Cartwright v. Burlington Northern RR Co.

• Decision Date: 15 November 1995
• Docket Number: Civ. No. J-C-94-305.
• Citation: 908 F. Supp. 662
• Parties: Joe CARTWRIGHT and Pat Cartwright, Co-Guardians of the Person and Estate of Latashia Cartwright, Plaintiffs, v. BURLINGTON NORTHERN RAILROAD COMPANY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Arkansas

908 F. Supp. 662

Joe CARTWRIGHT and Pat Cartwright, Co-Guardians of the Person and Estate of Latashia Cartwright, Plaintiffs, v. BURLINGTON NORTHERN RAILROAD COMPANY, Defendant.

Civ. No. J-C-94-305.

United States District Court, E.D. Arkansas, Jonesboro Division.

November 15, 1995.

Michael L. Gibson, Gibson Law Firm, Osceola, AR, Bill W. Bristow, Seay & Bristow, Jonesboro, AR, for plaintiffs.

John C. Deacon, Barrett & Deacon, Jonesboro, AR, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

EISELE, District Judge.

Before the Court is defendant Burlington Northern Railroad Company's (Burlington's) Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs have responded to the present motion, opposing the relief sought. For the reasons expressed in the following opinion, Burlington's motion will be granted.

I.

The standards governing the Court's consideration of a motion for summary judgment are well-established. Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate only when "`the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2509-10, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). To resist such a motion, the party bearing the burden of proof on any issue must come forward with sufficient evidence to establish that a material factual issue exists to be determined at trial. See Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 884, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 3186, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). However, at this stage of the litigation, the Court's function is not to divine the "true" facts of the case, but only to determine whether "there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., supra, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. at 2511. In making this determination, the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, affording that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 993, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962); Reich v. Hoy Shoe Co., Inc., 32 F.3d 361, 364 (8th Cir.1994). If, under such a view of the evidence, it is clear that no more than a "metaphysical doubt" exists as to the material facts of the case, and that the movant is clearly entitled to judgment under those facts, then summary judgment is appropriate. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

II.

This is a diversity action¹ arising out of railroad accident, and the events surrounding that accident are largely undisputed. On March 19, 1994, at approximately 11:00 a.m., plaintiffs' automobile was struck by a Burlington train while attempting to cross the Jefferson Street crossing in Luxora, Arkansas. Complaint ¶ 4; Burlington's Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 1 (Docket No. 6); Plaintiffs' Statement of Undisputed Facts ¶ 1 (Docket No. 9) As a result of the March 19th accident, plaintiffs' daughter, Latashia Cartwright, was severely injured. Complaint ¶¶ 4, 5; Answer ¶¶ 4, 6. The roadway portion of the Jefferson Street crossing was constructed across pre-existing railroad lines, though Burlington was not involved in the construction of that roadway. Burlington's Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶¶ 7-8; Plaintiffs' Statement of Undisputed Facts ¶¶ 7-8. The roadway approaches to the Jefferson Street crossing have an elevation grade of less than 1':5', and the angle between Jefferson Street and the railroad lines at the southwest corner (from which plaintiffs' automobile approached) is approximately 66°41'55". Burlington's Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶¶ 6, 9; Plaintiffs' Statement of Undisputed Facts ¶¶ 6, 9. At the time of the March 19th accident, the Jefferson Street crossing was marked by two reflectorized crossbucks, Burlington's Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 2; Plaintiffs' Statement of Undisputed Facts ¶ 2, the installation of which was paid for, and hence "approved," by the Federal Highway Administration. Burlington's Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶¶ 2-3; Plaintiffs' Statement of Undisputed Facts ¶¶ 2-3.

Plaintiffs claim that the March 19th accident was the result of Burlington's negligence. Specifically, plaintiffs claim that Burlington's train failed to sound an appropriate whistle when approaching the Jefferson Street crossing, Complaint ¶ 4(a); that the operator of Burlington's train failed to keep a proper lookout and maintain proper control over the train, Complaint ¶¶ 4(b), 4(c); that the train operator was operating the train at an excessive speed, Complaint ¶ 4(d); that the train operator failed to apply the brakes in time to avoid the collision, Complaint ¶ 4(e); that the Jefferson Street crossing was abnormally dangerous, in that it did not provide motorists with an adequate warning device and/or opportunity to view any oncoming train, Complaint ¶ 4(f); and that Burlington failed to operate its train, maintain its tracks, and otherwise exercise an appropriate degree of care, Complaint ¶¶ 4(g), 4(h). Burlington denies any negligence or responsibility for the March 19th accident. Answer ¶¶ 4-6.

III.

To the extent that plaintiffs' negligence claim is premised upon their allegation that the Jefferson Street crossing was abnormally dangerous because it was marked by an inadequate warning device (crossbucks, as opposed to some other warning device), Burlington argues that plaintiffs' claim is preempted by federal law.² See 45 U.S.C. § 434 (repealed July 5, 1994). The Court agrees. It is undisputed that the crossbucks installed at the Jefferson Street crossing were paid for, and were thereby "approved," by the Federal Highway Administration, and that those crossbucks were installed prior to the March 19th accident, probably sometime in 1980. See Selig Affidavit ¶ 9 (Docket No. 6, exh. A). It is also undisputed that the crossbucks at the Jefferson Street crossing were installed by someone other than Burlington. See Selig Affidavit ¶ 9. In Elrod v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 68 F.3d 241 (8th Cir.1995), the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit concluded that no such negligence claims may be made in connection with the warning device installed at the Jefferson Street crossing. In affirming a decision of this Court, the Court of Appeals held that the federal funding, and the consequent presumptive approval, of the Jefferson Street crossing's warning device (the crossbucks) compelled the conclusion, under the decisions of CSX Trans., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 113 S.Ct. 1732, 123 L.Ed.2d 387 (1993) and St. Louis S.W. Ry. Co. v. Malone Freight Lines, Inc., 39 F.3d 864 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 1963, 131 L.Ed.2d 854 (1995), that federal law (namely the grade crossing regulations found at 23 C.F.R. § 646.214(b)(3) & (b)(4) (1994)) operated to preempt any state law tort claims premised upon the crossing's allegedly inadequate warning device.³Id. at 866-67. The Eighth Circuit's decision in Elrod controls this case,⁴ and accordingly the Court concludes that Burlington is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs' negligence claim, in so far as that claim is based upon the premise that the warning device installed at the Jefferson Street crossing was inadequate.

IV.

Burlington next argues that, under 45 U.S.C. § 434 (repealed July 5, 1994), plaintiffs' claim that its train was being operated at an excessive speed is likewise preempted by federal law (namely the speed regulations found in 49 C.F.R. § 213.9(a) (1994)).⁵ The parties agree (as does the Court) that, with respect to the train at issue in this case, the speed limit applicable to the Jefferson Street crossing was 60 m.p.h. Burlington's Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 4; Plaintiffs' Statement of Undisputed Facts ¶ 4. Burlington has put forward evidence establishing that, at the time of the March 19th accident, Burlington's train was operating at 48 m.p.h., well within the applicable speed limit. Lovelady Affidavit ¶ 8 (Docket No. 6, exh. B). And while plaintiffs have refused to concede that the train was operating at 48 m.p.h. (or at any speed less than 60 m.p.h.), see Plaintiffs' Statement of Undisputed Facts ¶ 5, they have not come forward with any evidence, by affidavit or otherwise, to contradict Burlington's claim as to the operating speed of the train. Accordingly, the Court is satisfied that there is no material factual issue as to the speed the train was travelling at the time of the March 19th accident.⁶ See United States v. Warren Brown & Sons Farms, 868 F.Supp. 1129, 1132 (E.D.Ark.1994); cf. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, supra, supra, 477 U.S. at 323-24, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-53; Vance v. Stevens, 930 F.2d 661, 662 (8th Cir.1991). Since its appears, from the uncontroverted evidence in this case, that Burlington's train was operating within the speed limit established by the applicable federal regulations, the Court concludes that Burlington is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs' negligence claim, in so far as that claim is based upon the premise that Burlington's train was operating at an excessive speed at the time of the March 19th accident. CSX Trans., Inc. v. Easterwood, supra, 507 U.S. at 672, 113 S.Ct. at 1742-43; St. Louis S.W. Ry. Co. v. Pierce, 68 F.3d 276, 277-78 (8th Cir.1995); Williams v. Burlington N. R.R., supra, 849 F.Supp. at 684.

V.

Burlington finally argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs' negligence...