Carver v. Chase
| Citation | 174 So. 408,128 Fla. 287 |
| Parties | CARVER v. CHASE et al. |
| Decision Date | 21 May 1937 |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Error to Circuit Court, Lake County; J. C. B. Koonce, Judge.
Action by Margaret M. Chase, joined by her husband. W. W. Chase, and W. W. Chase in his own right, against A. R. Carver. Judgment for the plaintiffs, and the defendant brings error.
Reversed.
COUNSEL W. C. Brooker, John J. Twomey, and Sutton Tillman & Reeves, all of Tampa, for plaintiff in error.
Bryant & Trantham, of Lakeland, for defendants in error.
The writ of error brings for review judgment in favor of the plaintiff wherein she claimed damages resulting from injuries received in an automobile accident.
The plaintiff Mrs. Margaret M. Chase, her daughter, and another lady were invited by Mr. A. R. Carver, defendant, and his wife, to go with them in Mr. Carver's automobile from Lakeland to Gainesville, Fla., and return. On the return trip as the party was entering the outskirts of the city of Leesburg after nightfall they reached a place near a filling station which stood near the highway on the right side as one goes south. Two trucks with large trailers loaded with citrus fruit were standing parallel to the highway and parallel to one another just north of the pavement constructed between the filling station and the highway. The truck nearest to the highway was only a few feet from it and the other truck just beyond that. The highway is a 20-foot paved road. There is a curve in the road north of the highway around which the Carver car traveled approaching the filling station. As the Carver car was passing the two trucks, another automobile driven by a man by the name of Nichols approached the highway from the filling station and was entering the highway immediately in front of the Carver automobile when he came into Carver's range of vision. Nichols immediately stopped his car. Carver, being close upon the Nichols car, swerved his car to the left and applied his brakes, stopping his car within a distance equal to the length of the car. The right fender of the Carver car struck the bumper on the front of the Nichols car, breaking off the bumper of Nichols' car and damaging the fender of Carver's car. When Carver applied his brakes bringing his car to a quick stop, Mrs. Chase was thrown forward and to the right, her body passing partly over the front seat and her left arm was broken between the shoulder and the elbow. Mrs. Chase's daughter and Mrs Carver were thrown forward, but neither was hurt to any appreciable extent. Mrs. Durrance, who was on the back seat of the car with Mrs. Chase and Mrs. Chase's daughter, states that she was thrown backward instead of forward. The record shows that Carver was driving at a moderate rate of speed; that he had been driving along the open highway at about 50 miles per hour; that as he came around the curve and approached the filling station he saw the trucks on the roadside just off the pavement and slowed his speed. As stated before, just as he was passing the trucks the Nichols automobile was in the act of entering the highway immediately behind the trucks. Carver did the only thing that a reasonable, prudent man should have done under the circumstances. He turned to miss the truck, if possible, and at the same time applied his brakes to stop his car. The physical facts show that the Carver car, although not equipped with hydraulic brakes, was under such control that it was possible to stop within the short distance equal to the length of the car.
It is the contention of appellee that Carver was driving at an excessive rate of speed, considering the surroundings and condition of the place where the accident occurred.
The allegation in the declaration is: 'The defendant did so negligently and recklessly drive, in that he drove at a rate of speed in excess of that required by caution and care and at a rate of speed that violated the speed limit fixed by the said City of Leesburg and then in full force and effect; that it became necessary for him in an effort to avoid a collision with another automobile to apply his brakes with such force and suddenness as to throw the plaintiff who was riding in the rear seat violently against the front seat,' etc.
There is no material difference in these allegations as contained in the first, second, and third counts.
The fourth count was in behalf of the plaintiff W. W. Chase. It adopted all the allegations of the third count and alleged in addition thereto that he is the husband of Margaret M. Chase that he has been denied the care, attention, and companionship of his wife and has been required to spend large sums of money for...
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...Sattler, 141 Fla. 770, 193 So. 817; McMillan v. Nelson, 149 Fla. 334, 5 So.2d 867; Kozak v. Ake, 147 Fla. 508, 3 So.2d 120; Carver v. Chase, 128 Fla. 287, 174 So. 408; Ayers v. Morgan, Fla., 42 So.2d 2; Baker v. Hausman, Fla., 68 So.2d 572. Here, as in several of the above cited cases, the ......
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