Casares v. Bernal

• Citation: 790 F.Supp.2d 769
• Decision Date: 20 May 2011
• Docket Number: No. 08 CV 4198.,08 CV 4198.
• Parties: Daniel CASARES and Karina Casares, Plaintiffs,v.Officer BERNAL, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

790 F.Supp.2d 769

Daniel CASARES and Karina Casares, Plaintiffs,

v.Officer BERNAL, et al., Defendants.

No. 08 CV 4198.

United States District Court,N.D. Illinois,Eastern Division.

May 20, 2011.

Kimberly D. Fahrbach, Dykema Gossett Rooks Pitts PLLC, Lisle, IL, Abbas Badruddin Merchant, Robert J. Semrad & Associates, John Nicolas Albukerk, Albukerk and Associates, Leah Elana Selinger, Baumann & Schuldiner, Dan Zoloth Dorfman, Blake Wolfe Horwitz, The Blake Horwitz Law Firm, Ltd., Uma D. Bansal, The Law Firm of Blake Horwitz, Ltd., Daniel Matthew Noland, Paul A. Michalik, Dykema Gossett PLLC, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiffs.Kimberly D. Fahrbach, Dykema Gossett Rooks Pitts PLLC, Lisle, IL, Terrence Michael Burns, Daniel Matthew Noland, Paul A. Michalik, Dykema Gossett PLLC, Chicago, IL, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER

YOUNG B. KIM, United States Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiffs Daniel and Karina Casares bring this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that the seven defendant police officers violated their constitutional rights by using excessive force against them in the course of an arrest that took place on October 6, 2006. According to Plaintiffs, Defendants dragged Daniel—who has been a quadriplegic since 2002 and has limited use of his arms and hands—out of a car where he was sitting and hit and kicked him repeatedly. (R. 51, Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 7–8.) They also hit and kicked Karina repeatedly when she yelled at them to stop beating Daniel. ( Id. at ¶¶ 9–10.) According to Defendants, they used only reasonable force in arresting Daniel for striking a police officer in the face and Karina for interfering with Daniel's arrest. The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of this court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Currently before the court are Plaintiffs' motions in limine numbers 5, 19, 22, 24, and 26, and Defendants' motions in limine numbers 12, 18, 19, 20, 21, and 23. For the following reasons, the motions are granted in part and denied in part as follows: Plaintiffs' motion in limine number 5 is granted; Plaintiffs' motions in limine numbers 19, 22, 24, and 26 are denied; Defendants' motions in limine numbers 12 and 19 are denied; Defendants' motion in limine number 18 is granted; and Defendants' motions in limine numbers 20, 21, and 23 are granted in part and denied in part.

Legal Standard

Included in the district court's inherent authority to manage trials is the broad discretion to rule on motions in limine. Jenkins v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 316 F.3d 663, 664 (7th Cir.2002). The purpose of a motion in limine is to prevent the jury from hearing evidence that is “clearly inadmissible on all possible grounds.” Anglin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 139 F.Supp.2d 914, 917 (N.D.Ill.2001). Accordingly, in some instances it is best to defer rulings until trial, where decisions can be better informed by the context, foundation, and relevance of the contested evidence within the framework of the trial as a whole. Id. “A pre-trial ruling denying a motion in limine does not automatically mean that all evidence contested in the motion will be admitted at trial.” Delgado v. Mak, No. 06 CV 3757, 2008 WL 4367458, at *1 (N.D.Ill. March 31, 2008). And although a ruling granting a motion in limine excludes the introduction of certain evidence, the court may revisit evidentiary rulings during trial as appropriate in its exercise of discretion. Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41–42, 105 S.Ct. 460, 83 L.Ed.2d 443 (1984).

Analysis

I. Defendants' Motions in LimineA. No. 12, To Bar Lay Opinions on Plaintiff Daniel Casares's Medical Condition or What He Is Capable of Doing

Defendants seek to prevent Karina and other lay witnesses from testifying as to the kinds of movements Daniel is capable of making or giving their opinions regarding what kind of force would be necessary to arrest Daniel. Federal Rule of Evidence 701 states that lay witnesses are permitted to give opinions which are “(a) rationally based on the perception of the witness; (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue, and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.” In other words, “[l]ay opinion testimony is admissible only to help the jury or the court to understand the facts about which the witness is testifying and not to provide specialized explanations or interpretations that an untrained layman could not make if perceiving the same acts or events.” United States v. Conn, 297 F.3d 548, 554 (7th Cir.2002) (quoting United States v. Peoples, 250 F.3d 630, 641 (8th Cir.2001)).

Defendants' request to exclude lay opinions sweeps too broadly. Under Rule 701, Karina and other witnesses who know Daniel will be allowed to describe their first-hand perceptions of Daniel's physical condition, as long as their testimony does not conflict with his criminal conviction for battery, as explained below in part I–D. To the extent that their testimony strays into the realm of specialized or technical interpretations of Daniel's movements or legal conclusions regarding the level of force necessary to arrest him, the admissibility of those statements will be dealt with best at trial, where objections can be presented in context. See Hawthorne Partners v. AT & T Techs., Inc., 831 F.Supp. 1398, 1401 (N.D.Ill.1993). Defendants' motion in limine number 12 is denied.

B. No. 18, To Bar Evidence or Testimony Relating to a Sustained Complaint Register ¹

Defendants move to prevent Plaintiffs from submitting evidence regarding a sustained complaint register (“CR”) lodged against one of the defendant officers (“the accused officer”), in which he/she was accused of: (1) grabbing an arrestee, choking him, and slamming him to the ground outside the police station; (2) pushing the arrestee inside the station and causing his head to slam against the wall; and (3) providing false information regarding the arrest in case reports and in the Office of Professional Standards' (“OPS”) subsequent investigation. The OPS investigator sustained allegations that the accused officer choked, pushed, and slammed the arrestee to the ground, provided false information in the arrest and case reports, and gave a false statement to OPS during the investigation by stating that his/her use of force was in response to the arrestee's resistance. The accused officer was suspended for 30 days as a result of the sustained allegations. According to Defendants, any allusions to this incident represent inadmissible and unduly prejudicial propensity evidence.

Under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.” It may be admissible, however, to show motive, opportunity, intent, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake. Id. To determine admissibility under Rule 404(b), the court must consider whether: “(1) the evidence is directed toward establishing a matter in issue other than the defendant's propensity to commit the crime charged, (2) the evidence shows that the other act is similar enough and close enough in time to be relevant to the matter in issue, (3) the evidence is sufficient to support a jury finding that the defendant committed the similar act, and (4) the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” United States v. Hicks, 635 F.3d 1063, 1069 (7th Cir.2011). A trial judge is not required to permit a plaintiff in an excessive force case to introduce a defendant officer's prior disciplinary history. Okai v. Verfuth, 275 F.3d 606, 611 (7th Cir.2001).

Here, Plaintiffs assert that they seek to introduce evidence regarding the sustained CR not to show the accused officer's propensity for violence or untruthfulness, but to show “intent, plan, absence of mistake, training in and knowledge of proper police procedures, and trustworthiness.” (R. 224, Pls.' Resp. at 3.) More specifically, they argue that it is “admissible to show that [the accused officer] intended to use unreasonable force on Plaintiff Karina Casares and that the degree of force [he/she] used was not accidental or a mistake,” and that the accused officer's acts in “falsifying [his/her] factual account as to [his/her] battery and assault of the complainant, keenly demonstrates [his/her] state of mind, i.e., [his/her] knowledge and intent to injure, as well as [his/her] need to justify the unreasonable and disproportionate beating of Plaintiffs.” ( Id. at 4–5.) Plaintiffs' point is well-taken with respect to their argument that the accused officer's shifting explanations of the conduct underlying the CR is relevant to show his/her alleged knowledge and intent to justify his/her use of force after-the-fact. But their argument that the previous use of force demonstrates the accused officer's intent to use excessive force against Daniel is more problematic. This court recognizes that there have been excessive force cases in this district in which the court allowed evidence of an officer's prior use of excessive force to come in to demonstrate the officer's “intent to commit assault and battery in the case at bar.” See Edwards v. Thomas, 31 F.Supp.2d 1069, 1074 (N.D.Ill.1999); see also Finley v. Lindsay, No. 97 CV 7634, 1999 WL 608706, at *3 (N.D.Ill. Aug. 5, 1999). But as Defendants point out, whether the accused officer subjectively intended to use excessive force or to hurt Karina is not relevant to the excessive force analysis, which asks “whether the officers' actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). That is because “[a]n officer's evil intentions will not make a Fourth Amendment violation out of an objectively reasonable use of force; nor will an...