Carthage Special Road District of Jasper County v. Ross

Decision Date20 February 1917
PartiesCARTHAGE SPECIAL ROAD DISTRICT OF JASPER COUNTY, Appellant, v. J. C. ROSS et al
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

Appeal from Jasper Circuit Court. -- Hon. David E. Blair, Judge.

Reversed and remanded.

Gray & Gray for appellant.

McReynolds & Halliburton and S.W. Bates for respondents.

BROWN C. Railey, C., concurs.

OPINION

BROWN, C.

The following is the statement of facts made by appellant in its brief and adopted by the respondent:

"The city of Carthage and contiguous territory in Jasper County, Missouri, was, under the authority of sections 10576-10586, Revised Statutes 1909, as amended in 1911, organized as a body corporate to be thereafter designated as the 'Carthage Special Road District of Jasper County.'

"This suit was brought in the circuit court of Jasper County by the road district as plaintiff against Jasper County and the judges of the county court to restrain the defendants from transferring the funds which the court had set apart, under the provisions of section 11423, Revised Statutes 1909, for road and bridge purposes, and the sole question is whether the road district is entitled to any part of the funds levied and apportioned under said section.

"Acting under the provisions of said section, the county court of Jasper County on the 5th days of May, 1913, after having levied a tax of fifty cents on the one hundred dollars' assessed valuation for county purposes, made the following order:

"Ordered by the court that 'County Revenue Fund' be subdivided and apportioned, as follows:

"All in accordance with the law. Same covering taxes for the year 1913.

"$ 29,500.00 or 20 per cent for Contingent Fund.

"$ 36,875.00 or 25 per cent for Pauper Fund.

"$ 36,875.00 or 25 per cent for Salary Fund.

"$ 29,500.00 or 20 per cent for Road and Bridge Fund.

"$ 14,750.00 or 10 per cent for Grand and Petit Jury, Judges and Clerks of Election Fund.

"The $ 29,500 so apportioned to the Road and Bridge Fund was not received by the county until the collector made his settlement in January, 1914, and the county court used no part of said funds on the roads of the county for the year 1913, because the same were not on hand, but as soon as the same were received, concluded not to do any road work, and treated the whole funds levied for road purposes as a surplus, no longer required for road purposes, and proposed to turn them over to the county treasurer to pay other current expenses of the county for 1913.

"The records show that the road commissioners of the plaintiff in the year 1913, contemplating this money would be collected and paid over to them for road purposes in the district constructed roads and bridges and made demands in writing on the county court for the funds, but their requests were first refused because the funds were not on hand, and then when the funds were received, refused altogether, claiming that the funds were a surplus fund no longer needed for the purpose for which they were levied and collected, and the court proposed to transfer them to pay other current expenses of the county.

"The answer admitted making the order above set forth, and also that the county court proposed to apportion as a surplus the $ 29,500 to the payment of current expenses, on account of there being a deficit in the Pauper Fund, the Jury Fund and the Incidental Fund in the county.

"The answer also admitted that a written demand had been made to the court by the plaintiff for the funds, and that the court had refused to pay any part of the same.

"In addition to the pleadings there was an agreed statement of facts filed by which it was admitted that no part of the funds had been paid to plaintiff or its commissioners; that no part of them had been paid out by the county court; that the county court had drawn no warrants thereon, and that the plaintiff, by its commissioners, had made a written demand on the court for its part of said funds, and at the time said demand was made, there were outstanding obligations of the plaintiff for road work performed by plaintiff in its said district and contracted since the making of the order of May, 1913, and prior to January 1, 1914.

"The court dismissed the plaintiff's bill and it appealed to this court, and, as above stated, the only question is: What shall be done with the funds that were levied and apportioned for road purposes under the order of the court on May 5, 1913?"

I. Our road laws remind us of the famous comment of Peter on the epistles of his Beloved Brother Paul: "In which are some things hard to be understood." We have been compelled to approach them frequently during the last few years, and do so with the feeling that we are taking up a bundle of plugs, whittled to suit well enough the local uses that suggested them, but far too small for the apertures into which we are called upon to fit them. In the attempt to do so it will be of service to consider the broad foundation upon which they rest. The entire highway system is a unit. The legislative problem is to provide money to construct, improve and maintain these facilities in such a way as to distribute the burden approximately in proportion to the benefit received by each locality, as well as by each taxpayer. It is evident that this problem is not well solved by a system of little units like our road districts, for it is frequently the case that the most expensive roads must lie over the roughest, most unproductive and least valuable lands.

II. This suit is a conflict between the county and the plaintiff road district as to which of them is entitled to a fund raised by taxation of the property in the plaintiff district. It is a part of the levy of fifty cents on the hundred dollars valuation for county purposes authorized and limited by section 11 of article 10 of the Constitution, and levied as a road tax in pursuance of section 10481 of the Revised Statutes of 1909, as amended in 1913. Section 10481 was, as originally enacted, as follows:

"The county court in the several counties of this State, at the May term thereof in each year, shall levy upon all real and personal property made taxable by law, outside of incorporated cities, towns and villages, a tax of not more than twenty cents on the one hundred dollars' valuation as a road tax, which levy shall be collected and paid by the collector into the county treasury as other revenue, and the county treasurer shall place the same to the credit of the road district from which said tax was collected and shall pay the same to the overseer of said district on the warrants of the county court. The money derived from such road tax shall be expended by the respective road overseers in purchasing necessary tools with which to work the roads in their districts, in purchasing material to build or repair bridges and culverts, and for such other expenditures as may be necessary to keep the roads in their districts in good order: Provided, that the construction of all bridges and culverts shall be under the direction or supervision of the county highway engineer."

Included in the same act was section 10482, passed in pursuance of the constitutional amendment of 1908 (included in article 10 as section 22) authorizing the levy of an additional tax of twenty-five cents for road and bridge purposes. The next section of the same act (Sec. 10483, R. S. 1909) is as follows:

"All moneys collected under the levy authorized by section 10481, and paid into the county treasury, shall constitute the road fund of the several road districts, and shall be disbursed only by authority of the county court as provided by law, and no part thereof shall be used to pay costs and damages in opening new roads."

We are thus enabled to say with certainty that these three sections, together with sections 11 and 22 of article 10 of the Constitution on which they rested, were before the Legislature at the same time, and were enacted as a single plan to raise money for all purposes connected with roads and bridges; and that whatever we may think of their propriety, we must defer to the legislative will and give effect to all their provisions.

We have nothing to do in this case with any other fund than that levied under section 10481.

Up to this point we are impressed with the care and precision with which the Legislature hedged about the fund appropriated for roads and bridges out of the tax levied under the Constitution for "county purposes." It was not only declared in the section which authorized its levy that it be placed to the credit of the road district from which it was collected and paid to the overseer of such district on warrants of the county court and expended by the overseer, but also declared that it should constitute the road fund of the several road districts. In these provisions we can see no evidence of any intention that the county court might devote it at will to other uses.

III. At the legislative session of 1913 a doubt seems to have arisen as to whether the county court might not, in its discretion refuse to appropriate any portion of the general revenue for county purposes as a road-and-bridge fund, and for that purpose depend entirely on the additional levy authorized by the constitutional amendment of 1908; and section 10481 was so amended as to require the inclusion of a road tax of at least ten cents on the one hundred dollars' valuation in the levy for county purposes, and provided that the amount thereof collected upon property within any special road district should be paid into the county treasury as other revenue, and that the county treasurer should place the same to the credit of the special road district from which it was collected and "pay the same to the commissioner or...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT