Carter v. Williamson

• Decision Date: 20 December 1898
• Citation: 31 S.E. 651,106 Ga. 280
• Parties: CARTER et al. v. WILLIAMSON et al.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

31 S.E. 651

106 Ga. 280

CARTER et al. v. WILLIAMSON et al.

Supreme Court of Georgia

December 20, 1898

Syllabus by the Court.

1. A lease of "all of the round timber, or timber suitable for turpentine purposes," on designated lots of land each described as containing a specified number of acres, is not ambiguous. Such a lease passes, for the purposes designated, all the round timber on the land, and also all other timber thereon, if any, suitable for turpentine purposes, just as the trees stood when the lease was executed; and this is true, although the instrument contained a clause warranting generally the "right and title to all of the property [therein] conveyed." The lease being unambiguous, parol evidence was inadmissible to show an intention on the part of the lessor to lease lots actually having thereon the same number of acres of round timber as the lots themselves contained acres of land.

2. Irrespective of other questions presented by the record, this case turns upon the law above announced, and, applying the same to the facts in evidence, the verdict was contrary to law, and should have been set aside.

Error from superior court, Wayne county; J. L. Sweat, Judge.

Action by Williamson & Co., for the use of McCranie & Vickers against Carter & Elliott. There was a judgment for plaintiffs, and defendants bring error. Reversed.

S. R Harris and E. D. Graham, for plaintiffs in error.

Hitch & Myers, for defendants in error.

SIMMONS C.J.

1. Carter & Elliott leased to Williamson & Co. "all of the round timber, or timber suitable for turpentine purposes," on certain designated lots of land, each described as containing a specified number of acres. The lease contained a warranty of all of the property conveyed. Williamson & Co. brought suit, for the use of McCranie & Vickers, against Carter & Elliott, for breach of warranty claiming that 520 acres of the land contained no round timber or timber suitable for turpentine purposes. On the trial of the case, over the objection of the defendants, the judge allowed the plaintiffs to introduce a memorandum, made before the lease, for the purpose of showing what was meant by the lease. The plaintiffs claimed that it was the intention to warrant to the defendants that there were the same number of acres of round timber and timber suitable for turpentine purposes that there were acres of land. It is a recognized principle of law that all negotiations and...