Carter v. Tampkins
| Decision Date | 17 October 2018 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 16-cv-02129-WQH-BGS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of California |
| Parties | Maurice Carter, Petitioner, v. Cynthia Y. Tampkins, Respondent. |
Petitioner Maurice Carter ("Petitioner") filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (ECF No. 1 ["Petition"]). Petitioner is serving a negotiated sentence of six years, eight months following his guilty pleas in San Diego County Superior Court to one count of felon in possession of a firearm and two counts of grand theft, as well as his admission that he had sustained a prior strike conviction in 1999. In the Petition, Petitioner raises a single challenge. (Pet. at 6.1) He argues that his counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge the validity of a prior 1999 conviction and in failing to negotiate that his prior conviction could not be used against him. (Id.)
This case is before the undersigned Magistrate Judge pursuant to Southern District of California Civil Local Rule 72.1(d) for a report and recommendation. The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United States District Judge William Q. Hayes pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the United States District Court for the Southern District of California.
The Court has reviewed the Petition, Respondent's Answer, the lodgments, and all supporting documents submitted by both parties. For the reasons discussed below, the Court RECOMMENDS the Petition be DENIED.
On May 8, 2014, the San Diego County District Attorney filed a complaint in case number CN331975 charging Petitioner with four counts of possession of a firearm by a felon, four counts of possession of ammunition by a felon, two counts of commercial burglary and one count of grand theft. (Lodgment 1.) The complaint also alleged that Petitioner's 1999 conviction for unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor with a great bodily injury enhancement qualified as a strike under California's Three Strikes Law. (Lodgment 1 at 5.)
On July 15, 2014, the San Diego County District Attorney filed a complaint in case number CS2377328 charging Petitioner with one count of burglary and one count of grand theft. The district attorney alleged on-bail enhancements as to both counts and alleged the same strike prior based on Petitioner's 1999 conviction that was alleged in the first complaint. (Lodgment 2 at 2.) Thus, in total, Petitioner was charged with thirteen counts between the two complaints.
On October 15, 2014, pursuant to a global plea agreement, Petitioner pled guilty in case number CN331975 to one count of possession of a firearm by a felon and one count of grand theft and admitted the 1999 strike prior in exchange for a stipulated sentence of six years, eight months. (Lodgment 3 at 9; Lodgment 4.) In case number CS2377328, he pled guilty to one count of grand theft and admitted the same strike prior. (Lodgment 3 at10; Lodgment 5.) Petitioner faced a maximum sentence in the two cases of eight years, eight months. (Lodgment 3 at 7.)
On December 3, 2014, the trial court imposed the stipulated sentence for the two cases of six years, eight months as follows: four years for possession of a firearm by a felon (double the two-year midterm pursuant to California's Three Strikes law) and two consecutive terms of sixteen months for the grand thefts (one third the two-year midterm doubled). (Lodgments 6-8, Lodgment 9 at 5.) Petitioner did not appeal. (Pet. at 2-3.)
On June 16, 2015, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the San Diego County Superior Court, claiming that (1) his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to inform him that he had a constitutional right to a hearing or a bifurcated trial on the prior strike 1999 conviction allegation, and (2) his prior strike 1999 conviction was improperly used to enlarge his sentence in violation of due process and equal protection.2 (Lodgment 10.)
On August 4, 2015, the San Diego County Superior Court denied the petition on the merits, finding that Petitioner "cannot establish it is reasonably probable he would have obtained a more favorable result" if he had gone to trial. (Lodgment 11.) Further, the court found Petitioner's claim that his 1999 conviction was improperly used as a strike prior lacked merit. In 1999, Petitioner pled guilty to Penal Code § 261.5(d) and admitted to a Penal Code § 12022.7(a) great bodily injury allegation, based on sex with a minor that resulted in pregnancy. The Court noted that per California Supreme Court authority, a pregnancy without medical complications that results from unlawful but nonforcible intercourse can support a finding of great bodily injury. (Lodgment 11 at 2 [citing People v. Cross, 45 Cal. 4th 58, 63 (2008).]) Thus, his claim failed.
On May 31, 2016, Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the California Court of Appeal, claiming that defense counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge the validity of his prior strike conviction allegation, properly consult with him regarding the prior conviction, and negotiate a more favorable sentence. (Lodgment 12.) His requested relief was to "have lower court grant sentence modification." (Id. at 7.3) The Court of Appeal denied the petition the same day, noting that the "petition, filed more than 19 months after [Petitioner] was sentenced without any explanation for the delay, is barred as untimely." (Lodgment 13 at 1 [citing In re Reno, 55 Cal. 4th 428, 459 (2012), In re Swain, 34 Cal. 2d 300, 302 (1949)].) The court also held that, to the extent Petitioner was challenging the validity of his guilty plea, his petition was barred because he failed to obtain a certificate of probable cause under California Penal Code section 1237.5. (Lodgment 13 at 1 [citing In re Chavez, 30 Cal. 4th 643, 651 (2003)].) Finally, the court found that even if Petitioner's petition were not procedurally barred, it would still be denied as he had not satisfied his pleading burden because he did not support his claim with documentation or declarations regarding the plea negotiations or prior strike conviction. (Lodgment 13 at 2 [citing People v. Duvall, 9 Cal. 4th 464, 474 (1995), In re Reno, 55 Cal. 4th at 499-500].)
On June 15, 2016, Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the California Supreme Court, raising the same ineffective assistance of counsel claim that he raised in the California Court of Appeal. (Lodgment 14.) On July 27, 2016, the California Supreme Court summarily denied the petition in a decision that reads in full: (Lodgment 15.)
On August 22, 2016, Petitioner filed the instant Petition claiming that his counselwas ineffective for failing to challenge the validity of his prior conviction from 1999 and failing to negotiate that the prior conviction not be used against him.4 (Pet. at 6.) The totality of his argument regarding his ineffective assistance of counsel claim is:
Trial counsel failed to challenge the validity of a prior conviction from 1999. Trial counsel also failed to negotiate the prior conviction from 1999 should not be used against petitioner. Petitioner is actually prejudice.
(Id.) Respondent filed an answer on October 31, 2016, arguing that (1) Petitioner's claim is barred by his guilty plea; (2) the Petition is conclusory; and (3) relitigation of Petitioner's claim is barred because the California Supreme Court properly rejected it on the merits, or in the alternative, Petitioner is not entitled to relief even if the Court were to review his claim de novo. (ECF No. 7-1.) Plaintiff did not file a traverse.
This Petition is governed by the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). A federal court may not grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus made by a person in state custody with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless it: (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, 28 U.S.C. § 2245(d)(1); or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the state court proceeding, id. § 2254(d)(2). See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011).
A federal habeas court may grant relief under the "contrary to" clause if the state court applied a rule different from the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or if it decided a case differently than the Supreme Court on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002); Moses v. Payne, 555F.3d 742, 751 (9th Cir. 2008). A state court need not cite Supreme Court precedent when resolving a habeas corpus claim. See Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). "[S]o long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts [Supreme Court precedent,]" the state court decision will not be "contrary to" clearly established federal law. Id. Clearly established federal law, for purposes of § 2254(d), means "the governing principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision." Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72 (2003). A court may grant relief under the "unreasonable application" clause if the state court correctly identified the governing legal principle from Supreme Court decisions but unreasonably applied those decisions to...
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