

At the time of the wage earner's death in 1977, Michigan Compiled Laws, § 702.83, provided for the legitimation of a child born out of wedlock either by intermarriage of the parents or by written acknowledgment of paternity which is executed and acknowledged in the same manner as real estate deeds and recorded in the Probate Court where the parents reside. An Amendment to the Probate Code, § 700.111(4)(c), effective July 1, 1979, provided an additional means to establish a parent/child relationship for purposes of intestate inheritance. Under the new provision, if it could be established that the father and child bore a "mutually acknowledged relationship of parent and child" which began before the child became 18 years of age and continued until the death of either, such a child could inherit.

BACKGROUND FACTS

Following the death of Leonard Nabors on May 7, 1977, his mother, on July 27, 1977, filed an application for lump sum death benefits. She indicated that plaintiff was not married or survived by any children. On February 19, 1982, Wanda Carter filed for child's benefits on behalf of Lakesha and Felicia Carter. In the application, she noted that the children were not living with the insured at the time of his death and that Nabors had made no noncash contributions to the children and that the sole source of support for the children at the time of his death was AFDC payments.

In an Order of September 24, 1981, as amended October 1, 1981, the Wayne County Circuit Court (Tr. 75) determined that Lakesha T. Carter and Felicia J. Carter were children and heirs of the deceased and, thus, capable of taking under a wrongful death action brought on behalf of the estate. They each took approximately 31.5% of the estate, and the deceased's mother received 34.6%. These divisions were certified by the Circuit Court Judge to the Wayne County Probate Court. The Wayne County Probate Court, on November 19, 1981, determined that Lakesha Carter and Felicia Carter were heirs of the deceased (Tr. 69). The court records also note that during the deceased worker's lifetime, he and each child had a mutually acknowledged relationship as parent and child, which relation continued until his death, and the children thereafter bore a relationship to his mother as between grandparent and grandchild. The record further indicates that the court record shows that the deceased worker and Wanda Jean Carter, the applicants' mother, were scheduled to be married on May 14, 1977, which marriage did not occur due to Leonard Nabors' death on May 7, 1977 (Tr. 76).

The reconsideration decision considered plaintiff's application under the standards of the Type A inheritance child, § 416(h)(2)(A), and the Type D other evidence of parentage child, § 416(h)(3)(C)(ii). With regard to the new legitimation standard in the Michigan Probate Code effective July 1, 1979 — of the "mutually acknowledged relationship" test — the reconsideration decision noted that this test applied to individuals who died on or after July 1, 1979 (Tr. 60). It noted that it was not bound by the...