Carter v. Gilmore

• Decision Date: 17 March 2021
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 18-249-RGA
• Parties: ARTHUR A. CARTER, Petitioner, v. ROBERT GILMORE, Warden, and ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE, Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Delaware

ARTHUR A. CARTER, Petitioner, v. ROBERT GILMORE, Warden, andATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE, Respondents.

Civil Action No. 18-249-RGA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

March 17, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Arthur A. Carter. Pro se Petitioner.

Sean P. Lugg, Deputy Attorney General of the Delaware Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware. Attorney for Respondents.

March 17, 2021

Wilmington, Delaware

/s/ Richard G. Andrews

ANDREWS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

Presently pending before the Court is Petitioner Arthur A. Carter's Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 ("Petition"). (D.I. 1; D.I. 7) The State filed an Answer in opposition. (D.I. 15) For the reasons discussed, the Court will dismiss the Petition.

I. BACKGROUND

On June 22, 2013, [Petitioner] got into an argument with his pregnant girlfriend, Morlicea Capers, at her uncle's home in Edgemoor Gardens. Capers' uncle forcibly pushed [Petitioner] out of the residence. Once [Petitioner] was outside, he fired a gun into the air and then sped off in a silver car. Both Capers and a child inside the home telephoned 911 during the incident. Tapes of both phone calls were admitted into evidence. The State also admitted a redacted videotaped statement that [Petitioner] gave to police on June 27, 2013, the day he was arrested. In the tape, [Petitioner] initially says that someone fired a gun but that he did not know who. Later in the videotape, [Petitioner] admits that he fired a .45 caliber gun in the air before fleeing the scene.

Two neighborhood residents testified at trial that they heard gunshots on the evening of June 22, 2013. One of those witnesses testified that she heard an argument just prior to the sound of a gunshot. Neither neighbor could identify the shooter. One of the police officers who responded to the scene testified that he arrived within minutes after receiving a dispatch reporting a domestic dispute involving a gun. The officer interviewed Capers who stated that she had had a physical altercation with [Petitioner], after which [Petitioner] left the residence and then returned with a handgun and fired a shot in the air outside the residence before he fled the scene in a silver car.

Carter v. State, 105 A.3d 988 (Table), 2014 WL 7010032, at *1-2 (Del. Nov. 12, 2014). In January 2014, a Delaware Superior Court jury convicted Petitioner of aggravated menacing, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony ("PFDCF"), and possession of a firearm by a person prohibited ("PFBPP"). See id. at *1. On April 11, 2014, the Superior Court sentenced Petitioner as a habitual offender to a total period of thirty-five years at Level Vincarceration, to be suspended after serving thirty years for a period of probation. Id. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner's convictions. See id. at *3.

In January 2015, Petitioner filed a pro se motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Delaware Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. (D.I. 16-7 at 206-210) The Superior Court appointed counsel to represent Petitioner, and post-conviction counsel filed an amended Rule 61 motion ("Rule 61 motion"). (D.I. 2 at 23; D.I. 16-7 at 214 -257) The Superior Court denied the amended Rule 61 motion in January 2017. See State v. Carter, 2017 WL 237621 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 18, 2017). The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed that decision on November 15, 2017. See Carter v. State, 175 A.3d 620 (Table), 2017 WL 5499162 (Del. Nov. 15, 2017).

II. GOVERNING LEGAL PRINCIPLES

A. Exhaustion and Procedural Default

Absent exceptional circumstances, a federal court cannot grant habeas relief unless the petitioner has exhausted all means of available relief under state law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b); O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842-44 (1999); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971). The AEDPA states, in pertinent part:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that -

(A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State; or

(B)(i) there is an absence of available State corrective process; or

(ii) circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1).

The exhaustion requirement is based on principles of comity, requiring a petitioner to give "state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process." O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 844-45; see Werts v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178, 192 (3d Cir. 2000). A petitioner satisfies the exhaustion requirement by demonstrating that the habeas claims were "fairly presented" to the state's highest court, either on direct appeal or in a post-conviction proceeding, in a procedural manner permitting the court to consider the claims on their merits. Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447, 451 n.3 (2005); Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989). A federal legal claim is "fairly presented" to state courts when there is: "(1) reliance on pertinent federal cases employing constitutional analysis; (2) reliance on state cases employing constitutional analysis in like fact situations; (3) assertion of the claim in terms so particular as to call to mind a specific right protected by the Constitution; [or] (4) allegation of a pattern of facts that is well within the mainstream of constitutional litigation." McCandless v. Vaughn, 172 F.3d 255, 261 (3d Cir. 1999).

A petitioner's failure to exhaust state remedies will be excused if state procedural rules preclude him from seeking further relief in state courts. See Lines v. Larkins, 208 F.3d 153, 160 (3d Cir. 2000); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-98 (1989). Although treated as technically exhausted, such claims are nonetheless procedurally defaulted. See Lines, 208 F.3d at 160; Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750-51 (1991). Similarly, if a petitioner presents a habeas claim to the state's highest court, but that court "clearly and expressly" refuses to review the merits of the claim due to an independent and adequate state procedural rule, the claim isexhausted but procedurally defaulted. See id. at 750; Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 260-64 (1989).

Federal courts may not consider the merits of procedurally defaulted claims unless the petitioner demonstrates either cause for the procedural default and actual prejudice resulting therefrom, or that a fundamental miscarriage of justice will result if the court does not review the claims. See McCandless v. Vaughn, 172 F.3d 255, 260 (3d Cir. 1999); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750-51. To demonstrate cause for a procedural default, a petitioner must show that "some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts to comply with the State's procedural rule." Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). To demonstrate actual prejudice, a petitioner must show "that [the errors at trial] worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions." Id. at 494.

Alternatively, a federal court may excuse a procedural default if the petitioner demonstrates that failure to review the claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451 (2000); Wenger v. Frank, 266 F.3d 218, 224 (3d Cir. 2001). A petitioner demonstrates a miscarriage of justice by showing a "constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent." Murray, 477 U.S. at 496. Actual innocence means factual innocence, not legal insufficiency. See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998). In order to establish actual innocence, the petitioner must present new reliable evidence - not presented at trial - that demonstrates "it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 537-38 (2006); see Sweger v. Chesney, 294 F.3d 506, 522-24 (3d Cir. 2002).

B. Standard of Review

If a state's highest court adjudicated a federal habeas claim on the merits, the federal court must review the claim under the deferential standard contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), federal habeas relief may only be granted if the state court's decision was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," or the state court's decision was an unreasonable determination of the facts based on the evidence adduced in the trial. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) & (2); see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000); Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2001). A claim has been "adjudicated on the merits" for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) if the state court decision finally resolves the claim on the basis of its substance, "rather than on a procedural, or other, ground." Thomas v. Horn, 570 F.3d 105, 115 (3d Cir. 2009). The deferential standard of § 2254(d) applies even "when a state court's order is unaccompanied by an opinion explaining the reasons relief has been denied." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98 (2011). As explained by the Supreme Court, "it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary." Id. at 99.

Finally, when reviewing a habeas claim, a federal court must presume that the state court's determinations of factual issues are correct. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). This presumption of correctness applies to both explicit and implicit findings of fact, and it is only rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Campbell v. Vaughn, 209 F.3d 280, 286 (3d Cir. 2000); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 341(2003) (stating that the clear and convincing standard in §...