Carter v. South Carolina Coastal Council

• Decision Date: 09 February 1984
• Docket Number: No. 22066,22066
• Citation: 314 S.E.2d 327,281 S.C. 201
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: Robert W. CARTER, Respondent, v. The SOUTH CAROLINA COASTAL COUNCIL, Appellant. . Heard

Page 327

314 S.E.2d 327

281 S.C. 201

Robert W. CARTER, Respondent, v. The SOUTH CAROLINA COASTAL COUNCIL, Appellant.

No. 22066.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Heard Feb. 9, 1984.

Decided March 26, 1984.

James H. Quackenbush, Columbia; and Christopher McG. Holmes, Charleston, for appellant.

Augustine T. Smythe, of Buist, Moore, Smythe & McGee, Charleston, for respondent.

Mary Lowndes Bryan, Columbia, amicus curiae for Natural Resources Defense Council.

NESS, Justice:

Respondent Robert W. Carter applied for a permit to raise the elevation of approximately 5.3 acres of marshland adjacent to Scott Creek at Edisto Island in Colleton County. This request was denied by the appellant South Carolina Coastal Council. The circuit court reversed appellant's decision.

Appellant South Carolina Coastal Council now contends the circuit court erred in concluding the Council's original determination was (1) not supported by substantial evidence in the record; and (2) an unreasonable exercise of the State's police power. We agree with appellant's contention and reverse.

Appellant first argues its denial of respondent's permit request was not erroneous in view of the substantial evidence in the record. We agree.

S.C.Code Ann. § 48-39-180 (1983 Supp.) provides that any applicant whose permit application is denied may petition the circuit court for a "de novo" review of the Council's action. In Guerard v. Whitner, 276 S.C. 521, 522, 280 S.E.2d 539, 540 (1981), we determined the "de novo" review required by this section did not entail a "hearing of all the evidence anew." Rather, "the substantial evidence standard for judicial review, as stated in [S.C.Code Ann.] § 1-23-380(g) (1983 Supp.) is the proper standard for review of actions by the Coastal Council," as the Council is "clearly an 'agency' defined by § 1-23-310(1) of the Administrative Procedures Act ..." Id.

S.C.Code Ann. § 1-23-380(g), which establishes the standard for judicial review in these matters, provides:

The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on the questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:

(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record ...

Substantial evidence "is evidence which, considering the record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion that the administrative agency reached ..." Lark v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 276 S.C. 130, 135, 276 S.E.2d 304, 306 (1981); accord, Schudel v. S.C. ABC Commission, 276 S.C. 138, 276 S.E.2d 308 (1981); Henderson v. West Point Pepperell, Inc., 279 S.C. 171, 303 S.E.2d 859 (1983). "It must be enough to justify, if the trial were to a jury, a refusal to direct a verdict when the conclusion sought to be drawn from it is one of fact for the jury ..." Lark, supra, 276 S.E.2d at 307, quoting, Consolo v. Federal Maritime Commission, 383 U.S. 607 620, 86 S.Ct. 1018, 1026, 16 L.Ed.2d 131 (1966).

Substantial evidence exists "unless there is no reasonable probability that the facts could be as related by a witness upon whose testimony the [agency's] finding was based." Lark v. Bi-Lo, Inc., supra, 276 S.E.2d at 307.

The trial court decided the Coastal Council's refusal to grant the permit was not based on substantial evidence. We disagree, as the record is replete with evidence illustrating the detrimental environmental consequences of respondent's proposed plan. While we recognize the record could support a decision contrary to that reached by the Council, the mere "possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency's finding from being supported by substantial evidence." Id. We hold this evidence was substantial within the meaning of the relevant scope of review and reverse the trial court's determination.

Appellant also contends the trial court erred in finding Council's action constituted a "taking" of respondent's property without compensation. We agree.

The police power of the State rests upon the fundamental premise that every citizen must use his property so as not to wrong or injure others. "Thus the ... [State] may properly regulate the use of property where uncontrolled use would be harmful to the public interest; and ... [this] regulation, even though it prohibits a beneficial use, will not necessarily be deemed a (taking) in the constitutional sense." ¹ Brecciaroli v. Connecticut Commissioner of Environmental Protection, 168 Conn. 349, 362 A.2d 948, 951 (1975); see also, Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 82 S.Ct. 987, 8 L.Ed. 130 (1962); Richards v. City of Columbia, 227 S.C. 538, 88 S.E.2d 683 (1955).

Controlling and restricting the filling of wetlands ² is clearly within the scope of the State's police power, as the legislature enacted the Coastal Zone Management Act in response to its recognition of the detrimental effect the uncontrolled use of coastal wetlands would have on the public welfare. ³ While unquestionably respondent's wetland would have greater value to him if it were filled, "[a]n owner of land has no absolute and...