Carter v. City of L. A.
| Citation | 169 Cal.Rptr.3d 131,224 Cal.App.4th 808 |
| Decision Date | 26 February 2014 |
| Docket Number | B241060 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Saundra CARTER, et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendant and Respondent; Mark Willits, et al., Objectors and Appellants. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
See 4 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Pleading, § 320.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Judge. Reversed. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC363305)
Jose R. Allen; Schneider Wallace Cottrell Konecky, Guy B. Wallace; Goldstein, Borgen, Dardarian & Ho, Linda M. Dardarian for Objectors and Appellants.
Sarah Colby as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Objectors and Appellants.
Arias Ozzello & Gignac, Mark Arias, Mikael H. Stahle, Alfredo Torrijos; Law Offices of Morse Mehrban, Morse Mehrban for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
Michael N. Feuer, Los Angeles City Attorney, Gary G. Geuss, Chief Assistant City Attorney, Laurie Rittenberg, Assistant City Attorney; Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, David Raizman, Dennis Depalma, Benjamin Ikuta; Drinker Biddle & Reath, Christopher F. Wong for Defendant and Respondent City of Los Angeles.
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. § 12132; the ADA), Section 504 the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. § 794 et seq.; Section 504), the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civ.Code, § 51 et seq.), and the California Disabled Persons Act (Civ.Code, § 54) prohibit discrimination against disabled individuals and require that public entities eliminate impediments to disabled access to public facilities. (See Ability Ctr. of Greater Toledo v. City of Sandusky (6th Cir.2004) 385 F.3d 901, 907–908; Donald v. Cafe Royale, Inc. (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 168, 177–178, 266 Cal.Rptr. 804.) “For nearly two decades, [the ADA's] implementing regulations have required cities to make newly built and altered sidewalks readily accessible to individuals with disabilities.” (Frame v. City of Arlington (5th Cir.2011) 657 F.3d 215, 221.)
This class action litigation involves allegations that the City of Los Angeles violated the above statutes. After the parties conditionally agreed to certify a non opt-out class, settle the litigation for injunctive relief only, and release all claims for statutory damages, the trial court certified the class and approved the settlement, finding it to be fair and reasonable.
Appellants contend the settlement was meager and inadequate and the non opt-out provision violated due process. We disagree with the first contention but agree with the second. Therefore, we reverse.
On December 17, 2006, ten individuals led by Saundra Carter filed a class action complaint against the City of Los Angeles for violations of the Unruh Civil Rights Act and Disabled Persons Act, alleging city sidewalks lacked wheelchair ramps or cutouts. In their first amended complaint, which is operative, the Carter plaintiffs sought injunctive relief and “minimum statutory damages of $1,000 per violation of Civil Code sections 54 and 54.1.”
On December 5, 2007, Nicole Fahmie filed a class action complaint against the City of Los Angeles for violations of the Unruh Civil Rights Act and Disabled Persons Act, alleging, among other things, that city curbs lack ramps or cutouts. Fahmie sought injunctive relief, compensatory damages and trebled damages.
Neither the Carter nor Fahmie action alleged federal claims under the ADA or Section 504. The actions were eventually consolidated.
On August 4, 2010, Mark Willits, a quadriplegic, Judy Griffin, who has muscular dystrophy, and Brent Pilgreen, also a quadriplegic, all of whom use motorized wheelchairs for mobility, and Communities Actively Living Independent and Free, an independent living center (objectors/federal plaintiffs), filed a representative action against the City of Los Angeles and its mayor and council members in federal court alleging causes of action pursuant to the ADA, Section 504, the Unruh Civil Rights Act and the California Disabled Persons Act. (The Willits action.) The federal plaintiffs alleged the city systemically and pervasively discriminated against persons with mobility disabilities by denying them meaningful access to the city's curb ramps, sidewalks, crosswalks, pedestrian crossings, and other walkways. They sought declaratory relief, preliminary and permanent injunctions for the class, and, on behalf of Willits, Griffin and Pilgreen individually, monetary damages.1
On December 10, 2010, the district court declined to exercise jurisdiction over the federal plaintiffs' state law claims in the Willits action, and dismissed them, and also dismissed all individual defendants, leaving only the City of Los Angeles as a defendant. The court then refused to dismiss plaintiffs' claims under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act, characterizing them as claims for “only equitable remedies under the ADA, such as injunctive relief.” (The record does not disclose why the federal plaintiffs' damages claims were stricken.) ( Willits v. City of Los Angeles, No. CV 10–05782 CBM; U.S. Dist. Court, Central District.)
On January 3, 2011, the district court certified a representative class defined as follows: The court waived notice of certification to the class members.
In April 2011, the Carter and Fahmie actions settled. The settlement class was defined as all persons with any disability who at any time prior to April 25, 2011 through the term of the settlement (25 years) accessed or attempted to access a city sidewalk but were impeded by lack of a curb ramp or curb cut.
Pursuant to the settlement agreement, the City of Los Angeles agreed to install up to 1,000 curb ramps in the first year after settlement, at a cost of up to $3.5 million. After the first year, the city agreed to spend up to $4 million per year remediating curbs, contingent on the availability of certain types of funds, and to complete remediation, without limit as to cost, as to every curb identified as being in a “Transition Area,” which was defined as comprising major commercial corridors, bus routes, and public buildings. The city agreed to conduct a citywide survey to assess curb locations requiring remediation, form an advisory committee to evaluate and make recommendations to the city about future curb appropriations, and periodically report to class counsel regarding settlement implementation status, with ongoing court jurisdiction.
Plaintiffs agreed to release all claims against the city for injunctive or declaratory relief or statutory damages (but not compensatory damages) that are based on conduct or conditions preceding entry of judgment. This would include release of appellants' federal claims and state law damages claims.
The settlement agreement provided that the settlement class would be certified in accordance standards applicable under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 23(b)(2) (Rule 23(b)(2)), and that no class member would be permitted to opt out. The agreement further provided that notice of the settlement would be made by distribution to ten organizations serving disabled persons and by publication.
Prior to the hearing on final approval, 30 individual class members objected to the settlement. Their main objection was that the settlement set no mandatory minimum city expenditure, instead making expenditure contingent on future tax revenue availability, did not require that enough curb cut or ramps be installed, and set no date for full compliance with disability access laws. Objectors also argued the settlement gave class members no money payments and no ability to opt out to seek statutory damages in another forum.
On January 11, 2012, the trial court issued a 38–page order granting final approval of the settlement. In the order the court outlined settlement terms, found them to be reasonable, and addressed the objectors' arguments. As to objectors' arguments that the settlement was meager and inadequate, the court reviewed the city's obligations under the settlement, finding them to be substantial, and noted that it would be a risky and time consuming proposition for class representatives to pursue litigation to obtain a better result. Regarding the non opt-out provision, the court stated the settlement was “equitable and not for a money judgment,” so “[t]he requirement that class members be permitted to opt out ... does not apply.” The court also said, “statutory damages are a long shot” and the right to them “highly questionable” because no California court has considered a municipal entity to be liable under the Unruh Civil Rights Act or the Disabled Persons Act, and none likely would.
This appeal followed.
Under section 382 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a class action is authorized “when the question is one of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court.” “Drawing on the language of Code of Civil Procedure section 382 and federal precedent,” our Supreme Court has ...
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