Case v. Case

Decision Date18 November 2004
Docket NumberNo. 20030971-CA.,20030971-CA.
Citation2004 UT App 423,103 P.3d 171
PartiesRebecca J. CASE, Petitioner and Appellee, v. Clark P. CASE, Respondent and Appellant. State of Utah, Amicus Curiae.
CourtUtah Court of Appeals

David R. Hartwig, Salt Lake City, for Appellant.

Michael R. Labrum and Heather Jensen, Michael R. Labrum PC, Richfield, for Appellee.

Mark L. Shurtleff, Atty. Gen., and Karma K. Dixon, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for Amicus Curiae.

Before BILLINGS, P.J., GREENWOOD, and ORME, JJ.

OPINION

GREENWOOD, Judge:

¶ 1 Clark Case (Father) appeals from the trial court's summary judgment in favor of Rebecca Case (Mother), ordering Father to pay $530 per month child support. Father argues that (1) the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to modify the provision of the California Judgment of Dissolution addressing child support; (2) absent subject matter jurisdiction, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Mother; and (3) the trial court erred in modifying the child support order without requiring a showing of a substantial change in circumstances. We reverse.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 Father and Mother were married in California, in 1992. During their marriage, two children were born. In March 2002, the parties obtained a Judgment of Dissolution (Divorce Judgment) in the Superior Court of Stanislaus County, California. At the time of the divorce, and as reflected in the Divorce Judgment, Mother and the two children had moved to Utah, and Father had moved to Maryland. Under the Divorce Judgment, "[c]hild support is ordered as set forth in the attached." Attached to the decree was "Attachment 4.o.," which states:

The issue of child support shall be reserved until the first of the following events:
a. The children attain age 18, and are not full-time high school students residing with a parent or until the time the children complete the 12th grade or attain the age of 19 years;
b. The children die;
c. The children enter into a valid marriage, are on active duty with any of the armed forces of the United States of America or receive a declaration of emancipation under California law;
d. Further order of the court.

¶ 3 The parties also signed a "Marital Settlement Agreement" which includes the same statement reserving the issue of child support as found in "Attachment 4.o." However, it also states, "[t]he parties stipulate that, if the child support awarded is less than the mandatory minimum level, no change of circumstances need be demonstrated to obtain a modification of the child support award to the applicable mandatory minimum level or above."1

¶ 4 In March 2003, Mother filed a "Verified Petition for Domestication of Decree and Modification of Decree" in Utah's Sixth District Court. Mother's petition asked the Utah court, after communicating with the California court, to determine that Utah was the best venue to make child support determinations and to modify the Divorce Judgment to order Father to pay an appropriate amount of child support. In April 2003, Father was served in Maryland with Mother's petition, to which he filed a pro se answer. Mother filed a motion for summary judgment with an attached affidavit and memorandum. Father failed to file a response to Mother's motion. Pursuant to Mother's notice to submit, and without holding a hearing, the trial court issued a ruling granting Mother's motion for summary judgment. Father then filed a motion for relief from judgment, which the trial court denied. The trial court also entered findings of fact and conclusions of law relating to the summary judgment previously granted. Father filed a timely appeal.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 5 Father argues that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to modify the child support provisions of the California Divorce Judgment. Whether a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction presents a question of law which we review "`under a correction of error standard, giving no particular deference to the trial court's determination.'" Barton v. Barton, 2001 UT App 199,¶ 7, 29 P.3d 13 (citation omitted).2

ANALYSIS

I. Trial Court's Subject Matter Jurisdiction Under UIFSA

¶ 6 Father argues that the Utah trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to modify the Divorce Judgment and order him to pay child support. "`[B]ecause it is a threshold issue, we address jurisdictional questions before resolving other claims.'" Fisher v. Fisher, 2003 UT App 91,¶ 15, 67 P.3d 1055 (quoting Housing Auth. v. Snyder, 2002 UT 28,¶ 11, 44 P.3d 724).

¶ 7 The Utah Constitution gives the district courts subject matter jurisdiction "in all matters except as limited by this constitution or by statute." Utah Const. art. VII, § 5. By statute, Utah district courts are given "exclusive jurisdiction over matters relating to divorce, child custody, paternity, and child support." Department of Human Servs. v. Child Support Enforcement, 888 P.2d 690, 692 (Utah Ct.App.1994). However, the district courts' jurisdiction over child support proceedings was modified when Utah passed the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA). See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-45f-100 to -902 (2002). Congress required that all states adopt UIFSA "to further national uniformity in the enforcement of child support orders." Department of Human Servs. v. Jacoby, 1999 UT App 52,¶ 14, 975 P.2d 939.

¶ 8 UIFSA regulates the establishment, enforcement, or modification of support orders across state lines. See generally Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-45f-100 to -902. The primary purpose of UIFSA is to provide uniform child support enforcement laws between the states. See id. § 78-45f-901; Jacoby, 1999 UT App 52 at ¶ 14, 975 P.2d 939. "UIFSA is intended to `recognize that only one valid support order may be effective at any one time.'" LeTellier v. LeTellier, 40 S.W.3d 490, 493 (Tenn.2001) (quoting UIFSA, U.L.A. (1996) (prefatory notes)).

¶ 9 Utah's UIFSA confers subject matter jurisdiction upon Utah courts to modify child support orders issued by another state as long as certain conditions are met. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-45f-611 (2002). Section 78-45f-611 provides:

(1) After a child support order issued in another state has been registered in this state, the responding tribunal of this state may modify that order only if Section 78-45f-613 does not apply and after notice and hearing it finds that:
(a) the following requirements are met:
(i) the child, the individual obligee, and the obligor do not reside in the issuing state;
(ii) a petitioner who is a nonresident of this state seeks modification; and
(iii) the respondent is subject to the personal jurisdiction of the tribunal of this state.

Id. § 78-45f-611(1)(a)(i)-(iii) (emphasis added).3

¶ 10 Although Mother stated in her petition that she sought modification of the California child support order, the State, in its amicus memorandum, contends that Mother more appropriately seeks an initial order of support because the California court did not do so, but rather reserved the issue of child support. UIFSA similarly grants jurisdiction to Utah courts to establish a support order where an order otherwise entitled to recognition under UIFSA has not been issued if:

(a) the individual seeking the order resides in another state; or
(b) the support enforcement agency seeking the order is located in another state.
....
(3) Upon finding, after notice and opportunity to be heard, that an obligor owes a duty of support, the tribunal shall issue a support order directed to the obligor and may issue other orders pursuant to Section 78-45f-305.

Id. § 78-45f-401 (emphasis added). Both section 78-45f-611 and section 78-45f-401 clearly and unequivocally require that a petitioner be a nonresident of Utah in order to seek an initial order or a modification of child support under UIFSA in the State of Utah.

¶ 11 In this case, Mother and Father were divorced in California, and a California court issued the Divorce Judgment. The parties agreed at that time to reserve the issue of child support. After Father moved to Maryland and Mother moved to Utah, Mother sought a modification of the California order in a Utah court. Because she sought to modify the Divorce Judgment in Utah, the requirements of UIFSA were triggered. Whether the trial court was asked to modify the Divorce Judgment, or establish a new child support order, it lacked jurisdiction over the matter because Mother, as a resident of Utah, fails to meet the necessary requirements to establish a new support order or modify an existing order from another state. See id. §§ 78-45f-401, - 611.

¶ 12 Mother does not dispute that she does not meet the requirements of sections 78-45f-401 and 78-45f-611. Rather, she argues that those sections are inapplicable because under section 78-45f-202, the trial court obtained subject matter jurisdiction over the case by virtue of its personal jurisdiction over Father. Section 78-45f-202 reads:

A tribunal of this state exercising personal jurisdiction over a nonresident under Section 78-45f-201 may apply Section 78-45f-316 to receive evidence from another state, and Section 78-45f-318 to obtain discovery through a tribunal of another state. In all other respects, Parts 3,4,5,6, and 7 do not apply and the tribunal shall apply the procedural and substantive law of this state, including the rules on choice of law other than those established by this chapter.

Id. § 78-45f-202.

¶ 13 Mother argues that under section 78-45f-202, parts 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 of UIFSA do not apply to this case because the trial court obtained personal jurisdiction over Father. Included in parts 4 and 6 are sections 78-45f-401 and 78-45f-611, requiring the petitioner to be a nonresident. Accordingly, it is necessary to determine if section 78-45f-202 trumps the subject matter jurisdiction requirements found in sections 78-45f-401 and 78-45f-611. We conclude that the statutory language is ambiguous. Without any Utah case law on the subject, in order...

To continue reading

Request your trial
15 cases
  • Monteith v. Monteith
    • United States
    • Maine Supreme Court
    • July 27, 2021
    ...only one valid support order may be effective at any one time." (quotation marks omitted)); Ball, 123 A.3d at 723 ; Case v. Case , 103 P.3d 171, 174 (Utah Ct. App. 2004) ; Child Support Enf't Div. of Alaska v. Brenckle , 424 Mass. 214, 675 N.E.2d 390, 392 (1997). [¶5] A person may seek regi......
  • William B. v. Rachel H. (In re W.J.B)
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • December 15, 2016
    ..., and case law notes that the UIFSA allows for long-arm jurisdiction as broad as is constitutionally permitted. See, e.g. , Case v. Case , 103 P.3d 171, 175 (Utah Ct. App. 2004).¶ 35 We reject respondent's assertion that she was denied due process by the trial court's exercise of jurisdicti......
  • Monteith v. Monteith
    • United States
    • Maine Supreme Court
    • July 27, 2021
    ...that only one valid support order may be effective at any one time." (quotation marks omitted)); Ball, 123 A.3d at 723; Case v. Case, 103 P.3d 171, 174 (Utah Ct. App. 2004); Child Support Enf't Div. of Alaska v. Brenckle, 675 N.E.2d 390, 392 (Mass. 1997). [¶5] A person may seek registration......
  • Degroot v. Degroot, 06-FM-311.
    • United States
    • D.C. Court of Appeals
    • January 3, 2008
    ...Court's jurisdiction over his person. Thus, this case might properly be analyzed as a "one-state proceeding." See Case v. Case, 103 P.3d 171, 175 (Utah Ct.App.2004) ("A one-state proceeding occurs when the forum state exercises its long-arm statute to bring the nonresident within the jurisd......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT