Carter v. State
Decision Date | 17 August 1984 |
Docket Number | No. 83-1844,83-1844 |
Citation | 454 So.2d 739 |
Parties | LaMarcus Edward CARTER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Douglas A. Lockwood, III, of Peterson, Myers, Craig, Crews, Brandon & Mann, P.A., and Leonard C. Carter, Lakeland, for appellant.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Katherine V. Blanco, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.
Appellant LaMarcus Edward Carter challenges an order denying his motion to suppress cocaine seized from his vehicle during a warrantless search. We reverse.
Carter pled not guilty to the charge of possession of cocaine. Following a jury trial, he was found guilty as charged, adjudicated, and sentenced to a five-year probationary term, conditioned upon payment of a fine and service of a period of incarceration. This timely appeal ensued.
The facts are not in dispute and can be summarized as follows:
While undercover detectives Boatner and Ivancevitch were patrolling parking lots in the city of Lakeland--allegedly recognized areas for illegal narcotics distribution and use--they observed Carter and two male passengers seated in a lawfully parked Jeep Cherokee in the parking lot of the Office Lounge at approximately 9:00 p.m. The lounge was open at the time. The detectives' attention focused upon the vehicle because it was obviously parked, its interior dome light was on, and its occupants were looking around but making no attempt to get out.
Boatner and Ivancevitch drove past the vehicle, assumed a surveillance position in the parking lot, and observed the suspects for approximately three to five minutes. During this period, the detectives saw Carter, the driver, look toward the front and back of the vehicle "as though looking for someone who might be watching him" and then bend down toward the middle of the front seat on at least two occasions. Based upon their experience as narcotics investigators, the officers believed that these motions were consistent with the inhalation of cocaine and "felt" or "suspected" that a controlled substance might be present in the vehicle and that criminal activity might be taking place.
The foregoing observations prompted Boatner and Ivancevitch to radio for police back-up, exit their car, and approach the suspect vehicle to further their investigation. During their approach, the officers heard one passenger say, "They're cops." Boatner then observed the passenger throw a commercially rolled cigarette out of the back window of the vehicle; Ivancevitch witnessed the same activity but was unable to identify the item discarded. Believing that the passenger's recognition of them as police officers gave them "even further latitude in [their] investigation," the officers rushed to opposite sides of the vehicle, produced departmental identification, and secured the occupants after "brandish[ing]" Boatner's service revolver. In the process of securing the occupants, Boatner observed Carter place a rolled bill, which Boatner recognized as a common implement for cocaine inhalation, in Carter's right front pants' pocket. While later removing Carter from the vehicle, Ivancevitch observed a "white powdery substance," which he believed to be cocaine, on the armrest of the front seat. Upon detecting the powdery substance, Ivancevitch formally arrested Carter, searched him, and found a rolled twenty dollar bill in his right front pants' pocket. A subsequent search of the vehicle produced what may have been traces of cocaine on the armrest; however, the officers found no other evidence of contraband either in the vehicle or on Carter's person.
When presented with the foregoing facts in Carter's motion to suppress, the trial court concluded that the officers possessed a well-founded suspicion of criminal activity which authorized them to approach Carter's vehicle and to conduct a lawful investigatory stop and detention under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and section 901.151, Florida Statutes (1981). We disagree.
Neither party contends that the officers' initial interaction with the occupants of the suspect vehicle was anything less than an investigatory detention under Terry, which was justifiable only if the officers possessed a "founded" suspicion of the occupants' criminal activity. 1 Wilson v. State, 433 So.2d 1301 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Freeman v. State, 433 So.2d 9 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); R.B. v. State, 429 So.2d 815 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); State v. Perera, 412 So.2d 867 (Fla. 2d DCA), petition for review denied, 419 So.2d 1199 (Fla.1982); § 901.151, Fla.Stat. (1981). See Terry v. Ohio; United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 65 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) ( ); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968); United States v. Thompson, 712 F.2d 1356 (11th Cir.1983); Lightbourne v. State, 438 So.2d 380 (Fla.1983); State v. Cahill, 388 So.2d 354 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). Thus, it is clear that the instant investigatory detention was justified only if a "founded suspicion" existed in the minds of the detaining officers that the suspects had committed, were committing, or were about to commit a crime. Wilson; Kearse v. State, 384 So.2d 272 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); State v. Stevens, 354 So.2d 1244 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
A "founded suspicion" arises if the circumstances observed by the officer, interpreted in light of the officer's knowledge, reasonably indicate the possible...
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