Carter v. Jett

• Decision Date: 21 February 1963
• Citation: 51 Tenn.App. 560,370 S.W.2d 576
• Parties: Hoyt M. CARTER, Appellee, v. Leslie JETT, Sheriff of Davidson County, Tennessee, Appellant.
• Court: Tennessee Court of Appeals

Page 576

370 S.W.2d 576

51 Tenn.App. 560

Hoyt M. CARTER, Appellee, v. Leslie JETT, Sheriff of Davidson County, Tennessee, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of Tennessee, Middle Section at Nashville.

Feb. 21, 1963.

Certiorari Denied by Supreme Court Sept. 11, 1963.

Neill S. Brown, Newman Brandon, Nashville, for appellant.

W. Ovid Collins, Jr., Nashville, for Globe Indemnity Co.

J. F. Doty, Stockell, Rutherford & Crockett, Nashville, for appellee.

CHATTIN, Judge.

Complainant below, Hoyt M. Carter, filed this bill in Part I of the Chancery Court of Davidson County, Tennessee, against Sheriff Leslie Jett, of the same County, seeking to have a contract between the parties declared null and void. The bill charges the complainant was, at the time of the execution of the contract, working under Sheriff Jett as a Field Deputy Sheriff. The contract is exhibited to the bill and the pertinent parts of the contract for our consideration are as follows:

'1. The Deputy hereby agrees to devote his time and best efforts to the service of all civil process, assigned to him by the Warrant Officer, in compliance with the rules of procedure from time to time approved by the Sheriff.

'2. Whenever the Deputy may serve any such civil process whereby the Sheriff is entitled to the fee specified in T.C.A. 8-2133, for the service thereof, the Sheriff will pay to the Deputy, as compensation, 70% of such fees thus earned by the Sheriff and served by the Deputy, but such compensation shall not exceed $550.00 in any one month in accordance with the limitations contained in T.C.A. 8-2003 as amended. The Deputy will be paid such compensation by the Sheriff as soon after the first of each month as the fees thus earned are determined and distributed to the Sheriff by the Circuit Court Clerk of Davidson County, Tennessee.

'3. The Deputy understands and agrees that the remaining 30% of the fees to which the Sheriff is entitled, under said statute, is needed to defray the costs of supervising the service of such process and other necessary expenses of the Sheriff's office, so that additional 'tax money' will not be required to defray the expenses of operating the Sheriff's office.'

The bill further charges complainant earned $1,005.93 from the time he signed the contract until the day he resigned as a Field Deputy Sheriff and that the Sheriff had deducted and kept the sum of $331.78 out of this money.

It is then charged the contract is illegal and void as against public policy because complainant's salary is fixed by Code Section T.C.A. § 8-2003, which we quote:

'No deputy or deputies nor assistants shall be allowed to any office, unless the officer himself is unable to discharge the duties of the office by devoting his entire working time thereto, except field deputy sheriffs; and in case the officer is incapacitated from any cause to perform the duties of his office, one (1) person working in the place of the officer himself shall neither be considered nor paid as a deputy or assistant; except that in addition to the regular salaried deputies provided for, the sheriff in each county may appoint all necessary field deputies for misdemeanor and criminal work, and civil work before the justices of the peace; said field deputies to be appointed as provided under § 8-2001 and 8-2002. The salaries of said field deputies shall not exceed five hundred fifty dollars ($550) per month, for each deputy; provided, that said field deputy sheriffs shall earn said salaries from legal fees provided by statute; and all fees so earned by said field deputy sheriffs in excess of their fixed salaries shall be paid into the office of the sheriff of their said counties, and when so paid shall be paid to the county trustee of said county as provided in § 8-2203.'

The bill further charges the contract was procured by coercion and fraud.

The defendant demurred to the bill on the grounds the bill does not state a cause of action; and because the contract entered into by the parties was approved by Judges Leathers and Draper of the Criminal Court of Davidson County, and that his suit was instituted at least a year after the execution of the contract, and under which he had received and retained benefits and is, therefore, barred by laches to rescind the contract.

This demurrer was overruled by the Chancellor.

By leave of the Chancellor, the complainant filed an amendment to his bill in which he alleges the compensation of field deputy sheriffs is fixed by the Anti-Fee bill, Chapter 101, Public Acts of 1921. That a number of the field deputies had signed identical contracts with defendant; and, therefore complainant was entitled to a declaratory judgment in behalf of himself and the other field deputies.

The prayer of the amended bill is that the contracts be declared null and void as well as the decree of the Criminal Court ratifying them; and that all necessary references and accountings be ordered as may be required.

To the amended bill defendant filed a demurrer coupled with an answer. The grounds of the demurrer are that the complainant and other field deputies are not similarly situated; the number of field deputies are not too great for separate suits to be maintained; and there is no showing complainant has authority or permission from the other field deputies to bring this suit in their behalf.

The Chancellor sustained the demurrer in so far as complainant seeks to maintain the suit as a class action. The complainant excepted and prayed an appeal to this Court.

The answer denies the contract was secured by fraud or coercion.

The answer alleges that on January 5, 1961, complainant signed the contract after the defendant had explained to him the fees of his office for the period from September 1, 1960, at which time he took office, to January 1, 1961, failed to equal the necessary expenses of his office by $25,000.00. Therefore, it was necessary to either reduce the number of field deputies or the fees would have to be increased to meet the expenses of the office.

The answer avers the field deputies signed the contracts voluntarily and that they are not illegal or void.

Defendant further alleges that after the contracts were signed he filed a supplemental petition under authority of T.C.A. §§ 8-2001-8-2003 in the case of Leslie E. Jett, etc., v. Beverly Briley, etc., No. 12488 before Judges Leathers and Draper for the authority to appoint a number of field deputies and to have their compensation fixed. On April 5, 1961, this matter was heard and the following decree in part was entered:

'It is, accordingly, ordered, adjudged, and decreed by the Judges of this Court, that the agreement marked Exhibit 'A' to his supplemental petition, and all the provisions thereof, which has heretofore been agreed to by petitioner and certain of his Special and Field Deputies as the instrument fixing their compensation for serving Civil Court processes, is in all things and respects approved; and

'It is further ordered by the Judges of this Court that petitioner be and hereby is authorized, from the Special and/or Field Deputies approved by said prior order in this cause, to set and fix the salaries, or compensation, of twelve (12) Special Field Deputies and a number of Field Deputies, not to exceed seventy-five (75), for the service of the several Civil Court processes delivered to and served by them, at an amount of money equivalent to Seventy Percent (70%) of the fees provided by T.C.A. 8-2133 for the petitioner, as Sheriff, to demand and receive for the service thereof, but no such deputy may be paid, froom such fees thus earned, more than FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY AND 00/100 ($550.00) DOLLARS in any one month because of the limiting provisions of T.C.A. 8-2003, as amended.'

It is next averred the complainant accepted the benefits of the contract from January 5, 1961, until on or about December 10, 1961, at which time he resigned as field deputy; and, therefore, complainant is estopped to deny the validity of the contract.

The answer admits the complainant earned fees totaling $1,005.93 from the time he entered into the contract until such time as he resigned from his office and that defendant retained $331.78 under the terms of the contract.

The cause was tried upon oral and documentary proof pursuant to a written agreement of Counsel for the respective parties.

Complainant testified he signed the contract after Sheriff Jett had explained its terms. But he agreed to sign it because he had been a field deputy for twenty-three years and he knew if he did not sign the contract he would be kicked out and would have no employment. That he worked under the contract for about a year and learned that he could not make a living by giving up thirty per cent of his salary.

He further testified all the field deputies signed similar contracts.

He testified prior to the defendant's taking the office of Sheriff of Davidson County, the field deputies got all the fees they earned and paid all their expenses. If one earned more than the limit of $550.00, then the excess was turned over to the Sheriff's office. That prior to the signing of the contract, he had received his pay from the Clerks of the Court directly.

On cross examination he admitted Sheriff Jett had not told him he had to either sign the contract or turn in his commission.

The defendant testified he changed the policy of paying his field deputies in January, 1961, because his office was not collecting sufficient fees to meet the salaries and expenses of the same. That in January, 1961, his office was behind some $10,000.00 and for this reason he had the field deputies to agree to the contract.

He further testified he explained the contract to complainant and complainant signed it voluntarily.

He also testified he had no surplus funds in his office due to the contracts.

The Chancellor filed a memorandum opinion in which he found there was no fraud or coercion on the part of the defendant in procuring...