Cascina v. Hackensack Univ. Med. Ctr.
| Decision Date | 01 October 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civ. 19-17571 (KM) (ESK) |
| Parties | LUZ CASCINA, Plaintiff, v. HACKENSACK UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER n/k/a HACKENSACK MERIDIAN HEALTH AND JOHN/JANE DOES A THROUGH D, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
Plaintiff Luz Cascina, an Outpatient Reservation Specialist employed in the infusion center of the Hackensack University Medical Center (“HUMC”), has sued HUMC for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12112; the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 623(a); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000; and the parallel provisions of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, (“NJLAD”), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-12. HUMC now moves for summary judgment (DE 25), arguing that some of Cascina's claims are time-barred and that she is not able to meet her burden to present facts to prove discrimination on the other claims.
For the reasons set forth below, HUMC's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
The plaintiff, Luz Cascina, is a sixty-two-year-old woman of Colombian origin, a fact relevant to her claims. (DE 25-2 ¶ 1.) She began working as an Insurance Verification Clerk at HUMC in 1999 and has worked as an Outpatient Reservation specialist since 2003. (Id. ¶ 2-4.) At no point was Cascina ever demoted, and she regularly received annual raises. (Id. ¶ 7.) Cascina alleges that at various times during her employment she was mocked and harassed for her Spanish accent. (Compl. ¶ 21.) Cascina was denied access to CPR recertification courses, while a younger employee was permitted to attend. In addition, in January 2018, she overheard her supervisor make a statement to the effect of “sometimes people don't produce too much when they get older and sick… so they have to retire.” (DE 25-5 at 182-83.) She also received written reprimands and a three-day suspension in the summer of 2017 for repeatedly viewing her medical records in violation of HUMC policy, discipline which she alleges was a result of national origin discrimination. Cascina appealed her suspension through all three phases of HUMC's dispute resolution procedure and it was upheld. (DE 25-2 ¶ 19-27.)
On January 3, 2018, Cascina slipped and fell at HUMC and injured her knees and back. (DE 25-2 ¶ 31-32.) Cascina returned to work approximately two weeks later with no medical restrictions. (Id. ¶ 35.) Cascina testified that upon returning to work in January 2018, she requested that her supervisor not require her to walk long distances but that her request was denied. (DE 25-19 at 221-22.) That was the only accommodation she ever requested. (Id. at 255.) Cascina went on medical leave starting March 15, 2018, and has not returned to work since then. (DE 25-2 ¶ 36). Cascina applied for Social Security Disability Insurance benefits in June 2019 and in August 2019. The Social Security Administration issued a determination that Cascina was permanently disabled as of March 15, 2018. (Id. ¶ 41, 44.)
On January 4, 2019, Cascina filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). (Id. ¶ 47.) On June 4, 2019, the EEOC issued a Dismissal and Notice of Rights. (Id. ¶ 48.) On September 3, 2019, Cascina filed this action, and on March 19, 2021, HUMC moved for summary judgment. (Id. ¶ 49; DE 25.) Cascina filed papers in opposition (DE 26), and HUMC filed a reply (DE 27). The matter is fully briefed and ripe for decision.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that summary judgment should be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Kreschollek v. S. Stevedoring Co., 223 F.3d 202, 204 (3d Cir. 2000). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, a court must construe all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Boyle v. County of Allegheny Pennsylvania, 139 F.3d 386, 393 (3d Cir. 1998). The moving party bears the burden of establishing that no genuine issue of material fact remains. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). “[W]ith respect to an issue on which the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof ... the burden on the moving party may be discharged by ‘showing'-that is, pointing out to the district court-that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325.
Once the moving party has met that threshold burden, the non-moving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). The opposing party must present actual evidence that creates a genuine issue as to a material fact for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) (). “[U]nsupported allegations ... and pleadings are insufficient to repel summary judgment.” Schoch v. First Fid. Bancorporation, 912 F.2d 654, 657 (3d Cir. 1990); see also Gleason v. Norwest Mortg., Inc., 243 F.3d 130, 138 (3d Cir. 2001) (). If the nonmoving party has failed “to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial, ... there can be ‘no genuine issue of material fact,' since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Katz v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 972 F.2d 53, 55 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23).
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court's role is not to evaluate the evidence and decide the truth of the matter, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. Credibility determinations are the province of the fact finder. Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992). The summary judgment standard, however, does not operate in a vacuum. “[I]n ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the judge must view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254 (1986). That “evidentiary burden” is discussed in detail below.
Summary judgment is an appropriate stage to examine whether claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. See Cunningham v. M & T Bank Corp., 814 F.3d 156, 160 (3d Cir. 2016), as amended (Feb. 24, 2016). Because the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, and because HUMC has moved for summary judgment, HUMC bears the burden to demonstrate that Cascina's claims are time-barred. See Richard B. Roush, Inc. Profit Sharing Plan v. New Eng. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 311 F.3d 581, 585 (3d Cir. 2002). I can grant summary judgment on the issue only if I determine that there is no genuine dispute as to any fact material to the statute of limitations issue.
Cascina asserts federal claims under the ADA, the ADEA, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. All three statutes require an aggrieved party to file a complaint with the EEOC within 300 days after the occurrence of the alleged unlawful employment practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); Churchill v. Star Enters., 183 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 1999) (); Burgh v. Borough Council of Montrose, 251 F.3d 465, 469-70 (3d Cir. 2001) (Title VII); Griffin v. Dep't of Hum. Servs., 2019 WL 3369783 (D.N.J. July 26, 2019), aff'd, 2021 WL 3780078 (3d Cir. Aug. 26, 2021) (ADEA). If a claim is not part of a continuing violation (analyzed below), it is time-barred if it did not occur within the 300-day statute of limitations lookback period. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 109-10 (2002). Cascina submitted her EEOC questionnaire on January 4, 2019. (DE 25-2 ¶ 47). Thus, the statute of limitations bars any federal claim that accrued more than 300 days before January 4, 2019-i.e., before March 10, 2018. It was just four days later, on March 14, 2018, that Cascina ceased working at HUMC, suggesting that the temporal window may be a very narrow one. HUMC moves for summary judgment on all of Cascina's federal claims because all allegations of unlawful employment practices took place before March 10, 2018. (Def. Br. at 11.) I take each of Cascina's claims in order and determine when the alleged unlawful employment practices took place to determine if each is time-barred.
First, I analyze Cascina's claims under the ADA. Cascina testified that she requested an accommodation only once: upon her return to work in January 2018, when she asked that she not be required to walk long distances. (DE 25-19 at 255.) Her request was declined. (Id. at 221-22.) At no other point, including in the years since she has been on medical leave, has she requested any additional accommodation. (Id. at 266-67.) Thus, the only alleged failure to accommodate Cascina's disability took place in January 2018, outside of the 300-day statute of limitations period. Any ADA claim based on that failure to accommodate is therefore time-barred.[2]
Second I analyze Cascina's...
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