Carter v. Carter

• Decision Date: 06 June 1956
• Citation: 88 So.2d 153
• Parties: Ruby J. CARTER, Petitioner, v. Hunter J. CARTER, Sr., and Clara Brown, as administratrix of the estate of Hunter J. Carter, Jr., deceased, Respondents.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 153

88 So.2d 153

Ruby J. CARTER, Petitioner, v. Hunter J. CARTER, Sr., and Clara Brown, as administratrix of the estate of Hunter J. Carter, Jr., deceased, Respondents.

Supreme Court of Florida, Special Division A.

June 6, 1956.

Lathan & Davenport, Pensacola, for petitioner.

Richard H. Merritt, Pensacola, for respondents.

THORNAL, Justice.

Petitioner Ruby J. Carter, one of the defendants below, seeks review of an interlocutory order entered on a motion for summary judgment in an interpleader proceeding.

The questions to be determined are whether a wife who was acquitted of the alleged criminal homicide of her husband is entitled to receive the proceeds of an insurance policy on his life wherein she was designated primary beneficiary and what degree of proof is required in a civil proceeding to establish the felonious nature of the homicide. Incidental questions are hereafter pointed out.

Hunter J. Carter, Jr. was allegedly killed by his wife, the petitioner Ruby J. Carter. At the time of his death, his life was insured by the Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States under a group policy. The certificate of insurance, according to the complaint, named the wife Ruby J. Carter as beneficiary. The complaint alleges that the insurance policy and group certificate provided that in the event that 'there be no designated beneficiary, or no beneficiary surviving at the death' of the insured, then the proceeds would be payable to the first surviving class of successive preference beneficiaries, to-wit, (a) the widow, (b) surviving children, (c) surviving parents, (d) surviving brothers or sisters, (e) executors or administrators. The insurance certificate does not appear in the record; therefore the case is disposed of on the basis of the foregoing allegations of the pleadings purporting to show the contents thereof.

The Equitable Life Assurance Society, being dubious of the legal recipient of the proceeds of the policy, filed its complaint as a bill of interpleader alleging that Hunter J. Carter, Jr. met his death as a result of gunshot wounds claimed to have been inflicted by his wife, Ruby J. Carter; that she was tried on a charge of second degree murder and acquitted; that in addition to his wife, the insured was survived by his father, the defendant-respondent Hunter J. Carter, Sr., but not by any children or brothers or sisters. Respondent Clara Brown, as administratrix of the estate and a claimant to the proceeds, was also named as a defendant. After interpleading the three defendants, the trial judge excused the Equitable from further participation in the cause.

The surviving widow, Ruby J. Carter, claims the insurance because she contends that having been acquitted of the alleged criminal offense, the killing was clearly not felonious.

The father, Hunter J. Carter, Sr., claims by his answer that he is entitled to the insurance proceeds because he says the widow admitted killing her husband, that the act was wrongful and that it would be against public policy for her to receive the money.

On the same basic contention, Clara Brown, the administratrix, claims the insurance but in addition contends that the father should not receive it because the various classes of priority recipients were contingent upon the insured dying with 'no beneficiary surviving' and that although she is not entitled to the proceeds under the law, the widow Ruby did survive and the widow having survived, the insurance money cannot pass down the line of descendency to the father because of the provisions of the policy itself.

The record also reveals that although Ruby Carter was acquitted by the jury, when she was tried on a charge of second degree murder, she originally pleaded guilty to manslaughter but was permitted to withdraw the plea and go to trial on a plea of not guilty. In doing this she obviously exercised good judgment because the jury in the criminal trial agreed that she was not guilty.

After all of the pleadings were filed, the petitioner moved for a summary judgment. Her motion was denied and in his order, the Chancellor decreed that the 'issues will be made up to determine by a preponderance of the evidence whether the claimant wife feloniously killed her husband and further proceedings had in accordance with these views'. It is this order that is subjected to review by petition for certiorari.

The petitioner-widow contends that her acquittal in the criminal proceeding precludes any assault on her right to receive the proceeds of the insurance policy as the designated beneficiary and further that Section 222.13, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., controls distribution of the proceeds of an insurance policy to the exclusion of other considerations.

The respondents, father and administratrix, contend that acquittal in the criminal case is material only under Section 731.31, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., relating to inheritance by an alleged 'murderer' but has no relevancy to the pending question and that Section 222.13, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., is an 'exemption statute' rather than a distribution statute. It is contended by respondents that the results on this cause are concluded by common law principles rather than statutory enactments.

A solution to the problem involves a disposition of several incidental matters. We must first decide whether the cited statutes govern and if not, then the extent to which we will apply common law principles. The effect of the verdict of acquittal in the criminal case must be evaluated and this involves a consideration of the degree and burden of proof that will govern the civil action on the policy. Finally, the ultimate recipient of the proceeds of the policy must be determined in the event that the named beneficiary, to-wit, the widow, should be found disqualified to receive them.

Section 731.31, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., as applicable when this problem arose read as follows:

'Any person convicted of the murder of a decedent shall not be entitled to inherit from the decedent or to take any portion of his estate as a legatee or devisee. The portion of the decedent's estate to which such murderer would otherwise be entitled shall pass to the persons entitled thereto as though such murderer had died during the lifetime of the decedent.'

The last cited statute was originally enacted as Section 32 of Chapter 16103, Laws of Florida, 1933, otherwise known as the 1933 Probate Act. A casual examination of Section 731.31, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., reveal that it contains no language at all relating directly or by necessary implication to the right of a designated beneficiary to receive the proceeds payable under an insurance contract. It is merely a statutory restriction on the right to inherit or take under the will of a decedent, which right is prescribed by other sections of the same Act. We have considered Section 731.31, supra, in other cases to be mentioned later. None of these cases, however, involved life insurance contracts and our present consideration leads us to the conclusion that this section clearly does not apply to the controversy before us.

Section 222.13, Florida Statues, F.S.A., offers no greater difficulty. While in a measure the statute does provide the manner in which the proceeds of an insurance policy shall be distributed under stated circumstances, it is perfectly clear that it is primarily, if not entirely, an exemption statute that protects the proceeds of a life insurance policy against the demands of creditors in certain cases. It was so construed in Milan v. Daivs, 97 Fla. 916, 123 So. 668 (see particularly opinion On Petition for Rehearing). The conclusion that Section 222.13, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., is obviously an exemption statute and has no bearing on the problem before us is in some measure supported by the fact that it has consistently been included as a part of Chapter 222 dealing with 'Homestead and Exemptions' in each biennial statutory revision adopted by the Florida Legislature. We find nothing in this Act that would lead us to the conclusion that it is any more than a legislative enactment for the protection of the immediate family or the designated beneficiary of an insured against the claims of his creditors.

We have been referred to no statute that controls the situation before us. Our own research reveals none. We must, therefore, explore the broad firmament of the common law and adjudicated cases in order to locate the pole star that will guide us to a safe conclusion. We should be cautious to avoid confusing the issue by applying to insurance cases those precedents that deal with the right of inheritance under statutes such as Section 731.31, supra. It becomes necessary to consider certain broad basic principles upon which we must rely.

It is an axiom of the common law, supported by admirable concepts of common justice, that no person should be permitted to benefit from his own wrong. It is offensive to our sense of right that a wrongdoer be allowed to exploit his wrongs to the injury of another and to the profit of himself. The principle has been applied in many cases involving claims under insurance policies brought by beneficiaries who without excuse or justification killed the insured.

The rule is generally announced in 29 Am.Jur., Insurance, Section 1310, p. 979, as follows:

'It is a well-settled rule that a beneficiary in a life insurance policy who murders or feloniously causes the death of the insured forfeits all rights which he may have in or under the policy. This rule is based upon public policy and upon the principle that no one shall be allowed to benefit from his own wrong. It is not necessary that there should be an express exception in the contract of insurance forbidding a recovery in favor of a beneficiary who intentionally kills the insured, although, of course, the parties may incorporate in the contract a clause creating such an exception or providing for a forfeiture of the beneficiary's...