Carter v. Prince George's County Public Schools
| Decision Date | 05 October 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. Civ.A. AW-97-3234.,Civ.A. AW-97-3234. |
| Citation | 23 F.Supp.2d 585 |
| Parties | English CARTER, by her father and next friend, Siegfried WARD, et al., Plaintiffs, v. PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Anna Jenefsky, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.
Andrew W. Nussbaum, Gail B. Veins, Amy B. Glaser, Reichelt, Nussbaum, LaPlaca & Miller, Upper Marlboro, MD, for Defendants.
The parties are before the Court on cross motions for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Plaintiffs seek summary judgment, in substance, on the grounds that English Carter was denied a free appropriate public education in contravention of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et seq., the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (the "Rehabilitation Act"), 29 U.S.C. § 794, and Maryland law. Defendants filed its motion for summary judgment contending that Plaintiff is not "disabled" as defined by the respective statutes, and therefore not an eligible member of their protected classes. Both parties have opposed each other's respective motions for summary judgment. A hearing was held September 28, 1998. Local Rule 105.6 (D.Md.). Upon consideration of the motions, and careful attention given to the arguments in support of and opposition to, and for the reasons stated below, the Court will grant the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, and deny the Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment.
This litigation concerns the diagnosis of a eight-year-old girl, English Carter ("English"), for a learning disability. English's father, Siegfried Ward, claims that his daughter suffers from a disability that affects her ability to learn and perform academically, and is entitled to a specialized education as provided under the IDEA, the Rehabilitation Act, and Maryland law. However, Defendants, Prince George's County Public Schools ("PGCPS"), contend that English is not disabled, but a slow learner, and not entitled to be treated as such under the law.
Dissatisfied with the Defendants' determination that English was not considered to have a learning disability, Plaintiffs requested an impartial due process hearing before an impartial state administrative hearing officer pursuant to both the IDEA and Maryland statutes. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(c); Md. Code Ann., Educ. § 8-413 (1996). At the state administrative hearing, the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") concluded that the school authorities correctly determined that English did not have a learning disability or any other impairment entitling her to a specialized education under the IDEA or Maryland law. Accordingly, the ALJ affirmed the Defendants' determination. Plaintiffs now appeal the ALJ's decision to this Court pursuant to 20 U.S.C. Section 1415(e)(2). Thus, the ultimate question facing this Court on both parties' cross motions for summary judgment is whether English Carter is "disabled," as defined under the respective statutes, and thus eligible for benefits under them.
English Carter is currently enrolled in the first grade at Thomas Claggett Elementary School in the Prince George's County Public School District in Maryland. English first entered Thomas Claggett during the 1995-1996 school year as a Kindergarten student. In May 1996, at the end of her Kindergarten year, English's teachers noticed she was having extreme difficulty in all of her academic areas. English was then referred for a psychological evaluation to determine if she suffered from a learning disability. She was given the Wechsler Preschool and Primary Scale of Intelligence—Revised test ("WPPSI-R"), which evaluates an individual's cognitive abilities. English's performance on the WPPSI-R established that she had significantly low cognitive functioning. The test results showed that her full scale IQ score was 71, while her Verbal IQ was 73, and Performance IQ was 74. These scores placed English in the borderline range, between very low average cognitive functioning and mild mental retardation. (Admin. Record at p. 6a)
Despite the test results, and her teachers' observations, that established English was not academically ready for first grade, she was still promoted in the 1996-1997 school term. However, in the second trimester of the school term, English was returned to Kindergarten after her teachers noticed she was not learning at the same rate as her first grade peers. Upon her return to Kindergarten, the school's Admission, Review, and Dismissal ("ARD") Committee1 determined that English should be administered an additional series of tests to assess whether she had an educational disability. English was given a battery of tests measuring her language, vocabulary, speech, reading, and cognitive abilities. The results of the tests showed that English performed at a level well below her chronological age. The results were then presented to the ARD Committee for evaluation to determine whether English suffered from an educational disability and eligible for special education and related services under the IDEA. The ARD Committee concluded that English was in fact not disabled, but a "slow learner" entitled only to a regular education program.
In the case at bar, Plaintiffs argue that in addition to incorrectly classifying English as not having any learning disabilities or impairments, the Defendants violated a host of their procedural rights under the IDEA and Maryland law. Defendants deny the allegations. Accordingly, the Court will address the substance of both motions for summary judgment below.
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment will be granted when no genuine dispute of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). While the evidence of the non-movant is to be believed and all justifiable inferences drawn in his or her favor, a party cannot create a genuine dispute of material fact through mere speculation or compilation of inferences. Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., N.A ., 123 F.3d 156, 164 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213, 214 (4th Cir.1985)). To defeat such a motion, the party opposing summary judgment must present evidence of specific facts from which the finder of fact could reasonably find for him or her. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). "Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed `to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.'" Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (citations omitted). In determining whether genuine and material factual disputes exist, the Court has reviewed the parties' respective memoranda and the many exhibits attached thereto, construing all facts, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).
The purpose of the IDEA is to provide federal funding to state and local education agencies to ensure disabled children receive "some form of meaningful education." In re Conklin v. Anne Arundel County Board, 946 F.2d 306, 308 (4th Cir.1991). The IDEA entitles disabled children to a "free, appropriate public education" (FAPE). FAPE is defined as "special education and related services that (1) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and direction, and without charge, (2) meet the standards of the State educational agency, (3) include an appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary school education in the State involved, and (4) are provided in conformity with the individualized education program required under section 1414(a)(5) of this title." 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(a)(18).
However, to be considered a member of the IDEA's protected class, the individual must be classified as having a recognized disability. Section 1401(a)(1) of the IDEA identifies the following as covered disabilities: mental retardation, hearing impairments including deafness, speech or language impairments, visual impairments including blindness, serious emotional disturbance, orthopedic impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other health impairments, or specific learning disabilities; in addition to those children who, by reason thereof, need special education and related services.2 Once classified as disabled, a comprehensive statement of the educational needs of the student (commonly referred to as the individualized education program ("IEP")) is developed to identify the appropriate instruction and service necessary to meet those needs. See Burlington School Committee v. Department of Education of Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 359, 368, 105 S.Ct. 1996, 85 L.Ed.2d 385 (1985).
In addition to the educational benefits disabled students receive, the IDEA also affords the parents and/or guardians a panoply of procedural rights. See Sellers v. School Board of City of Manassas, 141 F.3d 524 (4th Cir.1998). One such right is that if a parent or guardian is dissatisfied with the "identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child" by the local school authorities, a due process hearing before an impartial state administrative hearing officer may be requested. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(A) and (b)(2); Md.Code Ann., Educ. § 8-413 (1996). Moreover, any decision made...
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E.P. v. Howard Cnty. Pub. Sch. Sys.
...of the IDEA's protected class, the individual must be classified as having a recognized disability." Carter by Ward v. Prince George's Cnty. Pub. Sch., 23 F. Supp. 2d 585, 589 (D. Md. 1998); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3) (listing the covered disabilities under IDEA). Notably, "[a] school pro......
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E.P. v. Howard Cnty. Pub. Sch. Sys.
...of the IDEA's protected class, the individual must be classified as having a recognized disability." Carter by Ward v. Prince George's Cnty. Pub. Sch., 23 F. Supp. 2d 585, 589 (D. Md. 1998); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3) (listing thecovered disabilities under IDEA). If a child qualifies, "[a......