Carter v. Beals
| Decision Date | 02 December 1966 |
| Docket Number | No. 18580,18580 |
| Citation | 248 S.C. 526,151 S.E.2d 671 |
| Parties | A. P. CARTER, Jr., Respondent, v. Carl D. BEALS, Appellant. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
I. A. Smoak, of Smoak & Smoak, Walterboro, Charlton B. Horger, of Horger & Horger, Orangeburg, for appellant.
Randolph Murdauth, of Murdaugh, Eltzroth & Peters, Hampton, for respondent.
This action was brought by the respondent against the appellant to recover damages for personal injuries allegedly suffered by him as a result of a collision between the automobile which he was driving in a northerly direction on Fishburne Street in the Town of Walterboro, and a police car driven by the appellant, a police officer of the Town of Walterboro, traveling easterly on U.S. Highway 17--A, otherwise known as Wichman Street. The aforesaid highways intersect at right angles.
The complaint alleged that the injuries of the respondent were proximately caused by the negligent, willful, wanton and reckless acts and omissions of the appellant in that he was driving the police car at a high and dangerous rate of speed, exceeding that which was lawful in view of the existing conditions; and, while so operating said automobile he failed to sound the siren and turn on the red light of the automobile as required of police cars by Section 46--292 of the Code. It was further alleged that the appellant failed to have the police car under proper control; to apply the brakes on the police car and reduce its speed when approaching the aforesaid intersection; to yield the right of way to the respondent who had entered the intersection prior to the appellant, and to keep a proper lookout and exercise due care in the operation of the police car in a manner commensurate with the dangers and obstacles to be encountered at the time and place, and without regard to the care required by the circumstances.
The appellant, by answer, interposed (1) a general denial; (2) that respondent's injuries were due to his own negligent, willful and wanton acts; and (3) the respondent's contributory negligence, willfulness and wantonness.
The case came on for trial before The Honorable Frank Eppes, Presiding Judge, and a jury, at the December 1965 term of the Court of Common Pleas for Colleton County, and resulted in a verdict in favor of the respondent for actual and punitive damages.
At appropriate stages of the trial, the appellant made motions for a non-suit and directed verdict in his favor and, after the verdict, for judgment Non obstante veredicto, or, in the alternative, for a new trial; and for judgment Non obstante veredicto as to punitive damages. These motions were refused by the trial judge and this appeal followed.
The exceptions of the appellant present three questions, one of which has been abandoned by the appellant. The remaining two questions for determination are: (1) Did the evidence require the conclusion, as a matter of law, that respondent was guilty of contributory negligence and willfulness in failing to yield the right of way to the appellant; and (2) Did the trial judge err in failing to direct a verdict as to punitive damages or for judgment Non obstante veredicto on the grounds that there was no evidence of negligence, gross negligence, willfulness, or recklessness on the part of the appellant to support an award of punitive damages.
It is a well established rule of law in passing upon the exceptions of the appellant to the refusal of the trial judge to grant their motions, it is incumbent upon this court to view the evidence and the inferences fairly deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the respondent. If more than one reasonable inference can be drawn from the evidence the case must be submitted to the jury. However, if the evidence is susceptible of only one reasonable inference, the question is no longer one for the jury but one of law for the court. Warren v. Watkins Motor Lines, 242 S.C. 331, 130 S.E.2d 896.
The collision here involved occurred about 10:20 P.M. on March 30, 1963, at the intersection of Wichman Street, U.S. Highway No. 17--A, and Fishburne Street, in the Town of Walterboro. The two cars collided approximately at the center of the intersection, the appellant's car striking the left side of the car driven by the respondent. Traffic on Fishburne Street is required to stop before entering its intersection with Wichman Street. A sign so indicating was located on the said Fishburne Street. The posted speed limit for traffic on Wichman Street is twenty-five miles per hour and such is a primary street and Fishburne Street is a secondary street.
A highway patrolman went to the scene of the collision shortly after it occurred. He testified that a stop sign was located on Fishburne Street but that a motorist stopping where said sign was located could not see traffic approaching from his left, this being the direction from which the appellant was approaching the intersection. In order for the respondent to be able to see an automobile approaching the intersection of these two streets from the driver's left it was necessary to move the automobile out near the curb of Wichman Street. At this point a motorist could see down Wichman Street to the left, a distance of two hundred and fifty to three hundred feet. This officer testified that the car of the appellant made four skid marks on Wichman Street, two of them measuring forty-nine feet eleven inches and forty-one feet seven inches. He also testified that there was debris in the center and across the center line on the westbound lane of Wichman Street. He further testified that the appellant admitted that he was driving at about thirty-five miles an hour and with two officers in the car with him was chasing an automobile.
The respondent testified that he was driving in a northerly direction along Fishburne Street approaching Wichman Street. He observed the stop sign and stopped his car there but because of flowers and shubbery he could not see to his left. He then drove to the curb of Wichman Street where he stopped, and a car passed in front of him going east at a high rate of...
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