Carter v. Board of Review Under Oklahoma Employment Sec. Act
| Decision Date | 18 March 1958 |
| Docket Number | No. 37811,37811 |
| Citation | 323 P.2d 362,1958 OK 73 |
| Parties | Zelma C. CARTER, Annie J. Clements, Billie F. Collie, Oliver D. Ervin, Velma F. Graham, Mildred A. Lusk, Dorothy D. Mann, Joe M. Marler, Frank Smith, and John Lee Stach, Plaintiffs in Error, v. The BOARD OF REVIEW UNDER OKLAHOMA EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT, Oklahoma Employment Security Commission and Douglas Aircraft Company, Inc., a corporation, Defendants in Error. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Prorata vacation pay and sick leave pay, to which employee, laid off through no fault or desire of his own, was entitled under collective bargaining agreement at rate of specified percentage of earnings since last preceding annual computation date, constituted wages payable with respect to period commencing immediately upon termination of employment and continuing until such vacation pay and sick leave pay had been used up at his current hourly wage, and hence during such period he was not 'unemployed' within meaning of Oklahoma Employment Security Act and was ineligible for unemployment benefits.
2. In a proceeding to secure unemployment compensation benefits under the Oklahoma Employment Security Act, the burden of proof to establish claimant's rights to benefits rests upon claimant, and the findings of Board of Review as to facts, if supported by evidence and in absence of fraud, are conclusive, and jurisdiction of court on appeal is confined to questions of law.
Appeal from the District Court of Tulsa County; W. Lee Johnson, Judge.
Action by Zelma C. Carter and others to review decision of Oklahoma Employment Security Commission and the Board of Review denying claim for unemployment compensation. From judgment sustaining order of Board of Review, claimants appeal. Affirmed.
Dyer, Powers & Gotcher, James D. Bass, Tulsa, for plaintiffs in error.
Homer L. Hurt and Roy W. Riegle, Jr., Tulsa, for Douglas Aircraft Co., Inc.
Burton Duncan and Milton R. Elliott, Oklahoma City, for Oklahoma Employment Security Commission.
This case arises under the Oklahoma Employment Security Act, 40 O.S.1951 sec. 211 et seq., and is an appeal by Zelma C. Carter and others, hereinafter referred to as claimants, from a judgment of the District Court of Tulsa County which upheld or approved a decision of the Board of Review holding that claimants were not unemployed during certain periods immediately following the termination of their employment and that consequently they were ineligible for unemployment compensation during said periods.
Claimants were all employees of Douglas Aircraft Company whose services had been terminated by Douglas between April 6 and April 27, 1956. Pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement between the Union and Douglas, each claimant, upon being discharged, was paid the full salary or wages due him and in addition received a further sum designated as 'vacation pay', and some of them received a further sum designated as 'sick leave pay'. Immediately following their discharge, claimants all filed applications with the Oklahoma Employment Security Commission for unemployment compensation under the provisions of the Oklahoma Employment Security Act, supra. Such Commission held that claimants were not unemployed for the period immediately following their respective discharges, finding that the vacation pay and sick leave pay received by them were wages under said Act, and that such wages were paid with respect to the week or weeks immediately following the discharges; that such pay should be apportioned out to said period immediately following the discharges on a weekly basis of the regular weekly wages, computed at the hourly wage rate for 40 hours per week; that claimants could not be eligible for benefits until after exhaustion of the time for which said pay was apportioned. Under said holding a few of the claimants were disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation for one week, most of them were disqualified for two weeks and a few of them were disqualified for three weeks, depending in each case upon the amount of vacation pay and sick leave pay which they had received when discharged. All of the claimants were paid unemployment compensation after the expiration of the disqualification period if they continued to be unemployed and filed claims, and the controversy relates only to the one, two or three week period during which each claimant was held to be disqualified by virtue of having received vacation pay and sick leave pay.
40 O.S.1951 sec. 214, Laws 1953, p. 142, sec. 3, provides in effect that an unemployed individual shall be eligible to receive benefits with respect to any week only if the commission finds that he has filed a claim therefor; that he has registered for work at the employment office; that he is able and available for work; that he has been unemployed for a waiting period of one week; and that he has earned certain wages in the past. 40 O.S.1951 sec. 229(j) Laws 1955, p. 242, § 1, defines 'unemployment' as follows:
'An individual shall be deemed 'unemployed' with respect to any week during which he performed no services and with respect to which no wages are payable to him, or with respect to any week of less than full-time work if the wages are payable to him, or with respect to such week are less than his weekly benefit amount plus Seven Dollars ($7.00).'
Sub-section (l) of the same section defines the term 'wages' as follows:
"Wages' means all remuneration for services from whatever source, including commissions and bonuses and the cash value of all remuneration in any medium other than cash. Gratuities customarily received by an individual in the course of his work from persons other than his employing unit shall be treated as wages received from his employing unit. The reasonable cash value of remuneration in any medium other than cash, and the reasonable amount of gratuities, shall be estimated and determined in accordance with rules prescribed by the Commission; provided that the term 'wages' shall not include: * * *
'(4) Dismissal payments after December 31, 1939, which the employing unit is not legally required to make by law or contract.'
Admittedly, no services were rendered by claimants for Douglas during the period immediately following the dates of their respective discharges, but claimants did receive wages, for we think it is obvious that the vacation pay and sick leave pay which they received constituted wages and were not gratuities. Such payments were required by the terms of the collective bargaining agreement negotiated between the labor union and Douglas, and therefore do not fall under exception (4) of the statute above quoted as dismissal payments which the employing unit was not legally required to make by law or contract. The question is, however, whether such wages were payable 'with respect to' the period immediately following separation from employment. If said wages were not paid 'with respect to' such period in question, then claimants were unemployed during such period and consequently were...
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