Carver v. Com.

Decision Date20 March 1953
Citation256 S.W.2d 375,49 A.L.R.2d 616
PartiesCARVER v. COMMONWEALTH.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky

Paul R. Huddleston, Bowling Green, for appellant.

J. D. Buckman, Jr., Atty. Gen. and Zeb A. Stewart, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

MOREMEN, Justice.

Appellant, Henry Carver, was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and sentenced to confinement in the penitentiary for a period of ten years. He killed James Hines.

Carver and Hines were tenant farmers and neighbors. They lived near Bowling Green. Appellant was about 53 years old and, according to his testimony, weighed about 150 pounds and was in poor health. The deceased was 26 years old, about 6 feet tall and weighed nearly 200 pounds. Appellant was known as a steady drinker and Hines drank occasionally. Neither had been in trouble before and each bore the reputation of being a good law-abiding citizen. Previous to the fatal day, the parties had had some 'trouble' but it appears to have been little more than rather rough horseplay which had been initiated by Hines. However, on the afternoon of Saturday, November 17, 1951, their relationship was friendly. They each drank a bottle of beer in a poolroom in Bowling Green and left together about 4 or 4:30 p. m. Appellant testified that they then went to a garage to pick up his car and at the garage he noticed that Hines had been drinking more than he theretofore had thought he had. Nevertheless, they got into the car and started home. During the ride home, over a distance of about seven miles, Carver stated that Hines began to show more plainly that he was under the influence of alcohol. Hines opened a pocket knife and, in order to annoy appellant, occasionally jabbed him in the leg with it. When appellant reached his house, he stopped at his gate and requested that Hines go on home, but Hines would not answer him and he finally drove up to the house where he got out and was followed into his home. He then realized that Hines was drunk.

Carver testified that the following happened within the space of ten minutes:

'Well, I went on the opposite side of the stove from the door and he set down in front of the stove like this, and it actually happens so that he hit at me from this chair he was setting in and hit me on the left side of the nose which was sore for some time. And then he swung this chair and when he got his chair I was moving back then toward the kitchen and the first thing that I could get my hands on was that gun over the kitchen door. I brought this gun down and shot this first shot into the wall. He said, 'Well, you son of a bitch, I will get you now.' I guess he must have thought that was the only shell in it. To tell you the truth, I didn't even know the gun was loaded when I took it down. I thought I could use it otherwise. Then when I brought this gun down and fired the second shot, the second shot actually shot him. He was within reaching distance of the kitchen door and I was on this side of the kitchen door.'

He further stated that when Hines struck him, 'he hit me on the left side of the nose which is very sensitive any way because I have had part of that bone took out, it seemed to kinder addle me and I didn't hardly seem to realize what did happen after I was hit.'

Appellant assigns as his principal ground for reversal the fact that the jury was not polled after the verdict was returned.

We will describe the circumstances surrounding this incident in the language used in the bill of exceptions 'After approximately two hours of deliberation, the jury returned into open court with a verdict, which verdict was received and announced by the court in the presence of the defendant but in the absence of defendant's counsel. Said counsel, having been absent about five minutes during a visit to the washroom located on the same floor and immediately across the hall from the courtroom, returned to find that the verdict had been received and announced...

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13 cases
  • Brooks v. Gladden
    • United States
    • Oregon Supreme Court
    • 25 Enero 1961
    ...v. Wentworth & Irwin, Inc., 1932, 139 Or. 1, 7 P.2d 796; Wilson v. State, 1956, 93 Ga.App. 375, 91 S.E.2d 854; Carver v. Commonwealth, Ky.1953, 256 S.W.2d 375, 49 A.L.R.2d 616; State v. Dow, 1957, 246 N.C. 644, 99 S.E.2d 860; State v. Butler, 1958, 27 N.J. 560, 143 A.2d 530; Reed v. Kinnik,......
  • Rice v. Wood
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • 20 Febrero 1996
    ...constitutional right to be present at imposition of sentence under Snyder, 291 U.S. at 105-08, 54 S.Ct. at 332-33); Carver v. Commonwealth, 256 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Ky.1953) (defendant's right to face jury at time of polling is " 'the most substantial right of the accused in a felony case' ") (......
  • Powell v. Com.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky
    • 24 Marzo 1961
    ...of the jurors is a permissive right which may be waived. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 308 Ky. 709, 215 S.W.2d 838; Carver v. Commonwealth, Ky., 256 S.W.2d 375, 49 A.L.R.2d 616. But it is a substantial legal right and to deny it without waiver is prejudicial error in a felony case. Boreing v. Be......
  • Miranda v. United States
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit
    • 30 Abril 1958
    ...944; Solar v. United States, D.C.Mun. App.1952, 86 A.2d 538; State v. Thursby, Mo.1952, 245 S.W.2d 859, 863; Carver v. Commonwealth, Ky.1953, 256 S. W.2d 375, 49 A.L.R.2d 616, and annotation thereto; Commonwealth v. Martin, 1954, 379 Pa. 587, 593, 109 A.2d 325, 328; State v. Schmelz, 1955, ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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