Case v. Morrison

• Decision Date: 16 September 1948
• Docket Number: 16131.
• Citation: 118 Colo. 517,197 P.2d 621
• Parties: CASE et al. v. MORRISON et al.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

197 P.2d 621

118 Colo. 517

CASE et al. v. MORRISON et al.

No. 16131.

Supreme Court of Colorado, en Banc.

September 16, 1948

Error to District Court, City and County of Denver; W. A. Black Judge.

Proceeding by Lloyd Case and others against Walter F. Morrison, as Secretary of State of the State of Colorado, and others to review action of Secretary in striking signatures from petition for initiation of proposed constitutional amendment. To review a judgment approving the action of the Secretary plaintiffs bring error.

Judgment reversed and cause remanded with instructions.

HILLIARD and LUXFORD, JJ., dissenting.

Harry A. King and E. B. Evans, both of Denver, for plaintiffs in error.

H Lawrence Hinkley, Atty. Gen., Duke W. Dunbar Deputy Atty. Gen., and Chas. F. Cory, Asst. Atty. Gen., for Walter F. Morrison.

O. Otto Moore and Arnold R. Gilbert, both of Denver, for other defendants in error.

HAYS Justice.

This action concerns the sufficiency of a petition to initiate an amendment to the Constitution, filed by plaintiffs in error, sponsors thereof, with defendant in error Walter F. Morrison as secretary of state. After a hearing on the protest lodged against the petition by the other defendants in error, many of the subscribed names, as will more fully hereafter appear, were stricken from said petition, thereby reducing the number below that required in order that the proposed amendment be placed upon the ballot at the ensuing election. By appropriate proceedings in the district court the action of the secretary of state was approved and judgment entered accordingly. We are asked to reverse this judgment upon several grounds, only two of which we deem it necessary to consider.

By written stipulation of the parties all of the essential facts have been agreed upon.

There appeared upon said petition 56,904 signatures; it was agreed by the parties that 49,386 signatures are required in order that the measure be placed upon the ballot; 10,342 names were stricken from the petition--by the secretary and the trial court--leaving 46,562 valid signatures, which resulted in rendering the petition deficient by 2,824 signatures.

Included in the names so stricken from the petition were those of 1,210 women who signed their husband's names or initials preceded by the abbreviation 'Mrs.' rather than their individual given names. These names were stricken for the reason, as stated, that such persons did not sign the petition 'in their own proper persons only' as provied by section 1, article V, of the Constitution.

It is not claimed that said signers were not qualified electors and legal voters, and there is no showing that they could not be located or identified by the names signed. It was expressly stipulated that the objection was sustained solely because of the form in which such signatures appeared, and that 'in many instances the signature of another using the same address would appear on the same section of the petition, nexample, Mrs. G. W. Jones--1020 Emerson St., followed by G. W. Jones, 1020 Emerson St.,).'

Section 1, article V, of the Constitution, provides in part, as follows: '* * * such petition shall be signed by qualified electors in their own proper persons only, to which shall be attached the residence address of such person and the date of signing the same.'

In construing this provision we have held that the requirements thereof are fully satisfied when the petition is signed 'by a person representing himself to be identifiable by the name signed to the petition * * *.' Brownlow v. Wunsch, 103 Colo. 120, 123, 83 P.2d 775, 781.

The use by married women of the prefix 'Mrs.' with their husband's christian name or his initials, followed by his surname, as a means of identifying themselves, is quite universally recognized and constitutes a 'social custom, which so largely prevails that it may be called a general one.' Carrall v. State, 53 Neb. 431, 73 N.W. 939, 940.

In Michigan State Dental Society v. Secretary of State, 294 Mich. 503, 293 N.W. 865, 869, in determining the sufficiency of a referendum petition, the court said: 'Signatures of married women who sign their husband's given name or initials with the prefix 'Mrs.' should also be accepted. * * * Our constitution does not prescribe what form the signatures must take and, in the absence of any statute to the contrary, the prefix 'Mrs.' followed by the husband's name is sufficient.'

In Ley v. Dominguez, 212 Cal. 587, 299 P. 713, 717, the court observed what is equally pertinent here, that:

'Signatures by married women who signed what respondent clerk assumes are their husband's given names or initials, with the prefix 'Mrs.' As to these signatures the respondent found affidavits of registration executed subsequent to January 1, 1930, by persons with the same surnames as shown on the petitions, and from the same addresses. In each case, in addition to a woman being registered from the address given on the registration affidavit, there was a man with the same given name or initials as was used by the woman in signing the petitions. In other words, the situation is one where a married woman, at the time of registering, signed her own given name, as required by law, but in signing the petitions, used the given name or initials of her husband. There is nothing in the charter provisions or in the general law that requires a married woman to sign a petition of this nature with the same given name as was used by her at the time of registration. The charter merely requires that the petition be signed by registered qualified electors, and is silent as to the form the signature must take. Thus, in Conn v. City Council, 17 Cal.App. 705, 121 P. 714, 719, it was held that a person could sign a petition, using the initials of his given names, although, when he had registered, he had used his full given names.

'In this regard the respondent clerk has the duty of examining the signature on the petition and comparing it with the signature found in the registration records. This can be done by an examination of the handwriting and the surnames. The question is simply one of identity. If reasonably satisfied by such examination that the two signatures are those of the same person, they should be approved, regardless of the given name or initials that are used.'

It is made the duty of the general...