Casciaro v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.

• Decision Date: 05 December 1944
• Citation: 183 S.W.2d 833,238 Mo.App. 361
• Parties: Ernest Casciaro, Respondent, v. The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company, a Corporation, Appellant
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

183 S.W.2d 833

238 Mo.App. 361

Ernest Casciaro, Respondent, v. The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company, a Corporation, Appellant

Court of Appeals of Missouri, St. Louis District

December 5, 1944

Appeal from the Circuit Court of St. Louis County; Hon. Fred E Mueller, Judge.

Reversed and remanded.

Orville Richardson and Jones, Hocker, Gladney & Grand for appellant.

The court erred in refusing to direct a verdict in favor of the defendant at the close of all the evidence, and also erred in giving and reading to the jury plaintiff's Instruction No. 1. (1) Defendant was not an insurer of plaintiff's safety while he was in defendant's store. Defendant was liable only if it negligently placed the boxes in the aisle or negligently permitted them to remain in the aisle after it knew or by ordinary care could have known of their presence for a sufficient length of time to remove them. There was no evidence to support either alternative theory of liability. Hudson v. K. C. Baseball Club, 349 Mo. 1215, 164 S.W.2d 318, 323; Robinson v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 347 Mo. 421, 147 S.W.2d 648, 649-650; State ex rel. Trading Post Co. v. Shain, 342 Mo. 588, 116 S.W.2d 99, 102; McKeighan v. Kline's, Inc., 339 Mo 523, 98 S.W.2d 555, 558-560; Berberet v. Electric Park Amusement Co., 319 Mo. 275, 3 S.W.2d 1025, 1029-1030; Uelentrup v. Switzerland Stores, Inc. (Mo. App.), 164 S.W.2d 650, 651; Smith v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (Mo App.), 117 S.W.2d 658, 661; Achter v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (Mo. App.), 105 S.W.2d 959, 962; Varner v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. (Mo. App.), 75 S.W.2d 585, 587; Broughton v. S.S. Kresge Co. (Mo. App.), 26 S.W.2d 838, 840; Taylor v. K. C. Terminal Ry. Co. (Mo. App.), 240 S.W. 512, 514. (2) Plaintiff actually knew of the presence of the boxes in the aisle before he fell. The condition was open and obvious and as apparent to plaintiff as to defendant. Therefore, defendant did not have superior knowledge of the condition, and could not be charged with negligence in failing to warn plaintiff. Steinmetz v. Nichols (Mo.), 180 S.W.2d 712, 715; Hudson v. K. C. Baseball Club, 349 Mo. 1215, 164 S.W.2d 318, 323; Lamberton v. Fish (Mo.), 148 S.W.2d 544, 546; Murray v. Ralph D'Oench Co., 347 Mo. 365, 147 S.W.2d 623, 626; Lindquist v. S.S. Kresge Co., 345 Mo. 849, 136 S.W.2d 303, 305; Stoll v. First Nat. Bk., 345 Mo. 582, 134 S.W.2d 97, 100-102; State ex rel. Golloday v. Shain, 341 Mo. 889, 110 S.W.2d 719, 723; Ilgenfritz v. Mo. Power & Light Co., 340 Mo. 648, 101 S.W.2d 723, 726-728; Paubel v. Hitz, 339 Mo. 274, 96 S.W.2d 369, 370, 373; Goetz v. Hydraulic Press Brick Co., 320 Mo. 586, 9 S.W.2d 606, 608; Vogt v. Wurmb, 318 Mo. 471, 300 S.W. 278, 279; Mullen v. Sensenbrenner Mercantile Co. (Mo.), 260 S.W. 982, 984; Main v. Lehman, 294 Mo. 579, 243 S.W. 91, 93; Fager v. Pevely Dairy Co., 235 Mo.App. 1036, 148 S.W.2d 61, 62; Cates v. Evans (Mo. App.), 142 S.W.2d 654, 657; Beitch v. Central Terminal Co. (Mo. App.), 122 S.W.2d 94, 95; Reddy v. Joseph Garavelli, Inc. (Mo. App.), 102 S.W.2d 734, 736-738; Vairo v. Vairo (Mo. App.), 99 S.W.2d 113, 116; Eisenberg v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 33 Mo.App. 85, 91. (3) Plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence in failing to avoid a condition which he had seen and which was open, obvious and apparent to him and was negligent in stepping backwards without looking or paying attention to what he was doing. Cash v. Sonken-Calamba Co., 322 Mo. 349, 17 S.W.2d 927, 929-931; Mullen v. Sensenbrenner Mercantile Co. (Mo.), 260 S.W. 982, 984; McGinnis v. Hydraulic Press Brick Co., 261 Mo. 287, 169 S.W. 30, 33; Heidland v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (Mo. App.), 110 S.W.2d 795, 801.

Frank E. Doyle and Paul D. Clerk for respondent.

(1) Although defendant objects to Instruction 1, in its assignment of errors, the objection is not developed in its points and authorities, nor in its argument. The assignment should be considered as abandoned; if considered the instruction should be approved. All the instructions must be construed together. Van Brock v. First Nat. Bank in St Louis, 349 Mo. 425, 161 S.W.2d 258; Long v. F. W. Woolworth Co. (Mo.), 159 S.W.2d 619. (2) Plaintiff was an invitee to the place of business of defendant and had a right to assume that the premises were reasonably safe for use and purpose intended. Bankhead v. First Nat. Bank (Mo. App.), 137 S.W.2d 594, certiorari denied, State ex rel. First Nat. Bank v. Hughes, 346 Mo. 938, 144 S.W.2d 84. (3) If the employees of defendant negligently placed the boxes in the aisle it was not necessary for plaintiff to prove that the boxes had remained in the aisle for any particular length of time. Summa v. Morgan Real Estate Co., 350 Mo. 205, 165 S.W.2d 390; Robinson v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 347 Mo. 421, 147 S.W.2d 648; Wood v. Walgreen Drug Stores (Mo. App.), 125 S.W.2d 534; Armstrong v. Kroger Grocer & Baking Co. (Mo. App.), 78 S.W.2d 564. (4) Whether obstructions were on floor for sufficient time to enable defendant storekeeper to know that premises were not in a reasonably safe condition is a question for jury, but of importance only if unsafe condition were caused by the acts of someone other than the owner or possessor of the premises. Summa v. Morgan Real Estate Co., 350 Mo. 205, 212, 165 S.W.2d 390, 393; Bankhead v. First Natl. Bank (Mo. App.), 137 S.W.2d 594, certiorari quashed, State ex rel. First Natl. Bank v. Hughes, 346 Mo. 938, 144 S.W.2d 84; State ex rel. Trading Post v. Shain, 342 Mo. 588, 116 S.W.2d 99; Hogan v. S.S. Kresge Co. (Mo. App.), 93 S.W.2d 118; Farrell v. Kroger Grocer & Baking Co. (Mo. App.), 71 S.W.2d 1076. (5) Plaintiff may not be held guilty of negligence as a matter of law unless the evidence is so clear that reasonable minds must reach the conclusion that plaintiff failed to use due care. If reasonable minds may differ the issue is for the jury. Poehner v. Lonsdale (Mo. App.), 129 S.W.2d 59; Clark v. Atchinson & Eastern Bridge Co., 324 Mo. 544, 24 S.W.2d 143; Morris v. Atlas Portland Cement Co., 323 Mo. 307, 19 S.W.2d 865. (6) In determining whether plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law evidence in his favor must be accepted and viewed most favorably to him. Long v. F. W. Woolworth Co. (Mo.), 159 S.W.2d 619; Murphy v. Fred Wolferman, Inc., 347 Mo. 634, 148 S.W.2d 481; State ex rel. First Natl. Bank v. Hughes, 346 Mo. 938, 144 S.W.2d 84; Cento v. Security Building Co. (Mo.), 99 S.W.2d 1; Rose v. Missouri District Telegraph Co., 328 Mo. 1009, 43 S.W.2d 562, 81 A. L. R. 400. (7) Questions of negligence and contributory negligence were for the jury. Cameron v. Small (Mo. App.), 175 S.W.2d 177; Summa v. Morgan Real Estate Co., 350 Mo. 205, 165 S.W.2d 390; Blackwell v. J. J. Newberry Co. (Mo. App.), 156 S.W.2d 14; State ex rel. First Natl. Bank v. Hughes, 346 Mo. 938, 144 S.W.2d 84; Myers v. Golloday (Mo. App.), 104 S.W.2d 1007; Moore v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 230 Mo.App. 495, 92 S.W.2d 912; Murphy v. Fidelity Natl. Bank & Trust Co., 226 Mo.App. 1181, 49 S.W.2d 668; Dudacs v. Hotel Statler, Inc. (Mo. App.), 295 S.W. 826; Scott v. Kline's, Inc. (Mo. App.), 284 S.W. 831. (8) Contributory negligence is an affirmative defense to be alleged and proved as any other affirmative defense. Such defense is by way of confession and avoidance. Pokora v. Wab. R. Co., 292 U.S. 98, 78 L.Ed. 1149, 91 A. L. R. 1049, 54 S.Ct. 580; Long v. F. W. Woolworth Co. (Mo.), 159 S.W.2d 619; Bluedorn v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 108 Mo. 439, 18 S.W. 1103, 32 Am. St. Rep. 615; Murray v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 101 Mo. 236, 13 S.W. 817, 20 Am. St. Rep. 601; Buesching v. St. Louis Gaslight Co., 73 Mo. 219, 39 Am. St. Rep. 503; Thompson v. North Mo. R. Co., 51 Mo. 190, 11 Am. St. Rep. 43. (9) The trial court should never direct a verdict unless the evidence and the legitimate inferences therefrom are so strongly against a verdict as to leave no room for reasonable minds to differ. Hopkins v. Kuhn (Mo. App.), 164 S.W.2d 207; Winter v. Metr. Life Ins. Co. (Mo. App.), 129 S.W.2d 99; Howard v. S. C. Sacks, Inc. (Mo. App.), 76 S.W.2d 460; Young v. Wheelock, 333 Mo. 992, 62 S.W.2d 950; Linderman v. Carmen, 255 Mo. 62, 164 S.W. 614. (10) Evidence is considered in light most favorable to prevailing party. Appellate court in determining questions of contributory negligence must view evidence, and inferences deductible therefrom, in most favorable aspect to prevailing party. Cole v. Am. Ry. Express Co., 228 Mo.App. 109, 68 S.W.2d 736; Whitley v. K. C. Pub. Serv. Co. (Mo. App.), 66 S.W.2d 952; Fortner v. Kelly, 227 Mo.App. 933, 60 S.W.2d 642; Great Lakes Coal & Coke Co. v. Segall, 227 Mo.App. 965, 59 S.W.2d 775; Wind v. Bank of Maplewood (Mo. App.), 58 S.W.2d 332; Cope v. Central States Life Insurance Co. (Mo. App.), 56 S.W.2d 602; Irvin v. Kelter (Mo. App.), 46 S.W.2d 924; Lord v. Austin (Mo. App.), 39 S.W.2d 575. (11) If the court should decide that the evidence, and the inferences therefrom, do not sustain the verdict the case should not be reversed without remand as the true facts warrant another opportunity to plaintiff to present all of the facts to a jury. Scullin v. Robertson (Mo.), 187 S.W. 34; Finnegan v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 244 Mo. 608, 149 S.W. 612. (12) It is no objection to a jury's verdict that some essential element of plaintiff's case is not proved by definite affirmative testimony, but is found presumably by reasoning or inferring from a fact or testimony, or even circumstantial evidence, that a certain required thing or fact existed or was true. The jury in the case at bar could infer, properly, that employees of defendant had placed the heavy box, over which plaintiff fell, on the floor behind the larger box. That such was actually the fact is shown by the statements contained in the excluded deposition of defendant's assistant manager. Van Brock v. First...