Cartmell v. Slavik Co.

• Decision Date: 24 March 1976
• Docket Number: Docket No. 23878
• Citation: 68 Mich.App. 202,242 N.W.2d 66
• Parties: Bernard C. CARTMELL and Lois E. Cartmell, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. The SLAVIK COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 66

242 N.W.2d 66

68 Mich.App. 202

Bernard C. CARTMELL and Lois E. Cartmell, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. The SLAVIK COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 23878.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

March 24, 1976.

Released for Publication June 4, 1976.

Hyman & Rice by Jefferson F. Riddell, Southfield, for defendant-appellant.

Erwin A. Salisbury, Ann Arbor, for plaintiffs-appellees.

Before McGREGOR, P.J., and T. M. BURNS and KAUFMAN, JJ.

T. M. BURNS, Judge.

This appeal concerns the accrual of a cause of action for breach of warranty.

Plaintiffs Bernard and Lois Cartmell brought this action to recover for breach of an express warranty. In 1958, plaintiffs purchased a new home from defendant. The home contained a tile roof for which the following lifetime express warranty was provided by defendant:

'The tile is warranted to be free from all defects in manufacture, and the roof is warranted against leaks due to failure of tile or its installation for the life of the building; losses resulting from acts of God or violence are excluded from this warranty.'

In 1960, plaintiffs observed damage to their ceiling, apparently caused by leaks in the roof, and unsuccessfully attempted to repair the roof. In 1969, plaintiffs informed defendant of the leakage and asked that the roof be repaired. Plaintiffs received no response.

In 1974, after being advised that their roof was improperly installed, plaintiffs initiated this action against defendant for breach of warranty.

At the commencement of the trial in district court, defendant moved for summary judgment alleging that the six-year statute of limitations had run. This motion was denied. Plaintiff admitted at trial that the roof had leaked since 1960. Relying upon this, defendant moved for a directed verdict, urging that the statute of limitations had begun to run in 1960. The district court judge denied this motion, concluding that the question concerning when the plaintiffs discovered or should have discovered the breach of warranty was a factual one for the jury to decide. Having this issue submitted to it, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs.

Defendant appealed the district court judge's denial of its motion for a directed verdict to the circuit court. The circuit court affirmed the trial court's judgment. Defendant sought leave to appeal, which we granted.

The technical issue before us is whether the circuit court erred in affirming the trial court's denial of defendant's motion for a directed verdict. The crux of the matter is whether the date upon which a cause of action for breach of express warranty accrues is a question of law for the court to determine or one of fact for the trier of fact.

The statute of limitations begins to run when plaintiff's action accrues. A claim for breach of warranty accrues when the breach is discovered or reasonably should have been discovered. M.C.L.A. § 600.5833; M.S.A. § 27A.5833.

Defendant contends that plaintiffs discovered the breach in 1960, that the cause of action accrued then, that the six years had thus run by the time this suit was commenced, and that the trial court should have directed a verdict in its favor. Plaintiff argues that the discovery of leaks in 1960 is not tantamount to discovery that the roof was improperly installed and that the latter discovery was not made until 1974.

Plaintiffs argued, and the district and circuit courts agreed, that the question of when the breach was discovered or should have been discovered, was a question of fact for the jury to decide. Both of the lower courts relied for their decisions upon our opinion in Weeks v. Slavik Builders, Inc., 24 Mich.App. 621, 180 N.W.2d 503 (1970), Aff'd, 384 Mich. 257, 181 N.W.2d 271 (1970).

The Weeks case was very similar to the one at bar, but any reliance upon it as controlling in the instant case is unwarranted. In Weeks, defendant made attempts to fix the roof but failed to stop the leakage. We held that the statute of limitations was tolled by defendant's efforts to repair and for a time thereafter until plaintiffs had a reasonable opportunity to determine that the repairs were not sufficient. In the instant case there were no such attempts to repair which would stop the running of the statute.

Despite the factual differences between this case and Weeks, we find no reason to reverse the decisions of the courts below. Reviewing the facts of this case, there is no basis for concluding absolutely that the cause of action accrued in 1960. Plaintiffs testified that they were aware of leaks in 1960. But for there to have been sufficient knowledge for the cause of action to accrue the plaintiffs would have had to have known or should have known that there were leaks that were caused by a failure of the tile or its installation. Knowing that there are leaks and knowing that there are leaks caused by faulty material or workmanship in the roof are two different things. ¹ Plaintiffs may have Suspected that the leaks were the fault of the defendant, but they did not Know this until 1974. Of course, whether plaintiffs Should have known of the breach earlier is another question. At what time the breach 'reasonably should have been discovered' ² is properly a question to be decided by the trier of fact. In Cree Coaches, Inc. v. Panel Suppliers, Inc., 23 Mich.App. 67, 178 N.W.2d 101 (1970), we held that the time at which a breach of warranty is discovered or should reasonably have been discovered is a question for the trier of fact. In affirming that decision in part, however, our Supreme Court decided that the above holding was obiter dicta and should not be regarded as an authoritative adjudication of that issue. Cree Coaches, Inc. v. Panel Suppliers, Inc., 384 Mich. 646, 186 N.W.2d 335 (1971).

Searching elsewhere for authority, we find that M.C.L.A. § 600.5833; M.S.A. § 27A.5833 has been interpreted by a Federal court as it was by this Court in Cree Coaches, supra, i.e. that a factual question exists regarding when a plaintiff discovered or should have discovered a breach of warranty. Crocker v. McCabe-Powers Auto Body Co., 321 F.Supp. 1154 (E.D.Mich.1970). ³

While not relying on Cree Coaches or Crocker, we think that such interpretation of the statute is correct. Where there is an issue concerning reasonable diligence in discovering a breach of warranty, a question of fact arises unless reasonable minds could not differ on the conclusion. In the instant case, we cannot say that the trial court erred in submitting the question to the jury.

Affirmed.

KAUFMAN, Judge (dissenting).

In general, questions regarding reasonableness of notice, Mutual Electric & Machine Co. v. Turner Engineering Co., 230 Mich. 63, 202 N.W. 964 (1925), and time which the cause of action accrued, Flynn v. McLouth Steel Corporation, 55 Mich.App. 669, 223 N.W.2d 297 (1974), represent conflicts to be decided by the trier of fact. However, in a few cases, no conflict is presented. I find that this is such a case.

My review of the record convinces me that reasonable minds could not differ as to whether plaintiffs knew or should have known of their cause of action against defendant at a time which would bar their action. Plaintiffs knew that their roof leaked in 1960. This knowledge is clearly manifested by their own attempt to fix the roof. The majority asserts that

'Knowing that there are leaks and knowing that there are leaks caused by faulty material or workmanship in the roof are two different things.' (Footnote omitted.)

On these facts this assertion is a distinction without a difference. Plaintiffs' house was new. What other than faulty material or installation could cause a new roof to leak? In attempting to fix the roof, plaintiffs should reasonably have ascertained the...