Carter v. State, (No. 6568.)

• Decision Date: 09 November 1921
• Docket Number: (No. 6568.)
• Citation: 234 S.W. 535
• Parties: CARTER v. STATE.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

234 S.W. 535

CARTER v. STATE.

(No. 6568.)

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

November 9, 1921.

Appeal from Criminal District Court, Dallas County; Robt. B. Seay, Judge.

Alf Carter was convicted of procuring, and appeals. Affirmed.

McCutcheon & Church, of Dallas, for appellant.

R. G. Storey, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

LATTIMORE, J.

Appellant was convicted in the criminal district court of Dallas county of the offense of procuring, and his punishment fixed at six months in the county jail and a fine of $200.

A motion to quash the information for various reasons was overruled. It was charged that appellant in Dallas county, on May 31, 1921, did unlawfully invite, solicit, procure, and allure one Stella Betts, then and there a female, to visit and be at a particular place, to wit, an automobile, in the county and state aforesaid, for the purpose of having unlawful sexual intercourse with a male person, and to then and there take part and participate in immoral conduct with men and women, etc. Appellant's objections were: That it charged no offense; that it was not charged that the female was invited, etc., to said automobile for the purpose "of meeting" and having intercourse, etc.; that it was not stated that the woman was procured to visit said place for the purpose "of meeting" and having such intercourse, etc.; that the name of the person she was to have such intercourse with was not alleged, nor was it stated that he was unknown; it was not stated what the unlawful sexual intercourse was, nor what the immoral conduct was; it stated no means or manner of solicitation; that an automobile is not a place within the contemplation of the law.

A complaint substantially similar to that in the instant case was held sufficient in Sanders v. State, 60 Tex. Cr. R. 34, 129 S. W. 605, to which reference will be made. We think the omission of the word "meeting" from the state's pleading does not vitiate the same. It appears to us impossible that the woman procured could have the sexual intercourse intended as the result of such solicitation without meeting said man.

It is held in the Sanders Case, supra, that a particular house or room need not be designated in the pleading. In Tracey v. State, 42 Tex. Cr. R. 494, 61 S. W. 127, we held that a hack or wagon might become a disorderly house, and we think an automobile in a named town is sufficient designation of the place of such meeting or intercourse. The motion to quash was properly overruled. We find nothing to the contrary in Denton v. State, 76 Tex. Cr. R. 58, 172 S. W. 796, cited by appellant.

Appellant has a bill of exceptions which consists of the entire stenographic question and answer report of the trial. This is not sufficient to call for any discussion of any part thereof, as a bill of exceptions, on the part of this court. Howard v. State, 65 Tex. Cr. R. 25, 143 S. W. 178; Cabral v. State, 57 Tex. Cr. R. 304, 122 S. W. 872; Harrison v. State, 69 Tex. Cr. R. 291, 153 S. W. 139. The manner and form of preserving and presenting errors complained of in the court below by bills of exception are well known, and should be conformed to.

Appellant asked for a continuance because of the absence of one Jewel. It was shown that a subpœna was issued by appellant's counsel for one Jewel at a given address. It is stated in the court's qualification to this bill of exceptions that on the morning of the trial one Jewell Alexander was brought into court in obedience to said subpœna. Appellant's counsel stated he was not the party they desired. It is also made to appear that they wished one Jewell, whose further name is not given, but whom they claimed to believe to be the man with whom the alleged date was made by appellant for said female. In his qualification to this bill of exceptions the court further says that no fact was brought out on the trial to show that any such named party was the person solicited for by appellant at any time. The continuance was properly denied.

Complaint is also made that appellant was forced to trial so soon after his arrest. He was arrested on Tuesday, and tried on the following Monday. The case is one of misdemeanor. A speedy public trial is not only commended by our Constitution, but guaranteed to the accused.

Appellant also complains that, by reason of the names of certain witnesses not being on the information, he was denied the privilege of talking to them. Nothing appears in the bill of exceptions indicating any injury to appellant. It appears that when said witnesses came into the court room appellant's counsel was apprised of that fact, and he was given whatever opportunity he desired to talk with them.

No error was committed by allowing in evidence with...