Case of Alves

• Decision Date: 16 April 2008
• Docket Number: SJC-09937.
• Citation: 884 N.E.2d 468,451 Mass. 171
• Parties: Steven ALVES'S CASE.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

884 N.E.2d 468

451 Mass. 171

Steven ALVES'S CASE.

SJC-09937.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued November 8, 2007.

Decided April 16, 2008.

Robert L. Quinan, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Workers' Compensation Trust Fund.

Jerry E. Benezra, Melrose, for the employer.

Present: MARSHALL, C.J., GREANEY, IRELAND, SPINA, COWIN, CORDY, & BOTSFORD, JJ.

IRELAND, J.

General Motors Corporation (General Motors), as a workers' compensation self-insurer, compensated Steven Alves for a work-related injury. Because it was Alves's second injury, General Motors was entitled to reimbursement of some of that compensation, pursuant to G.L. c. 152, § 37. The reviewing board of the Department of Industrial Accidents (board) held that there is no statute of limitations applicable to General Motors's filing its claim for reimbursement, where Alves's injury occurred while the 1985 version of the statute was in effect. The Workers' Compensation Trust Fund (Fund) appealed to the Appeals Court. We granted the Fund's application for direct appellate review and now affirm the decision of the board.

Background and procedure. In order "to encourage the employment of previously injured persons," Daly v. Commonwealth, 29 Mass.App.Ct. 100, 101-102, 557 N.E.2d 758 (1990), citing G.L. c. 152, § 37, as appearing in St.1973, c. 855, §§ 2, 5, the Legislature created a fund to provide some reimbursement to workers' compensation insurers for compensation they pay if such an employee suffers a subsequent injury. The insurer's eligibility for reimbursement does not begin until it pays the first 104 weeks of compensation. St.1973, c. 855, § 2. General Laws c. 152, § 37, was further amended in 1985. That amendment increased the amount of reimbursement an insurer could recoup from fifty per cent to seventy-five per cent. St.1985, c. 572, § 48. It also created the Fund. G.L. c. 152, § 65, as appearing in St.1985, c. 572, § 55. Money for the Fund comes from an assessment on employers. Id. See Daly v. Commonwealth, supra at 103, 557 N.E.2d 758. Most relevant to our purposes is that the 1985 version of G.L. c. 152, § 37, did not contain a statute of limitations on the filing of reimbursement claims by insurers.

In 1991, § 37 was amended again to add a two-year statute of limitations on the filing of claims for reimbursement for injuries occurring after December 23, 1991. St.1991, c. 398 §§ 71, 111.¹ The Legislature specifically made the amendment to § 37 "substantive," St.1991, c. 398, § 106, i.e., the changes were to be applied only prospectively. Austin v. Boston Univ. Hosp., 372 Mass. 654, 657, 363 N.E.2d 515 (1977). See Mills v. Continental Transp. Network, Inc., 44 Mass.App.Ct. 916, 916, 690 N.E.2d 458 (1998), citing G.L. c. 152, § 2A (1991 amendment to G.L. c. 152, § 66, allowing twenty-year statute of limitations on actions against employer, was prospective only).

Steven Alves was employed by General Motors. He suffered a work-related injury within the meaning of G.L. c. 152, § 37, in January, 1987. General Motors began paying reimbursable weekly benefits to Alves on March 10, 1989, ending with a lump-sum payment on March 8, 1991. In April, 2003, General Motors filed its claim for reimbursement for its payments beginning in March, 1989. It is uncontested that the 1985 version of § 37 applies to the reimbursement claim.

In July, 2003, at a conference before an administrative judge, held pursuant to G.L. c. 152, § 10A, the Fund was ordered to reimburse General Motors.² The Fund requested a hearing, which was held before another administrative judge. The Fund argued that a statute of limitations should be read into the 1985 version of § 37 and thus General Motors's claim was time barred.³ In his written decision of March, 2005, the administrative judge stated that he was bound by the board's decision in Walsh v. Bertolino Beef Co., 16 Mass. Workers' Comp.Rptr. 151, 153-154 (2002) (Walsh), where the exact issue was raised and rejected by the board.⁴

The Fund appealed and the board summarily affirmed the judge's decision, in December, 2005. The Fund appealed to the Appeals Court. G.L. c. 152, § 12(2).⁵

Discussion. As the Fund points out, its appeal focuses on "a discrete legal issue concerning the timeliness of the self-insurer's petition for reimbursement" pursuant to G.L. c. 152, § 37. That "discrete legal issue" involves the validity of the board's interpretation of the 1985 version of § 37. "The interpretation of a statute by the agency charged with primary responsibility for administering it is entitled to substantial deference." Gateley's Case, 415 Mass. 397, 399, 613 N.E.2d 918 (1993). The party challenging the board's decision bears a "heavy" burden of proving that the decision is invalid. Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v Energy Facilities Siting Bd., 448 Mass. 45, 51, 858 N.E.2d 294 (2006), citing Box Pond Ass'n v. Energy Facilities Siting Bd., 435 Mass. 408, 412, 758 N.E.2d 604 (2001).

The Fund's argument is premised on the assumption that where a statute does not specify a statute of limitations, courts always borrow one.⁶ Because the 1985 version of § 37 contains no statute of limitations, it follows, according to the Fund, that the board erred in not borrowing a statute of limitations. The Fund suggests that the most analogous statutes from which to borrow would be either G.L. c. 152, § 41 (four years), or G.L. c. 260, § 3A (three years).⁷

Although it is true that courts often borrow a statute of limitations when none is supplied, it is not always the case. See State Bd. of Retirement v. Woodward, 446 Mass. 698, 708, 847 N.E.2d 298 (2006) (no statute of limitations in G.L. c. 32, § 15[4], because of Legislature's clear expression); O'Brien v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 405 Mass. 439, 445, 541 N.E.2d 334 (1989) (G.L. c. 260, § 7, tolling statute has unlimited statute of limitations for mentally ill). We also must give substantial deference to the board's interpretation of G.L. c. 152, unless it is incorrect. Kszepka's Case, 408 Mass. 843, 846-847, 563 N.E.2d 1357 (1990) (board erred in interpreting mandatory language in statute). Moreover, if there is any ambiguity in a statute, "the reviewing board's interpretation of the statute is entitled to our deference." McCarty's Case, 445 Mass. 361, 367, 837 N.E.2d 669 (2005), citing Richards's Case, 62 Mass.App.Ct. 701, 706, 819 N.E.2d 604 (2004).

As the administrative judge stated in his written decision in this case, the board had already analyzed, in Walsh, the statute of limitations issue raised by the 1985 version of the statute. In Walsh, supra, the board first quoted the administrative judge at length, whose decision pointed out:

"Within its various Sections, the statute contains explicit language limiting the period for which certain benefits shall be paid, limitations on when various notices must be filed by employers and insurers, and also contains limitations on the time within which certain claims for benefits must be filed. Thus, the Legislature included specific limitations where it wanted them to be applied — and conversely, excluded them where it did not want limitations to apply. Only in the most arcane and unlikely circumstances would it be necessary or appropriate to find guidance in analogous statutes than within the Workers' Compensation Act itself.... [Moreover if] the Legislature felt that the Trust Fund would have been prejudiced in some way that required retroactive application of this [1991] limitations period, then it could have enacted a retroactive limitation on petitions, an action it specifically chose not to do here."

Id. at 152.

In its Walsh appeal, the Fund urged the board to borrow statutes of limitations, particularly G.L. c. 152, § 41, or G.L. c. 260, § 2. Id. at 153-154. The board rejected these arguments for several reasons. It stated that the entire concept of borrowing as it pertains to § 37 had "no bearing on the [Walsh] case." Id. at 153 citing Nantucket v. Beinecke, 379 Mass. 345, 398 N.E.2d 458 (1979). The board relied on the 1991 amendment to § 37 with its explicit prospective application to conclude:

"To apply this statute of limitations to the 1985 version of § 37 would render the Legislature's prospective characterization of this provision utterly meaningless. Indeed, if the Legislature had intended the new statute of limitations to have retroactive application, `it would have been natural for the Legislature to express such an intention,' as it did for the vast majority of the amendments enacted in 1991. See St. 1991, c. 398, § 107. Where there is such a plain and rational meaning to be applied, we are obliged to apply it, rather than set off on an interpretive quest. See O'Brien v. M.B.T.A., 405 Mass. 439, 443-444 (1989), quoting Commonwealth v. Vickey, 381 Mass. 762, 767 (1980) ('a basic tenet of statutory construction is to give the words their plain meaning in light of the aim of the Legislature, and when the statute appears not to provide for an eventuality, there is no justification for judicial legislation')."

Id. at 154.

Moreover, the board explicitly rejected the Fund's argument that the board should borrow the statute of limitations from G.L. c. 152, § 41, as "meritless," stating that § 41 covers employee claims for compensation, whereas § 37 covers claims for reimbursement.⁸ Id. at 154. See Mills v. Continental Transp. Network, Inc., 44 Mass.App.Ct. 916, 916, 690 N.E.2d 458 (1998) (rejecting employee's request to borrow statute of limitations from § 41 for G.L. c. 152, § 66, where action was one in tort for damages and not workers' compensation claim). The board also rejected the application of G.L. c. 260, § 2, because it had previously concluded that rights and obligations under § 37 are not contract based. Id. at 154, citing Carmilia v. General Elec., 15 Mass. Workers' Comp. Rptr. 261, 275 (2001).⁹ See Ahmed's Case, 278 Mass. 180, 184, 179 N.E. 684 (1932) (workers'...