Cartwright v. Scheels All Sports, Inc.

• Decision Date: 18 June 2013
• Docket Number: No. DA 12–0299.,DA 12–0299.
• Citation: 370 Mont. 369,310 P.3d 1080
• Parties: Brandon W. CARTWRIGHT, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SCHEELS ALL SPORTS, INC., Defendant and Appellee.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

370 Mont. 369

310 P.3d 1080

Brandon W. CARTWRIGHT, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.SCHEELS ALL SPORTS, INC., Defendant and Appellee.

No. DA 12–0299.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs March 6, 2013.

Decided June 18, 2013.

For Appellant: Antonia P. Marra, Marra, Sexe, Evenson & Bell, P.C., Great Falls, Montana.

For Appellee: Carey E. Matovich, Jesse G. Myers, Matovich, Keller & Murphy, P.C., Billings, Montana.

Justice LAURIE McKINNON delivered the Opinion of the Court.

[370 Mont. 370]¶ 1 Brandon W. Cartwright appeals from a judgment entered against him by the Eighth Judicial District Court, Cascade County, on his wrongful discharge complaint against Scheels All Sports, Inc. A jury found that Scheels did not wrongfully discharge Cartwright from employment, and the court entered judgment awarding Scheels the costs it incurred defending this action. We affirm.

¶ 2 The issues on appeal are:

¶ 3 1. Did the District Court err when it failed to grant summary judgment to Cartwright on liability and allowed Scheels to argue that it had “good cause” to discharge Cartwright?

[370 Mont. 371]¶ 4 2. Did the court err by failing to sanction Scheels for discovery abuse and destruction of evidence?

¶ 5 3. Did the court err when it failed to allow Cartwright to amend the pleadings to add a claim for punitive damages under § 39–2–905(2), MCA?

¶ 6 4. Did the court erroneously allow Scheels' expert witness to testify as to ultimate issues of fact and law, invading the province of the jury?

¶ 7 5. Did the court err in allowing witnesses to testify to rumors heard at Scheels about Cartwright?

BACKGROUND

¶ 8 Brandon Cartwright was employed at Scheels' store located in Great Falls, Montana, from 1996 to 2007. During that time, Cartwright was promoted to the “lead” assistant manager position in the store. By all accounts, he was a good worker.

¶ 9 Beginning in 2001 and continuing through the date of trial, Cartwright dated and lived with one of the nine other assistant managers at the Great Falls Scheels store. During the winter, spring, and early summer of 2007, he also had a “sexual fling” with J., another assistant manager at the Great Falls Scheels store. J. discussed the affair with several co-workers, some of whom then became uncomfortable working with Cartwright because his live-in girlfriend, also their co-worker, was unaware of what was going on. Darin Werner, the store manager, asked Cartwright about the situation in March and August of 2007, but Cartwright denied having a sexual relationship with J. In August of 2007, Cartwright and yet another assistant manager, Carri Blockyou, had a heated exchange concerning the situation. Shortly thereafter, Blockyou resigned.

¶ 10 On September 1, 2007, Werner called Cartwright and J. into his office for a meeting. Werner asked them about the rumors regarding their relationship. Both Cartwright and J. denied being involved in a romantic relationship, and Cartwright became angry. Werner fired both Cartwright and J.

¶ 11 Cartwright applied for and was found eligible to receive unemployment benefits. Scheels appealed to the Board of Labor Appeals, which affirmed. The eligibility decision included a determination that Cartwright had not been terminated due to his own misconduct.

¶ 12 In August of 2008, Cartwright filed this suit, in which he alleges that Scheels discharged him in violation of the Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act (WDEA), Title 39, chapter 2, part 9, MCA. Cartwright maintains he was fired because he had a relationship with J. and because he refused to discuss that relationship with Werner. In response, Scheels contends Cartwright was fired (1) because of the effects his relationships were having on the assistant manager team's ability to work together, (2) because the other assistant managers had lost trust in him, and (3) because he swore at Werner when Werner asked him about his relationship with J.

¶ 13 In the District Court, Cartwright moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability, based on having been found eligible for unemployment benefits. The District Court denied that motion, and also denied Scheels' cross-motion for summary judgment on whether Cartwright was fired for good cause. However, the court granted Scheels' motion for summary judgment on Cartwright's claim that his discharge was based on his refusal to violate public policy. In a later order, the court denied Cartwright's motion to amend the pleadings to add a claim for punitive damages.

¶ 14 This case was tried to a jury over the course of five days. At the end of trial, the jury found that Scheels did not wrongfully terminate Cartwright. Cartwright appeals.

DISCUSSION

ISSUE 1

¶ 15 Did the District Court err when it failed to grant summary judgment to Cartwright on liability and allowed Scheels to argue that it had “good cause” to discharge Cartwright?

¶ 16 This Court reviews a summary judgment ruling de novo, using the same M.R. Civ. P. 56 criteria applied by the district court. Eastgate Village Water and Sewer v. Davis, 2008 MT 141, ¶ 18, 343 Mont. 108, 183 P.3d 873. Summary judgment should be rendered only when no genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. M.R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3).

¶ 17 In his motion for summary judgment, Cartwright argued to the District Court that, because he was found eligible for unemployment benefits, the question of whether he was wrongfully discharged is settled under the doctrines of issue preclusion and claim preclusion. He makes the same argument on appeal.

¶ 18 This argument is specifically prohibited by statute. Section 39–51–110, MCA, provides that a finding of fact or law, judgment, conclusion, or order made under the unemployment insurance law may not be conclusive or binding or used as evidence in any separate or subsequent action or proceeding in another forum, regardless of whether they involve the same or related parties or the same facts.

¶ 19 Even without § 39–51–110, MCA, the District Court was correct in denying Cartwright summary judgment on grounds of issue or claim preclusion. Issue preclusion and claim preclusion bar a party from relitigating an issue that already has been litigated and decided in a prior suit. We apply a four-element test to determine whether relitigation is barred:

1. Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication identical to the issue raised in the action in question?

2. Was there a final judgment on the merits in the prior adjudication?

3. Was the party against whom preclusion is asserted a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication?

4. Was the party against whom preclusion is asserted afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue that may be barred?

Rooney v. City of Cut Bank, 2012 MT 149, ¶ 17, 365 Mont. 375, 286 P.3d 241. Here, the District Court determined that “the issue decided in the administrative hearing [for unemployment benefits] is not identical to the issues surrounding ‘good cause.’ ”

¶ 20 The District Court was correct. In the unemployment benefits proceedings, the administrative agency determined whether Cartwright had been discharged for misconduct. See§ 39–51–2303, MCA. “Misconduct” includes willful or wanton disregard of the rights, title, and interests of a fellow employee or the employer; deliberate violations or disregard of standards of behavior that the employer has the right to expect of an employee; carelessness or negligence that causes or is likely to cause serious bodily harm to the employer or a fellow employee; and carelessness or negligence to a degree or that reoccurs to a degree that shows an intentional or substantial disregard of the employer's interest. Section 39–51–201(19), MCA. In a wrongful discharge action, in contrast, employer liability generally hinges upon whether the employer had good cause to terminate the plaintiff. See§ 39–2–904, MCA. Under the WDEA, “good cause” is defined as “reasonable job-related grounds for dismissal based on a failure to satisfactorily perform job duties, disruption of the employer's operation, or other legitimate business reasons.” Section 39–2–903(5), MCA.

¶ 21 Cartwright also argues that he was entitled to summary judgment on the issue of liability because his conduct at issue was off-duty, out-of-office conduct. This is a misstatement of Scheels' case. As stated above, Scheels' position was that Cartwright's semi-secret relationship with J., an assistant manager at the store, while he lived with and dated another assistant manager at the store, was causing disruption of the store's operations. Scheels' justification for terminating Cartwright's employment went beyond Cartwright's off-duty, out-of-office conduct, and centered on the effects of that conduct in the workplace.

¶ 22 We hold that the District Court did not err when it failed to grant summary judgment on liability to Cartwright and allowed Scheels to proceed to trial on the question of whether it had good cause to discharge Cartwright under the WDEA.

ISSUE 2

¶ 23 Did the court err by failing to sanction Scheels for discovery abuse and destruction of evidence?

¶ 24 M.R. Civ. P. 37 allows a court to impose sanctions for a party's failure to make discovery. We review sanction orders under a deferential abuse of discretion standard, because the trial court is in the best position to know whether the parties have disregarded the rights of opposing parties during litigation, and which sanctions for such conduct are most appropriate. Lewistown Propane Co. v. Moncur, 2002 MT 349, ¶ 22, 313 Mont. 368, 61 P.3d 780.

¶ 25 In this case, Cartwright learned during discovery that, by January of 2008, Scheels had deleted his emails and data on the computer he had used at work. Cartwright says this left him unable to impeach the testimony of assistant manager Carri Blockyou and deprived him of evidence that he was well-regarded by his co-workers up until the day he was fired. Citing Oliver v. Stimson...