Carter v. Ssc Odin Operating Co. Llc

• Decision Date: 16 September 2011
• Docket Number: No. 5–07–0392.,5–07–0392.
• Citation: 955 N.E.2d 1233,353 Ill.Dec. 422
• Parties: Sue CARTER, Special Administrator of the Estate of Joyce Gott, Deceased, Plaintiff–Appellee,v.SSC ODIN OPERATING COMPANY, LLC, d/b/a Odin Healthcare Center, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

955 N.E.2d 1233353 Ill.Dec. 422

Sue CARTER, Special Administrator of the Estate of Joyce Gott, Deceased, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.SSC ODIN OPERATING COMPANY, LLC, d/b/a Odin Healthcare Center, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 5–07–0392.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fifth District.

Aug. 18, 2011.Rehearing Denied Sept. 16, 2011.

[955 N.E.2d 1235]

Malcolm J. Harkins III, James F. Segroves, Proskauer Rose LLP, Washington, DC, W. Jeffrey Muskopf, Mark R. Feldhaus, Lashly & Baer, St. Louis, MO, Attorneys for Appellant.Staci M. Yandle, The Law Offices of Staci M. Yandle, LLC, O'Fallon, IL, Attorney for Appellee.

OPINION

Justice STEWART delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 The plaintiff, Sue Carter, as the special administrator of the estate of Joyce Gott, deceased, filed a complaint against the defendant, SSC Odin Operating Company, LLC, doing business as Odin Healthcare Center, alleging that the defendant negligently provided nursing home services to Joyce that resulted in injuries to Joyce and contributed to the cause of her death. The defendant filed a motion to compel arbitration of the claim pursuant to two signed arbitration agreements. The circuit court denied the defendant's motion to compel arbitration. Initially, we affirmed the circuit court's order, holding that the arbitration agreements were void for being against the public policy set forth in the antiwaiver provisions of the Nursing Home Care Act (210 ILCS 45/3–606, 3–607 (West 2006)).¹

[955 N.E.2d 1236]

Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., 381 Ill.App.3d 717, 319 Ill.Dec. 524, 885 N.E.2d 1204 (2008). The supreme court reversed, holding that the Federal Arbitration Act ( 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (2000)) preempted the Nursing Home Care Act. Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., 237 Ill.2d 30, 340 Ill.Dec. 196, 927 N.E.2d 1207 (2010). The court remanded the cause to us for consideration of the other issues raised by the parties that we did not previously address, including whether the parties' arbitration agreements evidence a transaction “involving [interstate] commerce” within the meaning of section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act ( 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000)), whether the arbitration agreements are void for a lack of mutuality, and whether the arbitration agreements apply to the plaintiff's claim under the Wrongful Death Act ( 740 ILCS 180/0.01 et seq. (West 2006)). After consideration of the additional issues raised by the parties, we again affirm the order of the circuit court.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 The defendant operates a nursing home facility in Odin, Illinois. The plaintiff alleged in her complaint that Joyce was admitted to the facility from May 20, 2005, through July 29, 2005, and again from January 12, 2006, until her death on January 31, 2006. At the beginning of Joyce's first stay at the defendant's facility, the plaintiff, as Joyce's “legal representative,” executed a written “Health Care Arbitration Agreement” with the defendant. This agreement is dated May 20, 2005. Six days after Joyce's second admission to the defendant's facility, Joyce herself signed a second written “Health Care Arbitration Agreement” with the defendant, the terms of which are identical to those of the first agreement. This second agreement is dated January 18, 2006. The plaintiff's signature does not appear on the second arbitration agreement.

¶ 4 Both arbitration agreements state that they “shall not apply to any dispute where the amount in controversy is less than two hundred thousand ($200,000.00) dollars.” The agreements further provide as follows:

“In consideration of this binding Agreement, the Facility and the Resident acknowledge that they are agreeing to a mutual arbitration, regardless of which party is making a claim; that the Facility agrees to pay the fees of the arbitrators and up to $5,000.00 of reasonable and appropriate attorney's fees and costs for the Resident in any claims against the Facility; that the Resident shall have the right to choose the location of any arbitration under this Agreement; that the parties will mutually benefit from the speedy and efficient resolution of disputes which arbitration is expected to provide; and other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged by all parties hereto. Intending to be legally bound, the parties expressly agree that this Agreement will be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1–16 (‘FAA’). It is the express intent of the parties to have a binding arbitration agreement and the parties further agree as follows:

The parties agree that they shall submit to binding arbitration all disputes against each other and their representatives, affiliates, governing bodies, agents and employees arising out of or in any way related or connected to the Admission Agreement and all matters related thereto including matters involving the

[955 N.E.2d 1237]

Resident's stay and care provided at the Facility, including but not limited to any disputes concerning alleged personal injury to the Resident caused by improper or inadequate care including allegations of medical malpractice; any disputes concerning whether any statutory provisions relating to the Resident's rights under Illinois law were violated; any disputes relating to the payment or non-payment for the Resident's care and stay at the Facility; and any other dispute under state or Federal law based on contract, tort, statute (including any deceptive trade practices and consumer protection statutes), warranty or any alleged breach, default, negligence, wantonness, fraud, misrepresentation or suppression of fact or inducement.”

¶ 5 The agreements further state as follows: “Each party agrees to waive the right to a trial, before a judge or jury, for all disputes, including those at law or in equity, subject to binding arbitration under this Agreement.” The agreements state that the parties intend for the agreements to bind “the Resident, his/her successors, assigns, agents, attorneys, insurers, heirs, trustees, and representatives, including the personal representative or executor of his or her estate; and the Legal Representative, his/her successors, assigns, agents, attorneys, insurers, heirs, trustees, and representatives or executor of his or her estate.”

¶ 6 Joyce died on January 31, 2006, during her second stay at the defendant's nursing home facility. On November 22, 2006, the plaintiff filed a two-count complaint against the defendant. Count I of the complaint alleges a statutory survival action pursuant to the Probate Act of 1975 (755 ILCS 5/27–6 (West 2006)) and the Nursing Home Care Act (210 ILCS 45/1–101 et seq. (West 2006)) (the survival action). Count II alleges a statutory action under the Wrongful Death Act (740 ILCS 180/0.01 et seq. (West 2006)) (the wrongful death action). In both counts, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had failed to provide Joyce with adequate care. In the survival action, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant's acts and/or omissions resulted in Joyce suffering pain, emotional distress, and mental anguish between January 12, 2006, and January 31, 2006. In the wrongful death action, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant's acts and/or omissions resulted in Joyce's death and that, therefore, her heirs were deprived of her companionship and society.

¶ 7 In its answer to the complaint, the defendant raised the arbitration agreements as an affirmative defense to the claims. The defendant also filed a motion to compel arbitration based on the arbitration agreements. The plaintiff contested the motion to compel arbitration, arguing that the agreements are void for being in violation of Illinois public policy, as set forth in sections 3–606 and 3–607 of the Nursing Home Care Act (210 ILCS 45/3–606, 3–607 (West 2006)), that the arbitration agreements are void due to a lack of mutuality, that the contract does not fall under the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (2000)) because the agreements are not contracts evidencing a transaction involving interstate commerce, and that the arbitration agreements did not apply to the plaintiff's claim under the Wrongful Death Act (740 ILCS 180/0.01 et seq. (West 2006)).

¶ 8 On June 20, 2007, the circuit court entered an order denying the defendant's motion to compel arbitration. With regard to the survival action, the circuit court concluded that the agreements were not enforceable because they were “in direct violation of emphatically stated public policy and for lack of mutuality” and because, with regard to interstate commerce, “in

[955 N.E.2d 1238]

the aggregate the economic activity does not represent general practice subject to federal control.” With regard to the wrongful death action, the circuit court ruled that although Joyce was bound by the agreements with regard to her own claims, a plaintiff bringing a wrongful death claim on behalf of survivors was not bound by the agreements. The defendant filed a timely notice of interlocutory appeal.

¶ 9 We affirmed the circuit court's order, holding that the arbitration agreements were void for being against the public policy set forth in the antiwaiver provisions of the Nursing Home Care Act (210 ILCS 45/3–606, 3–607 (West 2006)). Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., 381 Ill.App.3d 717, 319 Ill.Dec. 524, 885 N.E.2d 1204 (2008). In our decision, we held that the Federal Arbitration Act did not preempt the Nursing Home Care Act. Because we affirmed the circuit court's order pursuant to the antiwaiver provisions of the Nursing Home Care Act, we did not address the alternative issues raised by the parties.

¶ 10 The defendant appealed to the supreme court, and the supreme court reversed our decision, holding that the Federal Arbitration Act preempted the Nursing Home Care Act. Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., 237 Ill.2d 30, 340 Ill.Dec. 196, 927 N.E.2d 1207 (2010). The court remanded the cause to us for consideration of the other issues raised by...