Carver Middle Sch. Gay-Straight Alliance v. Sch. Bd. of Lake Cnty.

• Decision Date: 06 March 2014
• Docket Number: No. 5:13–cv–623–Oc–10PRL.,5:13–cv–623–Oc–10PRL.
• Citation: 2 F.Supp.3d 1277
• Parties: CARVER MIDDLE SCHOOL GAY–STRAIGHT ALLIANCE, an unincorporated assoc iation; and H. F., a minor by and through parent Janine Faughnan, Plaintiffs, v. SCHOOL BOARD OF LAKE COUNTY, FLORIDA, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

2 F.Supp.3d 1277

CARVER MIDDLE SCHOOL GAY–STRAIGHT ALLIANCE, an unincorporated assoc iation; and H. F., a minor by and through parent Janine Faughnan, Plaintiffs,

v.SCHOOL BOARD OF LAKE COUNTY, FLORIDA, Defendant.

No. 5:13–cv–623–Oc–10PRL.

United States District Court,

M.D. Florida,

Ocala Division.

Signed March 6, 2014.

Benjamin James Stevenson, ACLU Foundation of Florida, Inc., Pensacola, FL, Daniel B. Tilley, ACLU Foundation of Florida, Inc., Miami, FL, Leslie Cooper, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, Inc., New York, NY, for Plaintiffs.

Phen Warfield Johnson, McLin & Burnsed, PA, Leesburg, FL, for Defendant.

ORDER

WM. PERRELL HODGES, District Judge.

The Carver Middle School Gay–Straight Alliance wants to be recognized by the Lake County School Board at Carver Middle School in order to receive certain benefits that would accompany that recognition. The School Board has declined to grant the Alliance such status.

This action was filed by the Alliance against the School Board on December 19, 2013 (Doc. 1).¹ Later, on January 15, 2014, the Alliance filed a motion for a preliminary injunction (Doc. 4) prohibiting the School Board “from denying [the Alliance] access to the forum for non-curricular student clubs, from denying [the Alliance] official recognition as a student club, and from denying [the Alliance] the ability to operate [the Alliance] at Carver with all attendant benefits afforded to student clubs.” (Doc. 4, p. 25).

The Court scheduled a hearing on the Alliance motion to be held on February 10, 2014 (Doc. 5). The School Board was then properly served (Doc. 8) and promptly filed a motion to dismiss (Doc. 10) followed by a response (Doc. 11) opposing the Alliance motion for preliminary injunctive relief.²

Oral argument was entertained at the hearing conducted on February 10, 2014, and all pending motions are ready for decision. The Court will Deny the School Board's motion to dismiss (Doc. 10), but will also Deny the Alliance's motion for a preliminary injunction (Doc. 4). Explanations follow.

I. The Legal Basis Of The Action.

The complaint (Doc. 1) states two claims. Count One seeks relief under the Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071–4074.³ Count Two invokes 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and seeks relief under the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States—specifically the First Amendment right to free speech and association as applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.

II. The School Board's Motion To Dismiss.

The motion to dismiss (Doc. 10) asserts five independent grounds for dismissal: (1) that neither of the Plaintiffs have standing to assert the claims alleged; (2) that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), and does not comply with the basic pleading requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8 and 10; (3) that the Equal Access Act is not applicable to the case; (4) that the First Amendment has been complied with at all times by the School Board; and (5) that the complaint fails to state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

In passing on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court is mindful that “[d]ismissal of a claim on the basis of barebones pleadings is a precarious disposition with a high mortality rate.” Int'l Erectors, Inc. v. Wilhoit Steel Erectors and Rental Serv., 400 F.2d 465, 471 (5th Cir.1968). For the purposes of a motion to dismiss the Court must view the allegations of the complaint in the light most favorable to plaintiff, consider the allegationsof the complaint as true, and accept all reasonable inferences that might be drawn from such allegations. Speaker v. U.S. Dep't. of Health & Human Servs., 623 F.3d 1371, 1379 (11th Cir.2010); Jackson v. Okaloosa Cnty., Fla., 21 F.3d 1531, 1534 (11th Cir.1994). Once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations of the complaint. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).

In order to avoid dismissal, a complaint must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” and that rises “above the speculative level.” Speaker, 623 F.3d at 1380 ( citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. at 1964–65, 1974). A claim is facially plausible “ ‘when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’ ” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)). The plausibility standard requires that a plaintiff allege sufficient facts to nudge his “claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. at 1974. However, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. at 1964–65).

As the School Board's motion accurately states (Doc. 10, pp. 2–3) in order for an unincorporated association to have prudential standing to sue for itself and its members, the association must show: (1) that the individual members would have standing to sue in their own right; (2) that the interests at stake are germane to the purpose of the association; and (3) that neither the claims nor the relief requested requires participation of the individual members. Ouachita Watch League v. Jacobs, 463 F.3d 1163, 1170 (11th Cir.2006) (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181, 120 S.Ct. 693, 704, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000)). In addition, a plaintiff must have constitutional standing under the case or controversy jurisdictional grant of Article III of the Constitution. This requires a showing that the plaintiff has suffered an injury in fact that is concrete and particularized as well as actual or imminent; and it must also be shown that there is a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of, with a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision of the court. Sierra Club v. Johnson, 436 F.3d 1269, 1276 (11th Cir.2006) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2136, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)).

The minor plaintiff alleges in the complaint (Doc. 1), and avers in her affidavit (Doc. 4–2) filed in support of the Alliance motion for a preliminary injunction, that she is a 12 year old student in the seventh grade at the Lake County Carver Middle School which is comprised of grades six through eight; that she is Vice President of Carver Middle School Gay–Straight Alliance; that she and other students “making up” the Alliance want to have the Alliance recognized by the school administrators as an official student club with the same privileges that are extended to other non-curricular related clubs like the Honor Society and the Cheerleaders (among others); that she participated in the preparation of a written application (Doc. 4–11) to School Board authorities to have the Alliance recognizedas an approved club; and that such application was denied. The complaint further alleges in two counts that the denial of the Alliance application under those circumstances constituted a violation of both statutory and constitutional rights, namely the Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. § 4071, et seq. (Count One) and the right of free speech and association assured by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution (Count Two).

The School Board argues that these allegations are insufficient to demonstrate that either of the Plaintiffs have suffered a concrete injury. It is asserted that the minor Plaintiff has not been disciplined or reprimanded for any speech or expression; and, similarly, that the Alliance has not been prohibited from meeting at its pleasure on the premises of the school upon compliance with the School Board's facilities use policy (Doc. 10, p. 3). The School Board's argument fails, however, not only because it involves assertions of fact going beyond or outside of the complaint thereby becoming a “speaking motion,” ⁴ but also because the Plaintiffs have alleged that approved groups may meet on school property without compliance with the School Board's facilities use policy; may have their finances accounted for through and by the school; may appear in the school's yearbook; may use school resources and equipment for meetings; and may have a School Board employee or sponsor appointed by the Principal to assist the Club (Doc. 1, p. 7, ¶ 17). Denial of these benefits in the context of an alleged statutory violation of the Equal Access Act as well as an alleged violation of the Constitution itself, constitutes a concrete, particularized, and actual injury to those rights. These allegations are sufficient to establish the standing of the minor plaintiff to bring this action.

The standing of the Alliance is also justified by the complaint. As just determined, the minor plaintiff, as a member of the Alliance, has standing to sue in her own right through her parent, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(c); the interests at stake are germane to the purposes of the Alliance; ⁵ and neither the claims asserted or the relief requested necessitates participation by the individual members.

Both Plaintiffs have standing to bring this action and the motion to dismiss on that ground will be denied.

The School Board advances three other arguments in seeking a dismissal. The first is that the complaint is too short on facts and too long on legal theories to comply with Fed.R.Civ.P. 8 and 10, and the Supreme Court's decision in Twombly, supra. This argument is simply unpersuasive. The complaint is well crafted and pleads alleged historical facts upon which...