Carter v. Haynes
Decision Date | 27 July 2018 |
Docket Number | 2170367 |
Citation | 267 So.3d 861 |
Parties | Larry CARTER v. Daniel Keith HAYNES |
Court | Alabama Court of Civil Appeals |
Mark Erdberg and Jaime C. Erdberg of Jaffe & Erdberg, P.C., Birmingham, for appellant.
Paul A. Miller and Patrick W. Franklin of Miller, Christie & Kinney, P.C., Vestavia Hills, for appellee.
In this action regarding a motor-vehicle collision, Larry Carter appeals from a judgment of the Bessemer Division of the Jefferson Circuit Court ("the trial court") determining, among other things, that Daniel Keith Haynes was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law as to Carter's claim of wantonness and the issue of punitive damages. Specifically, Carter asserts that the trial court improperly excluded evidence from which the jury could have inferred that Haynes was liable for wanton conduct.
The record indicates the following. On March 6, 2015, Haynes was driving a Honda Civic automobile that collided with the back end of Carter's pickup truck. At the trial, Haynes admitted that he was responsible for the accident. He testified that the collision occurred when he was talking to his girlfriend, a passenger in the automobile, and looked away from the road. He said that, when he looked back, there were vehicles stopped in front of him, and, he said, he did not have time to stop before hitting Carter's truck. Haynes said that he hit Carter's truck hard enough that his vehicle went under Carter's truck.
To prove his claim of wantonness against Haynes, which would enable Carter to receive punitive damages, Carter sought to introduce evidence indicating that Haynes had used methadone and marijuana on the morning of the day of the accident. Haynes had filed a motion in limine to preclude the introduction of such evidence. Initially, the trial court denied Haynes's motion, agreeing with Carter's contention that "the jury could reasonably infer impairment and intoxication based on how this wreck happened."
However, before testimony began, the matter of whether Carter should be able to introduce evidence of Haynes's drug use was discussed again. Haynes argued that, because of the six- to seven-hour lapse between the time the methadone
and marijuana were used and the accident, coupled with the absence of evidence indicating that Haynes was impaired when the accident occurred and the absence of expert testimony regarding the expected effects of the drugs in a man of Haynes's size over a certain time, the admission of evidence of Haynes's drug use would be more prejudicial than probative or relevant. Haynes also pointed out, and Carter agreed, that, to be entitled to punitive damages, Carter would have to prove wanton conduct by clear and convincing evidence.
In making his offer of proof to the trial court (out of the jury's presence), Carter elicited the following evidence. Haynes said that he had been addicted to opioids and received daily treatment at a methadone
clinic. On the morning of the day of the accident, Haynes said, he received his treatment at between 9:30 and 10:00 a.m. He went home and then smoked marijuana from a bong at about 11:00 a.m. He acknowledged that he "got high off the marijuana." He also testified that, although the physicians at the methadone clinic had instructed him not to use illegal drugs while he was taking methadone, he had never experienced any side effects from mixing methadone and marijuana. Haynes also candidly told the court that he knew that driving while impaired was dangerous, and he consciously decided to drive his vehicle the day of the collision.
However, Haynes said, he was not impaired at the time he drove. About six hours after smoking the marijuana, Haynes said, he was driving to work. The accident occurred at approximately 5:00 p.m. He testified that the effects of the drugs were gone by that time and that he was "totally sober" at the time of the accident.
The trial court reconsidered its previous ruling to deny the motion in limine. In doing so, the trial judge said: The trial judge also noted: "All evidence is prejudicial, but this is highly prejudicial to say someone has abused drugs by driving and then there's an accident." The trial judge ultimately granted Haynes's motion in limine, stating:
After the trial, the trial court entered a judgment as a matter of law in favor of Carter on the claim of negligence and in favor of Haynes on the claim of wantonness and the issue of punitive damages. It also entered a judgment on the jury's verdict awarding Carter damages of $28,284.41, plus court costs. On October 26, 2017, Carter filed a motion for a new trial in which he argued that the trial court had improperly excluded Haynes's admission that he had used methadone and marijuana on the day of the accident. After a hearing on the issue, the trial court entered an order denying the motion on November 16, 2017. Carter filed a timely notice of appeal on December 28, 2017.
On appeal, Carter contends that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of Haynes's drug use on the day of the accident.
Van Voorst v. Federal Express Corp., 16 So.3d 86, 92 (Ala. 2008).
Carter contends that the trial court improperly excluded evidence of Haynes's drug use earlier in the day based on Haynes's argument that Carter was required to offer expert testimony as to the effects of the drugs over time, based on the factors present in this case, such as Haynes's size, the amount of marijuana smoked, Haynes's tolerance for the drugs, and the like. However, in granting Haynes's motion in limine, the trial court did not mention the need for expert testimony. Instead, the trial court found that Carter had no evidence to present demonstrating that Haynes was impaired at the time of the accident and, therefore, that evidence of Haynes's drug use six to seven hours before the accident was unduly and unfairly prejudicial.
Rule 403, Ala. R. Evid., provides that, "[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
Ex parte Vincent, 770 So.2d 92, 95–96 (Ala. 1999). Moreover, "[t]he decision to admit or to exclude evidence is within the discretion of the trial judge, and we will not reverse such a decision absent an abuse of discretion." City of Birmingham v. Moore, 631 So.2d 972, 974 (Ala. 1994).
As was noted during the arguments presented to the trial court, there was no evidence from lay witnesses that would show that Haynes was driving erratically before the accident, the police officer who responded to the scene of the accident did not note signs that Haynes was impaired at the time of the accident, and Haynes was not arrested for driving under the influence.
Carter maintains that Haynes's admission of voluntary drug use earlier in the day, coupled with the accident itself, constitutes evidence from which the jury could find that he was impaired at the time of the accident. Carter cites Thomas v. Heard, 256 So.3d 644 (Ala. 2017), in support of his argument that the issue of wantonness should have gone to a jury because, he explains, evidence of Haynes's "voluntary intoxication" rebuts the presumption set forth in Thomas that a motorist...
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