Carter v. State
| Citation | 958 S.W.2d 620 |
| Parties | James David CARTER, Appellant, v. STATE of Tennessee, Appellee. |
| Decision Date | 20 October 1997 |
| Court | Supreme Court of Tennessee |
Gary C. Shockley, Baker, Donelson, Bearman & Caldwell, Nashville, for Appellant.
John Knox Walkup, Attorney General and Reporter, Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General, Kathy Morante, Deputy Attorney General, John P. Cauley, C. Berkeley Bell, District Attorney General, Eric Christiansen, Assistant District Attorney General, Nashville, for Appellee.
We granted the petitioner, James David Carter, permission to appeal to consider whether the lower courts erred by dismissing Carter's petition for post-conviction relief upon the grounds that his claims alleging violations of State v. Middlebrooks 840 S.W.2d 317 (Tenn.1992) (Drowota, J. and O'Brien, J., dissenting), and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), have been previously determined by the federal district court, and that his claim challenging the constitutionality of the reasonable doubt instruction given at his trial, is without merit.
We agree with the lower courts that the reasonable doubt jury instruction given at Carter's trial did not violate Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 111 S.Ct. 328, 112 L.Ed.2d 339 (1990) and its progeny and that the Brady claim was previously determined by the federal district court. Moreover, even though Carter's Middlebrooks claim was not previously determined since the federal district court was not a "court of competent jurisdiction" to resolve the state law issue, we hold that in the context of this case, Middlebrooks does not preclude reliance upon the felony murder aggravating circumstance as a basis for imposition of the death penalty. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals upholding the trial court's dismissal of Carter's petition is affirmed as modified.
The petitioner, James David Carter, was tried on a one count indictment charging both premeditated and felony first degree murder. The jury returned a general verdict of first degree murder and sentenced Carter to death by electrocution upon finding that there were two statutory aggravating circumstances, 1 and no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. 2 On direct appeal, the conviction and sentence were affirmed by this Court. State v. Carter, 714 S.W.2d 241 (Tenn.1986), cert. denied 479 U.S. 1046, 107 S.Ct. 910, 93 L.Ed.2d 860 (1987). Carter then filed his first post-conviction petition, which was unsuccessful. James David Carter, No. 304 Greene County, 1989 WL 105689 (Tenn.Crim.App., Knoxville, filed Sept. 14, 1989). Following a second unsuccessful petition for post-conviction relief, Carter v. State, 802 S.W.2d 223 (Tenn.Crim.App.1990), perm. app. denied (Tenn.1991), this Court granted the State's motion to set an execution date and designated April 3, 1991.
Thereafter, on March 13, 1991, Carter filed his original petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus in the federal district court of middle Tennessee. That court issued a stay of execution appointed counsel, and subsequently transferred the case to the federal district court in east Tennessee. After the transfer, the petition for habeas corpus was amended. In the federal action Carter claimed that when a defendant has been convicted of felony murder, the use of the felony murder aggravating circumstance to support the sentence of death is unconstitutional. When the habeas corpus petition was filed in 1991, Middlebrooks had not been rendered. In that case, a majority of this Court specifically held that "when the defendant is convicted of first degree murder solely on the basis of felony murder," use of the felony murder aggravating circumstance is not permissible because it "does not narrow the class of death-eligible murderers sufficiently under the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and Article I, § 16 of the Tennessee Constitution because it duplicates the elements of the offense." Id., 840 S.W.2d at 346. The decision in Middlebrooks was considered to be based on federal constitutional law 3 until this Court's subsequent decision in State v. Howell, 868 S.W.2d 238, 259, n. 7 (Tenn.1993), clarified that the Middlebrooks holding was independently based on Article 1, § 16 of the Tennessee Constitution.
Despite the independent state constitutional basis for the decision in Middlebrooks, the federal district court considered the claim in the habeas corpus action while ruling on the State's motion for summary judgment. By orders entered in November and December of 1994, the district court concluded that since the jury returned a general verdict of first degree murder, Middlebrooks does not apply to Carter's case because he was not convicted "solely on the basis of felony murder." The federal district court also granted the State's motion for summary judgment on Carter's alleged Brady violations.
Following this disposition in federal court, Carter filed his third petition for post-conviction relief in state court on January 30, 1995. As grounds for relief, Carter alleged that the trial court instructions on reasonable doubt at his trial violated Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 111 S.Ct. 328, 112 L.Ed.2d 339 (1990), that the State failed to disclose exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady and that his sentence of death violated Middlebrooks. The trial court dismissed Carter's post-conviction petition, finding that the asserted violations of Middlebrooks and Brady had been previously determined by the federal district court and that the alleged error in the reasonable doubt jury instructions was without merit. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal, and also found, as did the federal district court, that Middlebrooks does not apply unless the defendant is convicted of first degree murder "solely on the basis of felony murder." Id., 840 S.W.2d at 346. Thereafter, we granted Carter's application for permission to appeal and now affirm the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals.
The statutory provision relevant to the defense of previous determination provides that "[a] ground for relief is 'previously determined' if a court of competent jurisdiction has ruled on the merits after a full and fair hearing." 4 In this Court, Carter argues that the jurisdiction of federal district courts in habeas corpus proceedings does not extend to questions of state law. Since the federal district court was not a "court of competent jurisdiction," to consider his Middlebrooks claim, Carter argues that the trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals erred by concluding that the claim was previously determined. The State responds that the federal district court necessarily and appropriately considered the state constitutional issue when it decided the federal constitutional question. In addition, the State says that Carter chose to assert his Middlebrooks claim in the federal forum and should be bound by that court's decision on the claim.
It is well-settled that federal courts have the power under Article III of the United States Constitution to exercise pendent jurisdiction over state law claims. United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1138, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966). However, Gibbs delineated only the constitutional boundaries of federal judicial power. The jurisdiction of federal courts over a particular controversy may be limited by federal statutes. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 13-14, 96 S.Ct. 2413, 2419-20, 49 L.Ed.2d 276 (1976). Indeed, the United States Supreme Court described the jurisdictional hierarchy as follows:
It is apparent that Gibbs delineated the constitutional limits of federal judicial power.... Constitutional power is merely the first hurdle that must be overcome in determining that a federal court has jurisdiction over a particular controversy. For the jurisdiction of federal courts is limited not only by the provisions of Art. III ... but also by Acts of Congress.
Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 371-72, 98 S.Ct. 2396, 2401-02, 57 L.Ed.2d 274 (1978). Therefore, in determining whether the federal district court was a "court of competent jurisdiction" to decide the merits of the state constitutional Middlebrooks claim, we must look to the federal statutes which delineate the subject matter jurisdiction of federal courts in habeas corpus actions involving state inmates.
We begin with 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241(c)(3) which provides that "[t]he writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless ... [h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." (Emphasis added.) Likewise, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(a), provides that
[t]he Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.
(Emphasis added.) Even a cursory reading of the above statutes reveals that matters involving issues of state law are not cognizable in a habeas corpus proceeding and federal habeas corpus relief cannot be granted on state law grounds. U.S. ex rel. Hoover v. Franzen, 669 F.2d 433, 443 (7th Cir.1982). Congress has limited the power and jurisdiction of federal courts in habeas corpus actions to only addressing and remedying claimed violations of federal law. Id. Indeed, several cases explicitly state that federal courts have no jurisdiction over state law claims in habeas corpus proceedings. See e.g. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 65-69, 112 S.Ct. 475, 479-80, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991); Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 783, 110 S.Ct. 3092, 3102, 111 L.Ed.2d 606 (1990)...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Cribbs
...as we recently emphasized, verdict specificity is particularly desirable to ensure effective compliance with Middlebrooks. Carter v. State, 958 S.W.2d 620 (Tenn.1997). The concern expressed by a majority of this Court in Middlebrooks was that the felony murder aggravating circumstance does ......
-
State v. Reid
...verdicts as to alternative counts of first-degree murder, the two verdicts merge into one count of first-degree murder. See Carter, 958 S.W.2d at 624-625; see also supra, at footnote 1. Accordingly, a general verdict of guilty is sustainable if any one count in the indictment is supported b......
-
State v. Thacker
...as to alternative counts of first degree murder, the two verdicts merge into one count of first degree murder. See Carter v. State, 958 S.W.2d 620, 624-25 (Tenn.1997). A general verdict of guilty is sustainable if any one count in the indictment is supported by proof. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 4......
-
State v. Banks
...the circumstance properly may be applied if a defendant is convicted of premeditated first degree murder." See also Carter v. State, 958 S.W.2d 620, 624-25 (Tenn. 1997); State v. Price, 46 S.W.3d 785, 826-27 52. He asserts that all the challenged provisions "[e]xcept where otherwise noted,"......