Carter v. MISSISSIPPI DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS

• Decision Date: 13 November 2003
• Docket Number: No. 2002-CA-01726-SCT.,2002-CA-01726-SCT.
• Citation: 860 So.2d 1187
• Parties: Ruby CARTER, Individually, and on Behalf of the Wrongful Death Heirs and Beneficiaries, and Estate of Stacie Carter, Deceased, v. MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS and Fred Childs, in His Official Capacity as Superintendent of the Rankin County, Mississippi Correctional Facility.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

860 So.2d 1187

Ruby CARTER, Individually, and on Behalf of the Wrongful Death Heirs and Beneficiaries, and Estate of Stacie Carter, Deceased, v. MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS and Fred Childs, in His Official Capacity as Superintendent of the Rankin County, Mississippi Correctional Facility.

No. 2002-CA-01726-SCT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

November 13, 2003.

Carroll Rhodes, Hazlehurst, attorney for appellant.

Michael Jeffrey Wolf, James D. Holland, Ridgeland, attorneys for appellees.

EN BANC.

EASLEY, Justice, for the court.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 1. Individually and on behalf on the wrongful death heirs and the estate of Stacie Carter (Stacie), Ruby Carter (Carter) filed suit against the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC) and Fred Childs (Childs), Superintendent of the Central Mississippi Correctional Center in Rankin County (CMCC), in the Circuit Court of Copiah County, Mississippi. The Circuit Court of Copiah County transferred the case to the Circuit Court of Rankin County. The trial court allowed Carter to amend her original complaint on two occasions.

¶ 2. The trial court conducted a hearing on the MDOC and Childs' motion to dismiss or alternatively, for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, or alternatively, for summary judgment and dismissed the second amended complaint with prejudice. The trial court certified the judgment as final as to the MDOC and Childs, in his official capacity as superintendent of the CMCC, pursuant to M.R.C.P. 54(b). Carter timely appealed the decision to this Court.

FACTS

¶ 3. Stacie Carter died at 6:37 p.m., on January 15, 1997, at the Rankin County Medical Center in Brandon, Mississippi. At the time of his death, Stacie was an inmate at the CMCC in Rankin County, Mississippi. Stacie had been convicted for burglary and robbery by the Lincoln County Circuit Court and sentenced on January 30, 1995, to serve two concurrent terms of five years in the custody of the MDOC. Stacie was initially moved from the Lincoln County Sheriff's Department to the MDOC facility at Parchman, Mississippi, and then he was transferred to the CMCC in Rankin County.

¶ 4. Stacie was prescribed and provided the drug, Dilantin, to control his seizures. According to inmate Valentine Lewis (Lewis), Stacie had his first seizure before supper.¹ Lewis reported the seizures to the guard on duty, Catherine Burgess (Officer Burgess), after Stacie suffered his third seizure.

¶ 5. Lewis testified that each time he went to Officer Burgess he observed Officer Burgess "get on the phone and call," but he did not stay to see if she got anyone. According to Lewis, a S and E Officer came with an army cot.² Stacie had seven seizures by the time the S and E Officer arrived. Lewis estimated that 30 minutes passed before the S and E officer arrived. Lewis testified that about 20 minutes passed after the officer arrived before Stacie was moved. Two inmates helped Stacie to an army cot and carried him to the clinic. No one was in the clinic. ¶ 6. At approximately 5:05 p.m., Lt. Kevin Jackson (Lt.Jackson), the third watch commander, informed Capt. Patrick Marion (Capt.Marion), the institution watch commander, that Stacie needed to be transferred by ambulance from the clinic to the University of Mississippi Medical Center (UMMC) for medical treatment.

¶ 7. At approximately 5:20 p.m., the ambulance arrived with EMS operators. At approximately 5:40 p.m., the ambulance left the grounds with Stacie and Officer Kurt Wilson as escort. At approximately 5:43 p.m., Lt. Jackson was notified by Capt. Marion that medical complications arose during transport. Due to complications, Stacie was routed to the closest hospital, Rankin Medical Center. Lt. Jackson was notified that at approximately 6:37 p.m., Stacie had died at Rankin County Medical Center.

¶ 8. On appeal, Carter raises the following issues:

I. Whether the trial court erred in determining that the MDOC and Childs were immune from liability pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-9(1)(m).

II. Whether the trial court erred in determining that Carter had failed to establish any constitutional right violations.

DISCUSSION

I. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-9(1)(m)

¶ 9. Carter contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the MDOC and Childs based on their immunity from liability pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-9(1)(m).

¶ 10. This Court applies a de novo standard of review on appeal from a grant of summary judgment by the trial court. Jenkins v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 794 So.2d 228, 232 (Miss.2001); Russell v. Orr, 700 So.2d 619, 622 (Miss.1997); Richmond v. Benchmark Constr. Corp., 692 So.2d 60, 61 (Miss.1997); Northern Elec. Co. v. Phillips, 660 So.2d 1278, 1281 (Miss.1995). Rule 56(c) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment shall be granted by a court if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact...." M.R.C.P. 56(c). The moving party has the burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine issue of material fact in existence, while the non-moving party should be given the benefit of every reasonable doubt. Tucker v. Hinds County, 558 So.2d 869, 872 (Miss.1990). See also Heigle v. Heigle, 771 So.2d 341, 345 (Miss.2000). "If, in this view, there is no genuine issue of material fact and, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment should forthwith be entered in his favor. Otherwise, the motion should be denied." Williamson v. Keith, 786 So.2d 390, 393 (Miss. 2001). "Issues of fact sufficient to require denial of a motion for summary judgment obviously are present where one party swears to one version of the matter in issue and another says the opposite." Tucker, 558 So.2d at 872.

Of importance here is the language of the rule authorizing summary judgment `where there is no genuine issue of material fact.' The presence of fact issues in the record does not per se entitle a party to avoid summary judgment. The court must be convinced that the factual issue is a material one, one that matters in an outcome determinative sense ... the existence of a hundred contested issues of fact will not thwart summary judgment where there is no genuine dispute regarding the material issues of fact.

Simmons v. Thompson Mach. of Miss., Inc., 631 So.2d 798, 801 (Miss.1994) (citing Shaw v. Burchfield, 481 So.2d 247, 252 (Miss.1985)). The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Northern Elec. Co.,660 So.2d at 1281; Russell, 700 So.2d at 622; Richmond, 692 So.2d at 61; Simmons, 631 So.2d at 802; Tucker, 558 So.2d at 872.

¶ 11. The MTCA provides the exclusive civil remedy against a governmental entity or its employee for tortious acts or omission which give rise to a suit. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-7(1) (Rev.2002); City of Tupelo v. Martin, 747 So.2d 822, 826 (Miss. 1999); Pickens v. Donaldson, 748 So.2d 684, 687 (Miss.1999).

¶ 12. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-9 provides immunity from liability to the state and its political subdivisions for certain specific enumerated actions or inactions by the state or its employees. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-9(1)(m) states:

(1) A governmental entity and its employees acting within the course and scope of their employment or duties shall not be liable for any claim:

(m) Of an claimant who at the time the claim arises is an inmate of any detention center, jail, workhouse, penal farm, penitentiary or other such institution, regardless of whether such claimant is or is not an inmate of any detention center, jail, workhouse, penal farm, penitentiary or other such institution when the claim is filed;

¶ 13. In its opinion and order granting summary judgment, the trial court held that section 11-46-9(1)(m) barred this action against the MDOC and Superintendent Childs.

¶ 14. Carter concedes that Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-9(1)(m) bars the claims of a state inmate. However, Carter argues that "the wrongful death claims of [the] wrongful death survivors are distinct torts from the personal injury claims of inmates." Carter also contends that the denial of the wrongful death heirs of an inmate to bring suit amounts to constitutional violations of the due process clause and the equal protection clause.

¶ 15. In support of her position, Carter cites Gentry v. Wallace, 606 So.2d 1117 (Miss.1992), out of context. In Gentry, this Court was actually addressing when the statute of limitations began to run in a wrongful death claim. This Court reasoned that:

Had Mary Gentry lived to bring a medical negligence action for the personal injuries she sustained, the clock would have begun to tick on March 1, the date she might have reasonably discovered the negligence of her physicians. However, this is a wrongful death action brought by John Billy Gentry in his capacity as his mother's sole surviving heir. Wrongful death is a separate distinct cause of action, which can be brought only by the survivors of the deceased. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-7-13 (1972 and Supp.1991). Without and until the death of Mary Gentry, there was no cause of action under the wrongful death statute to trigger the two year statute of limitations. Further, under the statute, the limitations period does not begin to run until the heir knows or should reasonably know about the medical negligence which caused the death.

Gentry, 606 So.2d at 1119 (emphasis added).

¶ 16. Contrary to Carter's position that the wrongful death survivors have a separate tort from that of the deceased inmate, Miss.Code Ann. § 11-7-13 (Supp.2003) clearly states that wrongful death beneficiaries are entitled to maintain an action and recover damages as would the decedent if death had not ensued:

Whenever the death of any person shall be caused by any real, wrongful or negligent act or omission, or by such unsafe machinery, way or appliances as

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