Carter, In re
| Decision Date | 16 April 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 7415DC888,7415DC888 |
| Citation | 213 S.E.2d 409,25 N.C.App. 442 |
| Parties | In re Vincent LeGrande CARTER. |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
Atty. Gen. Rufus L. Edmisten by Asst. Atty. Gen. Parks H. Icenhour, Raleigh, for petitioner-appellee.
Jerry Davenport, Hillsborough, for respondent-appellant.
Though respondent has been released, her appeal is not moot. So long as the judgment of involuntary commitment remains unchallenged, potentially adverse collateral consequences may continue. For example, the record discloses a controversy between respondent and her husband over custody of their child, and the judgment here appealed from may well affect the determination of the controversy. Furthermore, the statute expressly provides that appeal may be had from a judgment of involuntary commitment in the district court to this court, as in civil cases. G.S. § 122--58.9. Since the statute also directs that the initial period of commitment may not exceed 90 days, G.S. § 122--58.8(b), there woould be little reason to provide a right of appeal if the appeal must be considered moot solely because the period of commitment expires before the appeal can be heard and determined in this court. Accordingly, we consider this appeal on its merits.
Chapter 122, Article 5A of the General Statutes, which became effective 12 June 1974, provides:
' § 122--58.2. Definitions.--As used in this Article:
'(1) The phrase 'dangerous to himself' includes, but is not limited to, those mentally ill or inebriate persons who are unable to provide for their basic needs for food, clothing, or shelter;
'(2) The words 'inebriety' and 'mental illness' have the same meaning as they are given in G.S. 122--36 . . .'
The statute provides for a hearing in the district court upon a petition for involuntary commitment. G.S. § 122--58.7. Subsection (i) of that section is as follows:
Thus, statutory mandate requires as a condition to a valid commitment order that the district court find two distinct facts: first, that the respondent is mentally ill or inebriate, as those words are defined in G.S. § 122--36; and second, that the respondent is 'imminently dangerous to himself or others.' The application of this dual requirement is the sole question on this appeal.
In the order appealed from, findings of fact 8, 9 and 10 are as follows:
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