Cartwright v. City of Marine City

• Decision Date: 21 July 2003
• Docket Number: No. 02-1728.,02-1728.
• Citation: 336 F.3d 487
• Parties: Dinnell C. CARTWRIGHT, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Terry L. Cartwright, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CITY OF MARINE CITY; James Vandermeulen and Timothy Rock, Marine City Police Officers, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

336 F.3d 487

Dinnell C. CARTWRIGHT, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Terry L. Cartwright, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CITY OF MARINE CITY; James Vandermeulen and Timothy Rock, Marine City Police Officers, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 02-1728.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued: May 7, 2003.

Decided and Filed: July 21, 2003.

Julie O'Connor, (argued and briefed), O'Connor, DeGrazia & Tamm, Bloomfield Hills, MI, for Appellant.

Wolfgang Mueller, (argued and briefed), Olsman, Mueller & James, Berkley, MI, for Appellee.

Before: SUHRHEINRICH and COLE, Circuit Judges; CARR, District Judge.^*

OPINION

CARR, District Judge.

Dinnell C. Cartwright, as personal representative of the estate of the late Terry L. Cartwright, sued the City of Marine City, Michigan ("City"), and two of its police officers for failing to prevent the death of Terry Cartwright, a pedestrian who was struck and killed by a truck. The district court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment and claim of qualified immunity. We hold that the plaintiff has not made out a constitutional violation against the City or the officers. We therefore REVERSE the district court's denial of qualified immunity, and REMAND the case for dismissal.

I. BACKGROUND

The tragic facts of this case are not in dispute. On October 27, 1998, at around midnight, Terry Cartwright was walking on the foggy, unlit shoulder of 26 Mile Road in St. Clair County, Michigan. Defendants James Vandermeulen and Timothy Rock, police officers for Marine City, Michigan, saw him on the side of the road while they were riding in their patrol car to the Speedy-Q convenience store for a prisoner pickup. The officers stopped and asked Cartwright where he was going. Cartwright said he was traveling to Yale, Michigan. The officers offered him a ride to Port Huron, Michigan, and Cartwright accepted. He got into the back of the patrol car, and the three drove for eight or nine minutes to reach the store.

During the trip, the officers asked Cartwright for identification. Cartwright produced an identification card. The officers noticed that Cartwright smelled of alcohol, but did not notice other signs of intoxication, such as bloodshot eyes or slurred speech.

At the convenience store, the officers took custody of their prisoner. The officers then told Cartwright that they could not put the prisoner in the back seat with Cartwright unless Cartwright consented to a pat-down search. Cartwright refused to allow the pat-down search, and told the officers that he did not want a ride. The officers left Cartwright at the store, and drove away.

According to store clerk John Beaufait, Cartwright entered the store sometime between midnight and 12:30 a.m., bought a soft drink, and left. Cartwright returned sometime between 1 a.m. and 1:30 a.m. and tried to buy a beer. Beaufait refused to sell him the beer because he looked haggard and confused, and slurred his speech. Beaufait gave Cartwright a cup of coffee, and Cartwright stayed in the store for about twenty or thirty minutes, drinking the coffee and talking to Beaufait. Cartwright then left the store.

Approximately one hour later, at about 2:25 a.m., Cartwright was run over by a truck and killed as he lay in the middle of 26 Mile Road, about two miles from the store. The autopsy report determined that Cartwright's blood alcohol level at the time of his death was .27 percent. A forensic pathologist determined that Cartwright's blood alcohol level at about 12:15 a.m. would have been in excess of .30 percent. At that level, Cartwright's speech would have been slurred, his eyes would have been red, and he would have had trouble standing.

Cartwright's wife, Dinnell Cartwright, representing his estate, initiated this action against the City of Marine City, Rock, and Vandermeulen. She alleges that the police officers violated Terry Cartwright's substantive due process rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and that the City is liable for failure to train and supervise its police officers. Plaintiff also asserted a claim of gross negligence and a violation of Mich. Comp. Laws § 333.6501 (2003). The district court denied summary judgment on the constitutional claim, and also denied summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The defendants appeal.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Jurisdiction

The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C § 1331. This Court has jurisdiction over the defendants' appeal of the district court's denial of qualified immunity pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985) (holding that a district court's denial of a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of law, is appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, though not a final judgment).

The district court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment based on its conclusion that there were genuine issues of material fact for trial, never mentioning qualified immunity. The order still is appealable, however, because "[e]ven when the district court denies summary judgment without stating its reasons for doing so, a court of appeals may decide the legal question underlying the qualified immunity defense." Christophel v. Kukulinsky, 61 F.3d 479, 485 (6th Cir.1995) (citing Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 318-19, 115 S.Ct. 2151, 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995)); see also Klein v. Long, 275 F.3d 544, 549 (6th Cir.2001) (quoting Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 299 (6th cir.1999)) (noting that as long as "a defendant seeking qualified immunity [is] willing to concede to the facts as alleged by the plaintiff and discuss only the legal issues raised by the case" the defendant is entitled to an interlocutory appeal to show that "the undisputed facts or the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff fail to establish a prima facie violation of clear constitutional law").

B. Standard of Review

We review de novo a district court's denial of qualified immunity. Klein, 275 F.3d at 550 (citation omitted).

C. Qualified Immunity

The plaintiff asserts that the defendant officers and the City violated Terry Cartwright's substantive due process rights. Because a constitutional violation against a city requires, but is not made out by, an antecedent violation on the part of its officials, see Bukowski v. City of Akron, 326 F.3d 702, 708 (6th Cir.2003), we start with the roles played by defendants Rock and Vandermeulen.

As governmental officials acting within the scope of their duty, Rock and Vandermeulen can claim qualified immunity. Id. Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense shielding governmental officials from liability as long as their conduct does "not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). The plaintiff has the burden of establishing that a defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity. Rich v. City of Mayfield Hts., 955 F.2d 1092, 1095 (6th Cir.1992).

The qualified-immunity inquiry has two principal parts. First, the court must determine "whether the plaintiff has shown a violation of a constitutionally protected right." Davis v. Brady, 143 F.3d 1021, 1024 (6th Cir.1998). Then, the court must discern whether the right is so "clearly established" that a "reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). We start with the question of whether the officers violated Terry Cartwright's due-process rights at all. Because there was no violation, we do not reach the clearly-established prong.

D. Section 1983

Plaintiff seeks to hold the government officials responsible, under § 1983, for the act of private violence that Cartwright suffered when he was struck and killed by a motorist. To succeed on a § 1983 claim, plaintiff must show defendants: 1) acted under color of state law; and 2) deprived plaintiff's decedent of his rights under the United States Constitution. Upsher v. Grosse Pointe Pub. Sch. Sys., 285 F.3d 448, 452 (6th Cir.2002) (citations omitted).

1. Color of State Law

Defendants do not contest that they were acting under state law.

2. Deprivation of Rights

Plaintiff alleges that defendants violated Cartwright's constitutional right to substantive due process by failing to take him into custody. In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 197, 109 S.Ct. 998, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989), the Supreme Court noted that "a State's failure to protect an individual against private violence simply does not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause." The Court in DeShaney held that the defendant social services department was not liable for the injuries a father inflicted on his son, even though the department had a responsibility to prevent child abuse, and had taken temporary custody of the child before returning him to his father. While the Court in DeShaney denied relief, it explained that it was not considering a case where a person suffered injuries either while in state custody or because of state acts that made him more vulnerable to private violence. Id. at 201, 109 S.Ct. 998. Instead, DeShaney involved a situation where a state's involvement placed the victim "in no worse position than that in which he would have been had it not acted at all." Id.

This Court has recognized both of these exceptions to the general rule announced in DeShaney. Sargi v. Kent City Bd. of Educ., 70 F.3d 907, 910 (6th Cir.1995). See Stemler v. City of Florence, 126 F.3d 856, 867-68 (6th Cir.1997) (holding that an injury suffered while in state custody may be violation of Due Process Clause); Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055, 1066 (6th Cir.1998) (holding that there may be liability under Due Process Clause where state's affirmative acts either create or increase...